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First let me talk with this philosopher. — 
What is the cause of thunder? 
William Shakespeare, King Lear III. iv. 138-9 
  
ABSTRACT 
This dissertation focuses on the ontological underpinnings of Aristotle’s philosophy of science. 
His notion of scientific knowledge is committed to a certain kind of foundationalism, which 
recognizes essences as ultimate explanatory factors. The philosopher distinguishes between two 
kinds of essence-bearers: subjects and attributes. Our analysis of this distinction involves a study 
of Aristotle’s doctrine of ontological categories and his theory of predication. In addition, we 
specify the roles played by the essences of subjects and the essences of attributes in scientific 
explanations. As a result, Aristotle’s foundationalism amounts to the view that reality is composed 
of finite chains of explanatory connections and entities whose essences are connected to one 
another in a hierarchical structure. 
Keywords: Aristotle; science; essence; ontology; epistemology.  
 
  
RESUMO 
Esta tese dedica-se aos fundamentos ontológicos da filosofia da ciência de Aristóteles. Sua noção 
de conhecimento científico compromete-se com certo tipo de fundacionismo, que reconhece 
essências como fatores explanatórios últimos. O filósofo distingue dois tipos de portadores de 
essência: sujeitos e atributos. Nossa análise dessa distinção envolve um estudo da doutrina das 
categorias e da teoria da predicação de Aristóteles. Ademais, procuramos especificar os papéis 
desempenhados pelas essências dos sujeitos e pelas essências dos atributos em explicações 
científicas. Como resultado, temos que o fundacionismo de Aristóteles consiste na visão de que a 
realidade é composta de cadeias explanatórias finitas e entes cujas essências estão conectadas umas 
às outras em uma estrutura hierárquica. 
Palavras-chave: Aristóteles; ciência; essência; ontologia; epistemologia. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
 
 
 
We do not find anywhere in the corpus aristotelicum a systematic approach to the concept 
of knowledge in general. Perhaps such a general epistemology can be reconstructed in some way 
or another by comparing the different kinds of cognition Aristotle recognizes in many of his 
works.1 It is true that one of his treatises, the APo, focuses on the notion of , commonly 
translated as ‘knowledge’. However, unlike Plato in the Theaetetus, Aristotle, in the APo, is not 
primarily concerned with knowledge generally speaking, with its conditions of possibility, sceptical 
challenges, or other topics we classify as typically epistemological.2 Actually, the philosopher is 
interested in – as defined in APo I 2, 71b 9-12 –, the superior kind of knowledge 
that is characteristic of expert scientists.3 If the main object of the APo is scientific knowledge, we 
                                                 
1 For a useful discussion, see Bronstein (2016a, pp. 16-21).  
2 See Taylor (1990, p. 116); Ferejohn (1991, pp. 2-3). However, as we shall see, a sceptical challenge against Aristotle’s 
notion of scientific knowledge (and not knowledge in general) is addressed in APo I 3 and APo I 19-22. 
3 See Bronstein (2016a, pp. 18-20). Burnyeat (1981) argues that this use of the expression ‘ ’ corresponds to 
our notion of ‘understanding’, rather than the broader notion of ‘knowledge.’ Although I accept Burnyeat’s main 
claims, I agree with Bronstein that it is important to emphasize that ‘ ’ is a kind of knowledge (the kind of 
knowledge expert scientists possess). Thus, I prefer to translate ‘ ’ as ‘scientific knowledge’. 
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can affirm that the theory advanced in the treatise is better described as a philosophy of science 
than as a general epistemology.4 
Aristotle recognizes two basic types of scientific knowledge. On one hand, there is 
‘demonstrative knowledge’ ( ), which is provided by an argument called 
‘demonstration’ ( ). A demonstration is a deductive reasoning in which the premises 
present the cause or the explanation ( ) of the fact expressed in the conclusion.5 On the other 
hand, there is another kind of scientific knowledge called ‘comprehension’ – in Greek, ‘ ’. 
is the knowledge that scientists have of fundamental explanations, i.e. indemonstrable principles 
on which demonstrative knowledge is ultimately based. 
The existence of two kinds of scientific knowledge is crucial to Aristotle. If every 
premise in a demonstration were itself known by demonstration, the philosopher would have to 
admit one of the following two scenarios: 
(A)  The number of propositions in a demonstration is finite. However, if all scientific 
propositions are demonstrable, demonstrations have to proceed ‘in a circle and reciprocally’ 
(APo I 3, 72b 17-18), i.e. the demonstration of p includes among its premises propositions 
whose demonstration includes p among its premises. 
(B)  There is no such thing as circular demonstrations. However, if all scientific propositions 
are demonstrable, every demonstration must involve infinitely many premises (APo I 3, 72b 
7-10), i.e. p is demonstrated from different and more basic premises, whose demonstrations 
involve different and even more basic premises, and so on ad infinitum. 
In APo I 3, Aristotle rejects both of these scenarios. Scenario (A) is denied on the grounds that 
circular ‘demonstrations’ are not properly explanatory. For him, the relation ‘…being explanatory 
of…’ is asymmetrical: if a proposition p1 is explanatory of p2 (and p1 is a premise from which p2 is 
demonstrated), p2 is not explanatory of p1 (and therefore cannot be a premise from which p1 is 
demonstrated).6 Scenario (B) is also rejected because an infinite set of premises cannot be surveyed 
with thought.7 Aristotle avoids circularity, on one hand, and infinite regress, on the other, by 
rejecting the common assumption underlying (A) and (B), namely, that all scientific propositions 
                                                 
4 Cf. Ferejohn (1991, p. 2-3), who argues that none of the nomenclatures fully applies to Aristotle’s theory.  
5 I shall use the word ‘cause’ to translate Aristotle’s notion of ‘ ’ with the consciousness that we should not conflate 
the concept Aristotle has in mind with the modern (humean) notion of cause. 
6  According to Aristotle, ‘an explanation is prior to what it is explanatory of’ ( , APo II 
16, 98b 17) and priority is an asymmetrical relation (Cat. 12, 14ª 29-35; 14b 11-22; Metaph. V 11, 1019a 1-4; VII 10, 1034b 
30-32; 1035b 6-7). See also APo I 3, 72b 25-73a 20; APr II 16. 
7 APo I 3, 72b 7-15; I 22, 82b 37- 83a 1; 83b 6-7, 83b 32 - 84a 6. 
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are demonstrable. For him, demonstrative knowledge relies on noetic knowledge of 
indemonstrable premises. 
Given this picture, it is easy to see how the theory advanced in the APo has been taken 
as a form of ‘foundationalism’.8 In the following chapters, I attempt to clarify the main aspects of 
Aristotle’s theory of demonstration and try to specify in what sense it can be taken as a 
foundationalist doctrine. My primary aim is to show how Aristotle’s foundationalism is deeply 
rooted in metaphysical views involving concepts such as cause, essence, and predication. 
In Chapter 1, I discuss in detail the common view that Aristotle endorses some form 
of foundationalism. Without disputing the nomenclature, I argue that his ‘foundationalism’ should 
not be taken as a rationalist theory of epistemic justification, as if the first principles of science 
could be known as such independently of their explanatory connections to other propositions. On 
the contrary, knowing first principles as such involves knowing them as explanatory of demonstrable 
facts. As a result, we can affirm (or so I shall argue) that noetic and demonstrative knowledge are 
in a sense interdependent cognitive states. In addition, the relation between and 
 elucidates in which way definitions are first principles for Aristotle. The philosopher 
distinguishes definitional sentences as mere accounts of meaning (or nominal definitions) from 
definitions as accounts of essence (or real definitions). Real definitions are ‘accounts displaying the 
reason why’ (APo II 10, 93b 39), which, in virtue of their explanatory content, play the role of first 
principles in demonstrative sciences. In other words, Aristotle’s ‘foundationalism’ consists in 
recognizing essences as ultimate explanations, which makes his essentialism one of the most 
important ontological underpinnings of his philosophy of science. 
Chapter 2 focuses on another topic closely related to what is discussed in Chapter 1: 
the interdependence between defining and explaining. I shall follow part of the secondary literature 
and argue that defining and explaining are interdependent scientific practices.9 For Aristotle, we 
cannot know the essence of something independently of the explanatory role it plays in 
demonstrations. This means that the acquisition of definitions intrinsically involves the act of 
explaining demonstrable facts. According to Aristotle, real definitions are made clear through 
demonstrations (APo II 8, 93b 17-18) and are described as demonstrations ‘differing in 
arrangement’ (APo II 10, 94a 2). These definitions are isomorphic to demonstrative syllogisms: 
thunder is defined as a certain noise in the clouds caused by extinction of fire; we acquire this 
definition by explaining syllogistically that the kind of noise we call ‘thunder’ (major term) occurs 
in the clouds (minor term) in virtue of fire being extinguished (middle term).  
                                                 
8 See Irwin (1988, pp. 130-1); Ferejohn (1991, pp. 4-5; 2009, p. 66); Goldin (2013); Zuppolini (2014b; 2016). 
9 The most prominent defence of this view is in Charles (2000). See also Kung (1977); Charles (2010b, pp. 268-328); 
Williams & Charles (2013); Peramatzis (2011, pp. 180-188; 2013); Koslicki (2012); Angioni (2014c; 2016). 
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At the end of this chapter, I address a long-standing question, recently revived in the 
literature.10 In different passages of APo II, Aristotle affirms that the middle term captures the 
essence (or the causal part of the essence) of the major term11: extinction of fire (middle term) is 
the causal element in the definition of thunder (major term) and explains why it belongs to the 
clouds (minor term). However, demonstrable attributes are described by Aristotle as ‘per se 
accidents’ ( ), which are defined as predicates belonging to a subject ‘in itself’ 
( ), but not as a part of its ‘essence’ ( ).12 Many interpreters think that, by characterizing 
demonstrable attributes as per se accidents, Aristotle wants to stress that science deals with 
properties that are peculiar to their subjects and belong to them in virtue of the subjects being what 
they are. In other words, demonstrable attributes are non-essential properties that follow from and 
are explained by the essence of their subjects. Thus, the reader of the APo is entitled to ask: is the 
middle term the definition of the major (attribute) or the minor term (subject)? I shall not present 
my solution to this problem until Chapter 5. 
The debate about whether the explanation of a demonstrable fact is the essence of the 
attribute or the essence of the subject requires a fine-grained analysis of the distinction between 
subjects and attributes. In Chapter 3, I reconstruct a sophisticated and complex proof presented 
by Aristotle in APo I 19-22. An important part of his proof consists of a theory of predication 
involving the doctrine of ontological categories. Thus, a close examination of these chapters helps 
us understand the distinction between subjects and attributes and the constraints it imposes on 
scientific discourse. But there is a reason to consider the proof in its entirety. Its main purpose is 
to show how a demonstrative science is protected against the threat of infinite regress if it adopts 
the syllogistic as its underlying logic and regulates its use with certain ontological-semantical 
principles. If so, we can take Aristotle’s argumentation in APo I 19-22 as a metaphysically loaded 
defence of his foundationalism. 
The topic of predication is further examined in Chapter 4, in which I analyse the four 
senses of ‘ ’ (‘in itself’ or ‘per se’) distinguished in APo I 4. Far from being just linguistic 
relations between terms (as it is usually thought), I argue that the four uses of ‘in itself’ presuppose 
a hierarchical organization of the different kinds of entities in a scientific domain, in which the 
ontological priority of subjects over attributes plays an important role. The first use of ‘in itself’ (per 
se1) covers all essential predicates of all kinds of essence-bearers (subjects and attributes). The 
second (per se2) presupposes the distinction between prior and posterior essence-bearers (subjects 
and attributes, respectively), the former being defined without mentioning the latter, but not the 
                                                 
10 Ferejohn (2013, p. 149-155); Angioni (2014c, pp. 103-107); Bronstein (2015; 2016a, pp.48-50). 
11 See APo II 8, 93b 6; 12; II 16, 98b 21-24; II 17 99a 21-22, 25-26. 
12 Metaph. V 30, 1025a 10-34. 
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other way around. The third use (per se3) applies precisely to the primary essence-bearers, which are 
what they are independently of being predicated of something different. Finally, the fourth sense 
of ‘in itself’ (per se4) is used to identify the appropriate subjects of demonstrable attributes from an 
explanatory point of view. In addition, I discuss some of the most prominent views on the notion 
of ‘per se accident’ available in the secondary literature and offer my own interpretation of this 
concept. 
In Chapter 5, I propose an interpretation of APo II 16-17. In these chapters, Aristotle 
claims that there cannot be more than one explanans for the same scientific explanandum. However, 
this seems to be true only for ‘primary-universal’ ( ) demonstrations, in which the 
major term belongs to the minor ‘in itself’ and the middle term is coextensive with the extremes. 
If so, several explananda we would like to admit as truly scientific would be out of the scope of an 
Aristotelian science. The secondary literature has identified a second problem in II 16-17, which 
we previously discuss at the end of our Chapter 2 : the middle term of a demonstration is sometimes 
taken as the definition of the minor term (the subject), other times as the definition (or the causal 
part of the definition) of the major (the demonstrable attribute). I shall argue that Aristotle’s 
solution to the first problem involves showing that certain problematic attributes, which appear to 
admit more than one explanation, actually fall into the privileged scenario of primary-universal 
demonstrations. In addition, his solution suggests a conciliatory way-out to the second problem 
(or so I shall argue): the existence of an attribute as a definable unity depends on its subject having 
the essence it has, which indicates that both the essence of subjects and the essence of 
demonstrable attributes can play explanatory roles in demonstrations. 
Finally, in Chapter 6, I argue against the view that the essence of subjects constitutes 
an exception to the interdependence between defining and explaining. By analysing passages from 
Metaph. VII 17 and VIII 2-4, I try to show how the model applied to attributes and processes in 
APo II 8-10 works for subjects as well. The chapter includes a brief discussion of Aristotle’s 
hylomorphism. After all, his theory of form and matter is what allows him to extend to subject-
kinds the picture advanced in APo II 8-10. In addition, I shall argue that the interdependence 
between defining and explaining holds good even for subjects that are not analysable as compounds 
of form and matter: despite not being isomorphic to a demonstrative syllogism, the essence of an 
unanalysable subject cannot be known as such if it is not perceived as explanatory of the subject’s 
demonstrable properties. 
In all these six chapters, we can see Aristotle offering general principles that (he 
believes) can be used by expert scientists in their specific fields. However, those guidelines should 
apply to all scientific domains independently of their differences and peculiarities. My aim is to 
17 
 
clarify how Aristotle’s general metaphysics (which he believes to be true for all domains of reality) 
helps him to accomplish this task. Therefore, this dissertation can be regarded as an attempt to 
reconstruct the ontological framework associated with Aristotle’s philosophy of science. 
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CHAPTER 1 
ARISTOTLE’S FOUNDATIONALISM 
 
 
 
 
 
1.1 – Scientific Knowledge: Demonstration, Comprehension, and Foundationalism 
Aristotle begins the APo with the following general statement: ‘all teaching and all 
learning of all intellectual kind proceed from pre-existing knowledge’ (APo I 1, 71a 1-2).13 The 
philosopher notes that, when intellectual learning is provided by an argument, either deductive or 
inductive, we learn the conclusion when we have previous knowledge of the premises (APo I 2, 71a 
5-9). In the APo, Aristotle focuses on a preeminent kind of learning which produces what he calls 
‘demonstrative knowledge’ ( ). Such knowledge is acquired by demonstration 
( ), a deductive argument in which the premises present the explanatory factor ( ) in 
virtue of which the conclusion is the case. A full-fledged demonstration provides understanding 
‘without qualification’ ( ), which differs from the mere pretence of knowledge labelled as 
‘sophistic’ ( ) or ‘incidental’ ( ): 
[T1] 
 
                                                 
13 All quotations of the APo come from Barnes (1993). Eventual modifications are indicated. 
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We think we understand something without qualification (and not in the 
sophistical way, incidentally) when we think we know of the cause because 
of which something holds that it is its cause, and also that it is not possible 
for it to be otherwise [APo I 2, 71b 9-12; Barnes 1993, with changes]. 
Aristotle also affirms that demonstrative knowledge is one of the (apparently two)14 
types of ‘understanding without qualification’ ( ): ‘whether there is another type 
of scientific knowledge we shall say later: here we assert that we do know things through 
demonstrations’ (APo I 2, 71b 16-17). Although Aristotle is primarily concerned with demonstrative 
knowledge in the APo, the other kind of  whose existence is implied in this passage 
is relevant to assessing the overall picture of his philosophy of science. As a result of intellectual 
learning, demonstrative knowledge is based on previous knowledge, which means that, if the 
ordered pair ⟨Π, c⟩ is a demonstration – where Π is a set of premises and c is the conclusion –, 
the knowledge of c is based on the knowledge of the members of Π, p1, p2, … , pn. However, if 
the knowledge of each pi is itself demonstrative, there should be, for each pi, a subset of Π, Π’, 
such that ⟨Π’, pi⟩ would the demonstration of pi. In that case, either each pi would never be a 
member of Π’ – that is to say, every premise would be demonstrated from different and more 
basic premises – or ⟨Π, c⟩ would involve circular explanations. In APo I 3, Aristotle takes both 
alternatives as problematic. In the first case, the set Π would be infinite and Aristotle believes that 
a demonstration with an unlimited set of premises is impossible simply because we could not survey 
it with thought.15 The alternative, however, is not better, since Aristotle does not recognize any 
demonstrative value in circular proofs (see APo I 3, 72b 25-73a 20; APr II 16). 
The two horns of this (apparent) dilemma relates to two epistemological views 
Aristotle rejects in APo I 3. One of them admits the possibility of scientific knowledge by accepting 
circular explanations as authentic demonstrations. The other view is sceptical about the possibility 
of demonstrative knowledge on the grounds that demonstrating would be a process that leads to 
infinite regress. Aristotle believes that both views rely on the false assumption that every type of 
knowledge is demonstrative and offers a solution that has been described as a form of 
‘foundationalism.’16 If ⟨Π, c⟩ is a demonstration, the set Π is finite, there being a subset of Π, Π’, 
such that, whereas all the members of Π’ are indemonstrable, all the other premises in Π (and 
consequently c) are directly or indirectly demonstrated from them.17 In APo I 2, Aristotle had 
already anticipated his solution by affirming that all demonstrations proceed from ‘items which are 
                                                 
14 The other kind of knowledge in question is called ‘ .’ For a convincing argument that the definition of 
 in T1 applies to noetic knowledge as well, see Bronstein (2016a, pp. 51-57). See also Bronstein (2012, p. 34). 
15 APo I 3, 72b 7-15; I 22, 82b 37- 83a 1; 83b 6-7, 83b 32 - 84a 6. 
16 See Irwin (1988, pp. 130-1); Ferejohn (1991, pp. 4-5; 2009, p. 66); Goldin (2013); Zuppolini (2014b; 2016). 
17 APo I 3, 72b 18-25; I 19, 82a 2-9; I 22, 83b 24-84b 2. 
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true and primitive and immediate and more familiar than and prior to and explanatory of the 
conclusion’ (APo I 2, 71b 19-22). Although these basic premises are indemonstrable (APo I 2, 71b 
26-7), we do have knowledge of them ‘without qualification’ by a cognitive state Aristotle calls 
‘comprehension’ ( , APo II 19, 100b 5-17).18 Therefore, the nature of is two-
fold not without reason. Working with those two kinds of scientific knowledge (noetic and 
demonstrative) is what enables Aristotle to sustain his foundationalist project. 
After these general considerations on the nature of knowledge and demonstration in 
APo I 1-3, Aristotle moves on to present a an abstract model or paradigm of demonstrative knowledge 
(with its own ontological framework, semantic principles, and formal features) whose feasibility is 
meant to show that the foundationalist enterprise is possible and worth pursuing.19  Because it 
produces knowledge by means of arguments of a certain sort, demonstrative sciences should adopt 
an appropriate set of rules of inferences to underlie its argumentation. To play the role of 
underlying logic in his abstract model, Aristotle selects the formal system developed in APr, the 
Syllogistic.20 Thus, in an Aristotelian demonstration ⟨Π, c⟩, each element of Π and c are phrased 
– or at least susceptible to being phrased – in one of the four syllogistic categorical sentences: 
Universal Affirmative: P holds of all S (henceforth, ‘PaS’) 
Particular Affirmative: P holds of some S (‘PiS’) 
Universal Negative: P holds of no S (‘PeS’) 
Particular Negative: P holds not of every S (‘PoS’) 
In addition, an Aristotelian demonstration is made of one or more syllogistic inferences, in which 
a pair of categorical premises sharing a common term (the middle term) entails another categorical 
sentence with the remaining two terms (the major and the minor extremes); an inference in Barbara, 
for instance, could be represented as follows: 
PaM, MaS  P holds of all M, M holds of all S 
 PaS             P holds of all S 
                                                 
18 It is worth noting that in APo II 19 (and also in I 3, 72b 18-25) the term ‘ ’ refers to a narrower notion that 
excludes the knowledge of first principles. In these passages, ‘ ’ is described not as ‘ ’ but as ‘
.’ 
19 Cf. Ferejohn (2013, p. 81) who describes his overall interpretation of the APo as showing that ‘there is a major break 
between the opening three chapters (A 1-3) – where Aristotle develops a set of general pre-theoretical constraints on 
the possession of scientific knowledge – and the remainder of the book, beginning in chapter A 4, in which he sets out 
his own (syllogistic based) theory of demonstration designed specifically to satisfy these constraints.’ See also Ferejohn 
(1991; 2013, p. 65). I would like to point out that I take the constraints formulated in APo I 1-3 as concerning scientific 
knowledge (and not knowledge generally speaking), with its characteristic explanatory content, understood in the strong 
and restrictive terms I am going to propose in rest of this chapter. 
20 For a defence of the view that the Syllogistic is not a logical theory, but an underlying logic, and that syllogisms are 
not conditionals, but arguments, see Smiley (1973); Corcoran (1974a; 1974c); Smith (1989); Ribeiro (2011, pp. 14-15); 
Ferreira (2012, pp. 65-68); Weinmann (2014, pp. 4-5). For the opposite view, see Łukasiewicz (1957); Patzig (1968).  
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Several interpreters objected to the presence of Aristotle’s Syllogistic in his theory of 
demonstration by arguing that the logic of the APr is too limited to apply to actual scientific cases, 
which would explain why it was ignored by scientists of his time – including, according to some of 
these interpreters, Aristotle himself.21 One may reply to these critics by pointing out shortcomings 
either in their interpretations of the Syllogistic or in their understanding of Aristotle’s scientific 
practice.22 However, there is a sense in which these criticisms are clearly out of place. Once we take 
the Syllogistic as part of a model or a paradigm meant to illustrate the nature of demonstrative 
knowledge in general, it becomes neither necessary nor desirable to assume that the APo require 
all scientists to adopt the Syllogistic as their underlying logic, as if knowledge ‘without qualification’ 
were not possible without this specific formal apparatus.23 In fact, one may argue that Aristotle had 
good reasons to select a particular logical system for his model of science. In order to come to 
know c based on a set of premises Π, we need not only to know that the premises are true, but 
also to be familiar with the rules of inference that allow us to obtain c from Π. Therefore, 
elaborating and selecting a particular deductive system would be a helpful way of exemplifying what 
kind of knowledge and skills are involved in the process of learning ‘by demonstration’ (APo I 18, 
81a39-40). 
It is far from clear, however, how exactly Aristotle thinks we can acquire knowledge 
through demonstrations. As we shall see in the next section, depending on how this process of 
learning is specified, Aristotle’s solution to the dilemma of APo I 3 can be seriously misinterpreted, 
rendering his foundationalist model of science inconsistent and unattractive. 
                                                 
21 See, for instance, Barnes (1981); Leslz (1981); Harari (2004, pp. 87-116); McKirahan (1992, p. 150). I do not intend 
to deal with the problem of whether Aristotle created the syllogistic before or after the development of the core theses 
of his theory of demonstration. About the topic, see Solmsen (1929); Ross (1939); Barnes (1981); Smith (1982a); Smith 
(1982b). 
22 See Gotthelf (1987); Lennox (1987, pp. 118-119); Ribeiro (2011, pp. 23-31; 2014); Angioni (2014b); Zuppolini 
(2014b). 
23 See Ferejohn (1991; 2013, p. 65; p. 81). Even though the notion of syllogism is present in APo I 2 (71b 16-18; 72a 
15), I believe this chapter is primarily concerned with general requirements on the possession of scientific knowledge, 
which can be met by sciences that eventually adopt alternative underlying logics. Angioni (2012) argues that the 
requirements introduced in APo I 2, 71b 20-33 already presuppose the syllogistic structure of demonstrations. 
Previously, I have myself defended that at least the ‘immediacy’ criterion brings Aristotle’s Syllogistic to the context of 
71b 20-33. See my Zuppolini (2014b, pp. 187-188); see also Smith (1986; 2009, p. 53); McKirahan (1992, p. 25); Barnes 
(1993, p. 94). I no longer think that it is necessary to read the passage in this way, mainly because Aristotle clarifies the 
notion of ‘immediacy’ in terms of ‘priority’ in 72a 7-8, not in terms of absence of syllogistic middle terms. Of course, 
in Aristotle’s model of demonstrative science, ‘immediacy’ amounts to the absence of an explanatory middle term, which 
might explain why he uses the expression ‘immediate syllogistic principle’ in 71a 14. However, this does not mean that, 
for Aristotle, only sciences that adopt the Syllogistic as their underlying logic can meet the requirements listed in 71b 
20-33. Nevertheless, I shall argue in Chapter 5 that the Syllogistic is not a random choice of Aristotle: syllogistic 
inferences always involve three terms, which makes them adequate to capture causal relations, which Aristotle takes to 
be triadic – i.e. they involve a cause, an attribute of which it is cause ( ) and a subject for which it is cause ( ). 
This is what Lucas Angioni calls ‘the triadic structure’ of scientific explanations. For a systematic discussion of this 
notion – to which I am very much indebted – see Angioni (2008, pp. 328ff.; 2012; 2013; 2014b; 2014c; 2016). For 
similar approaches, see Charles (2000, pp. 204-209); Ribeiro (2011, pp. 7-31; 2014). 
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1.2 – A Rationalist Interpretation of Aristotle’s Foundationalism 
According to the common contemporary view, someone learns something through an 
argument ⟨Π, c⟩ when, without previously knowing c to be true, she finds it to be true by (i) 
knowing in advance that the premises in Π are true and (ii) realizing that c is a logical consequence 
of Π. Naturally, this view has been imputed to Aristotle and his theory of demonstration: 
Aristotle presented a general truth-and-consequence conception of 
demonstration meant to apply to all demonstrations. According to him, a 
demonstration, which normally proves a conclusion not previously known 
to be true, is an extended argumentation beginning with premises known 
to be truths and containing a chain of reasoning showing by deductively 
evident steps that its conclusion is a consequence of its premises 
[Corcoran 2009, p. 1]. 
In the same vein, some interpreters believed that Aristotle’s foundationalism implies that the 
indemonstrable principles of sciences are self-evident premises whose truth is known by non-
inferential procedures and from which the scientist infers and therefore learns other propositions 
not previously known to be true.24 This interpretation of Aristotle’s foundationalism might seem 
congenial to the fact that, in his theory, demonstrations proceed from definitions:25 
[T2]
Again, the principles of demonstrations are definitions, and it has been 
proved earlier that there will not be demonstrations of principles – either 
the principles will be demonstrable and there will be principles of 
principles, and this will continue ad infinitum, or else the primitives will be 
indemonstrable definitions [APo II 3, 90b 24-7; Barnes 1993]. 
Certain definitional statements (usually called ‘nominal definitions’) are meant to fix the meaning 
of the terms of scientific discourse. Such statements can be described as analytic and knowable a 
priori. Hence, their status as first principles would rely primarily on self-evidence. According to this 
view, the intuitive knowledge we have of propositions of this kind is what Aristotle calls ‘ ’, 
from which  is (deductively) derived. Since these are the only kinds of 
knowledge ‘without qualification’, it is easy to understand why Aristotle was once seen as ‘the 
                                                 
24 See, for instance, Scholz (1975); Irwin (1988, pp. 130-131); Frede (1996). 
25 See also APo I 2, 72a 14-24; I 8, 75b 30-1; I 33, 89a 16-9; II 3, 90b 30-3; APo II 8, 93b 6-7, 12; II 17, 99a 3-5, 21-6.  
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paradigm of an extreme rationalist’, who would recognise a posteriori truths as knowable (if at all) 
‘only in a debased sense of knowledge.’26 
However, if this is the process of intellectual learning by which we acquire 
demonstrative knowledge, Aristotle’s foundationalist project seems blatantly inconsistent. As we 
saw, if ⟨Π, c⟩ is a demonstration, the set of premises Π reveals the appropriate explanation of the 
conclusion c. However, the philosopher believes we cannot start pursuing the explanans without 
knowing in advance that the corresponding explanandum is true (see APo II 1-2). Thus, how could 
a demonstration ⟨Π, c⟩ enable us to learn c in the first place if knowing that c is true is a necessary 
condition for investigating the very explanation the set Π is expected to display?27 
The apparent inadequacy of Aristotle’s account seems to lie with his assumption that 
the explanans is presented by the premises of a demonstration, whereas the explanandum is found in 
the conclusion. In fact, this seems to violate our modern intuitions about how knowledge of causal 
or explanatory relations is acquired. For instance, modern philosophers of science such as Charles 
Peirce distinguish between three kinds of arguments:28 
Deduction: 
All the beans from this bag are white, These beans are from this bag 
These beans are white 
Induction: 
These beans are from this bag, These beans are white 
All the beans from this bag are white 
Abduction: 
All the beans from this bag are white, These beans are white 
These beans are from this bag 
In a deductive argument such as the one formulated above, the premises state a general rule (all 
the beans from this bag are white) and a case under the rule (these beans are from this bag), whereas 
the conclusion is obtained by applying the general rule to the particular case (these beans are 
white).29 Inductive arguments, on the other hand, obtain a general rule (all the beans from this bag 
are white) from a number of cases of which certain facts are simultaneously true (these beans are 
                                                 
26 Frede (1996, pp. 157-158). 
27 Barnes (1969, p. 146); Burnyeat (1981, pp. 116-117). For a clarifying exposition of the problem, see Bronstein (2014, 
p. 13; 2016a, pp. 32-33). 
28 See Peirce (Collected Papers; 2. 622-623) 
29 See Peirce (Collected Papers; 2. 620). 
24 
 
from this bag, these beans are white). Finally, abduction is a kind of reasoning that could be 
described as ‘the process of forming explanatory hypotheses’30 or as ‘inference to the best 
explanation.’31 Suppose we find a handful of white beans on a table next to a bag of beans, knowing, 
in addition, that all the beans from this bag are white. In that case, we are inclined to infer that the 
beans lying on the table came from the bag simply because this conclusion, if true, would best 
explain why these beans are white. Thus, abductive inferences produce causal knowledge insofar 
as the conclusions are explanatory of one or more of their premises. In the APo, on the other hand, 
the premises are explanatory of the conclusion and not the other way around, which seems to 
invert the order in which arguments are supposed to produce knowledge of causal relations. 
This picture explains why the interpretation advanced by Jonathan Barnes (1969) has 
been so influential. Barnes argued that the APo are not meant to describe how scientists acquire 
knowledge, nor does it intend to account for scientific research. Instead, ‘the theory of 
demonstration offers a formal account of how an achieved body of knowledge should be presented 
and taught’ (Barnes 1969, p. 147). This solution is attractive. Without violating our intuitions about 
how causal knowledge is acquired, it explains why it is possible to learn things ‘by demonstration’: 
demonstrative arguments do not reflect the order in which the expert scientist reaches his 
explanations, but the order in which she imparts these explanations to her pupils. 
However, if demonstrating were essentially a pedagogic procedure, it would not be 
good one. Aristotle makes it clear that the premises of a demonstration are more familiar and prior 
to the conclusion precisely because they are explanatory of it (APo I 2, 71b 31-2). In this context, 
the explanatory priority of the premises corresponds to what Aristotle describes as priority ‘by 
nature’. However, what is prior and more familiar ‘by nature’ ( ), says he, is not the same as 
what is prior and more familiar ‘to us’ ( , APo I 2, 71b 33- 72a 5). The premises of a 
demonstration are not more familiar and prior to the conclusion in the sense of being obviously 
true and more likely to be accepted by someone who is not yet an expert on the subject in question. 
They are prior and more familiar ‘by nature’ insofar as they display the cause of the fact expressed 
in the conclusion – see ‘ ’ in APo I 2, 71b 31 –, a cause that not even the expert knows 
from the start, but grasps only after a complex procedure of inquiry. In other words, what counts 
as an  for Aristotle is (causally) prior to the phenomenon it explains independently of the way 
the phenomenon was discovered in the first place. 
To some extent, this is a problem of philosophical vocabulary. Foundationalism is 
usually depicted as a theory of how knowledge and true beliefs are justified, whereas Aristotelian 
                                                 
30 Peirce (Collected Papers; 5.172). 
31 Harman (1965). 
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explanations cannot be confounded with mere justification. Mere justifications provide answers to 
questions such as ‘why do I believe that p?’. Aristotelian explanations, on the other hand, are meant 
to answer the question ‘why is it the case that p?’32 In order to justify my belief in a proposition p, 
all I need is to set out the reasons why I believe in p. On the other hand, for Aristotle, to present 
the  of p is to identify a real-world item that is responsible for p being true (instead of being 
responsible for my belief that p is true).33 Premises that are explanatory in this strong sense are 
certainly not self-evident or knowable a priori. Therefore, when interpreted according to the 
rationalist approach depicted above, Aristotle’s foundationalism becomes incompatible with his 
own concept of explanation. If his solution to the dilemma of APo I 3 is to be labelled as a form 
of foundationalism at all, it seems preferable to specify what kind of foundationalism it is not in 
terms of justification, but in terms of causal explanations. 
1.3 – Coming to Know First Principles: A Non-Rationalist Account 
The acquisition of first principles is the topic of the very last chapter of the APo. In II 
19, Aristotle identifies ‘the state that knows’ ( , 99b 18) the principles with , 
which is characterised as the most ‘accurate’ of our cognitive states (100b 5-14). One of Aristotle’s 
aims in the chapter is to address the following puzzle: 
[T3]
… …
I have said earlier that you cannot understand anything through a 
demonstration unless you know the primitive immediate principles. As for 
knowledge of the immediates, one might wonder […] whether the states, 
not being present in us, come about in us or rather are present in us 
without being noticed. It is absurd to suppose that we possess such states; 
for then we should possess pieces of knowledge more accurate than 
demonstration without its being noticed. But if we get them without 
possessing them earlier, how could we come to acquire knowledge and to 
learn except from pre-existing knowledge? This is impossible, as I said in 
connection with demonstration [APo II 19, 99b 20-30; Barnes 1993, with 
changes]. 
                                                 
32 See Goldin (2013, p. 200). 
33 See my Zuppolini (2014b, pp. 178-179; 2016). On the difference between justification and explanation, see Burnyeat 
(1981, p. 101); Goldin (2013, p. 200); Salmieri (2014, pp. 2-3). For other interpretations that claim or assume that this 
is the notion of explanation present in Aristotle’s theory of demonstration, see Kosman (1973); Matthen (1981); Taylor 
(1990, p. 120); McKirahan (1992, pp. 209-31); Lesher (2001, p. 46); Charles (2000); Angioni (2007a; 2012; 2013; 2014b; 
2014c; 2016); Bronstein (2012; 2014; 2015; 2016a). 
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Aristotle discusses two alternative hypotheses about the origin of our knowledge of first principles: 
either (i) it is already present in us without being noticed ( , 99b25-26) or (ii) it 
‘comes about’ ( , 99b 25) in us somehow. It is worth stressing that Aristotle does not 
consider the possibility of first principles being available to us from the beginning, as if they were 
self-evident propositions we could know without any heuristic procedure being required. On the 
contrary, if they are known to us at all – as in alternative (i) – we are not completely aware of them 
(along the lines of Plato’s theory of recollection).34
Aristotle rejects alternative (i) on the grounds that such an ‘accurate’ cognitive state – 
even more accurate than demonstrative knowledge (99b 27) – could not be present in us without 
us noticing them. As stated in hypothesis (ii), comprehension ( ) must ‘come about’ in us, which 
in this context implies that first principles are acquired by a process of learning ( , 99b 
29). Since there cannot be learning except from pre-existing knowledge (99b 28-30) – as the very 
first sentence of the APo makes it clear (APo I 1, 71a 1-2) –, ‘the state that knows’ first principles is 
not a fundamental cognitive state in the sense of not being based on previous knowledge of any 
kind. This pre-existing knowledge, however, cannot be ‘more valuable (…) in respect of accuracy’ 
(99b 33-340) than , since is the most accurate of all cognitive states. Therefore, the task 
Aristotle takes on in APo II 19 is to indicate a state or capacity that, despite being less accurate than 
comprehension or demonstration, can at least initiate the process that leads us towards these 
superior forms of knowledge.35 
Aristotle goes on to claim that this initial state is a ‘connate discriminatory capacity’ 
( ) known as ‘perception’ ( , 99b 34-35). As an innate capacity, 
perception does not come from pre-existing knowledge nor is it a result of intellectual learning 
( ). Therefore, the principle stated in the opening lines of the APo no longer 
threatens Aristotle’s theory with infinite regress, since it does not apply to the capacity that initiates 
scientific inquiry. However, a feature common to all animals such as perception (99b 34) is certainly 
not enough to give rise to a sophisticated form of knowledge such as , which means the 
acquisition of first principles requires co-operation of other capacities. First, Aristotle recognises 
‘memory’ ( ) as indispensable to the process, since the information gathered by perception 
must be retained in our souls in some way (100a 3-4). Second, several memories of the same thing 
                                                 
34 Some interpreters take hypothesis (i) as referring to Platonic innatism. See Barnes (1993, p. 261); Bronstein (2012, 
pp. 38-39; 2016a, p. 234; 2016b). 
35 This description of Aristotle’s aim in APo II 19 follows in general lines the interpretation advanced by Bronstein 
(2012; 2016a, pp. 225-247), who argues convincingly that the philosopher does not intend in this chapter to specify all 
the steps involved in the acquisition of first principles, but to defend that our knowledge of them originates in 
perception. Cf. Kahn (1981). However, my interpretation is significantly different from his when it comes to the role 
of induction in the acquisition of first principles, as will become clear soon.   
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must be collected and compared with one another, which is made possible by a capacity Aristotle 
calls ‘experience’ ( , 100a 4-6).36 Experience, in turn, allows us to grasp what Aristotle calls 
‘the entire universal’ ( , 100a 6-7).37 At some point, this process ends up with the 
acquisition of  (100b 12-14) – or, as it is called in this passage, a ‘principle of knowledge’ (
, 100a 8; cf. 100b 12-14). 
We might think that, by tracing the acquisition of first principles back to perception, 
Aristotle prevents us from understanding his theory of demonstration along the lines of the 
rationalist interpretation sketched in the previous section. However, the capacities discussed in 
99b34-100b5 can be understood as parts of a process of concept-formation.38 If so, the proponent 
of the rationalist interpretation might argue that the first principles we grasp by the end of this 
process are nothing more than propositions specifying the meaning of conceptual terms to be used 
in scientific discourse. 
This reasoning is a non sequitur. From the fact that perception, memory and experience 
might be relevant to concept-formation it does not follow that the first principles of science are a 
priori self-evident propositions or that is nothing more than an intuitive grasp of the meaning 
of conceptual terms.39 In this chapter, Aristotle is primarily engaged in the task of identifying an 
innate capacity that is not based on pre-existing knowledge and therefore can serve as a starting 
point in our journey towards higher forms of cognition. As has been argued, there might well be 
further steps between the last stages described in 99b34-100b5 and the noetic knowledge of first 
principles, a gap Aristotle did not attempt to fill in APo II 19.40 Therefore, it is not safe to conclude, 
only based on APo II 19, that the grasp of first principles is nothing more than a process of concept-
formation. 
Moreover, Aristotle claims that induction ( ) is the kind of inference 
underlying the process by which we get from perception to the grasp of ‘the entire universal’ (100b 
4-5; with 100a 6-7). Therefore, it plays an important role in the acquisition of the first principles of 
science ( , 100b 3-4).41 It is certainly true that inductive reasoning is part of the process of 
                                                 
36 See Metaph. I 1, 980b 28-982a 1. Cf. Ferejohn (2009, p. 69), who characterises experience as ‘the ability to classify 
retained percepts into general kinds.’ For a detailed discussion of this notion, see Hasper & Yurdin (2014). 
37 I shall set aside the question of whether ‘the grasp of the universal’ is intrinsic to experience (see Ross 1949, p. 674; 
Barnes 1993, p. 264) or a further, independent step in the acquisition of first principles (see McKirahan 1992, p. 243; 
Bronstein 2012, pp. 44-46; 2016a, pp. 237-240). 
38 See Barnes (1993, pp. 264-265); Ross (1949, pp. 675-676). Cf. Kahn (1981, pp. 391-395); McKirahan (1992, p. 246); 
Charles (2000, p. 264, n. 37); Bronstein (2012, p. 58, n. 67; 2016a, p. 246, n. 63 ). 
39 Lesher (1973, p. 61). 
40 See Kahn (1981, pp. 396-397); Bronstein (2012; 2016a, pp. 225-247). 
41 In order to avoid the consequence that induction is all it takes to know the first principles, Bronstein (2012, pp. 53-
54; 2016a, p. 242) argues that ‘ ’ in 100b 4 denotes something else – in his words, ‘first universals’ and 
‘preliminary accounts’. However, in APo II 19, 100b 3-4, the dative ‘ ’ does not necessarily mean that induction 
is sufficient for coming to know the items Aristotle calls ‘ .’ Therefore, it is possible to interpret ‘ ’ as 
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concept-formation. However, this is not the only, nor the most important role it plays in scientific 
inquiry.42 Aristotle seems to have recognised this fact in APr II 23, where he offers a sophisticated 
account of the kinds of reasoning involved in the discovery of scientific explanations. Contrary to 
expectations, his account is significantly close to the one proposed by contemporary philosophers 
of science: 
[T4]
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Induction, then – that is, a deduction from induction – is deducing one 
extreme to belong to the middle through the other extreme, for example, 
if B is the middle for A and C, proving A to belong to B by means of C 
(for this is how we produce inductions). For instance, let A be long-lived, 
B stand for not having bile, and C stand for a particular long-lived thing, 
as a man, a horse, or a mule. Now, A belongs to the whole C (for every C 
is long-lived); but B (not having bile) belongs to every C. If, then, C 
converts with B and the middle term does not reach beyond the extreme, 
then it is necessary for A to belong to B: for it has been proved earlier that 
if two terms belong to the same thing and the extreme converts with one 
of them, then the other of the predicates will also belong to the term that 
converts with it. (But one must understand C as composed of every one 
of the particulars: for induction is through them all.) [APr II 23, 68b 15-
29; Smith 1989, with changes].  
In this passage, Aristotle is primarily concerned not with ‘induction’ ( ) properly speaking 
but with an argument derived from it – here called ‘deduction from induction’ (
). Let us examine Aristotle’s example. 
Scientists investigate certain biological phenomena by having perceptual contact with 
certain animals ( ), retaining images of them ( ) and realizing that these animals 
instantiate certain properties with regularity ( ). Let us suppose that, in this process, the 
biologist finds out a co-relation between longevity and absence of bile in animals like humans, 
                                                 
referring to the first principles of science without committing Aristotle to the view that induction is sufficient for 
grasping them. 
42 I therefore disagree with Kahn (1981, p. 396) and Bronstein (2012; 2016a, p. 243), who limit the use of inductive 
inferences to the acquisition of nominal definitions. 
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horses and mules. Eventually, an inductive procedure will indicate that all animals of a certain kind 
are long-lived whenever their bodies do not contain a significant quantity of bile: 
Syllogism I:43 
Longevity holds of humans, horses etc., Being a K holds of humans, horses etc. 
Longevity holds of all Ks 
Syllogism II: 
Absence of bile holds of humans, horses etc., Being a K holds of humans, horses etc. 
Absence of bile holds of all Ks 
Relying on this result, the inquirer proceeds to an inference that could be described as an ‘inverted 
demonstration’, where the explanatory term is not the middle, but the major extreme:44 
Syllogism III: 
Longevity holds of all Ks, Being bileless holds of all Ks 
Longevity holds of all bileless animals  
In fact, the co-occurrence of longevity and absence of bile made Aristotle believe that, 
in certain animals, the latter is the explanation of the former.45 Thus, in Syllogism III, the explanans 
appears in the conclusion while the explanandum occurs in the major premise – an inference a 
modern reader could classify as abductive. However, while the so-called ‘inferences to the best 
explanation’ are non-deductive, Aristotle believes that, if the induction that precedes it is 
sufficiently comprehensive, we can obtain a deduction to the best explanation. Lines 68b 24-27 refer 
back to APr II 22, 68a 21-25, where Aristotle has shown that if two terms A and B hold of all C, 
and C also holds of all B, then A necessarily holds of all B. Therefore, if the induction shows us 
that all and only the members of the relevant kind are bileless – and perhaps this is what Aristotle 
means by the enigmatic phrase ‘the entire universal’ in APo II 19 ( , 100a 6-7) –, 
we are warranted to convert the previous minor premise and obtain ‘a deduction from induction’ 
concluding that all bileless animals are long-lived: 
Syllogism IV: 
Longevity holds of all Ks, Being a K holds of all bileless animals 
Longevity holds of all bileless animals 
 
                                                 
43 I am calling Syllogism I, II, and III ‘syllogisms’ just for the sake of exposition. Technically speaking, these arguments 
are not Aristotelian syllogisms, since Aristotle uses the term ‘ ’ only for valid arguments in syllogistic form.    
44 The terms called ‘middle’ and ‘extreme’ in T4 do not match the roles they play in the argument discussed in the 
passage, which means that these expressions are used as rigid designators of the middle term and the extremes of a 
demonstrative syllogism. See Ross (1949, pp. 484-485). 
45 PA IV 2, 676a 30-677b 10. 
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Therefore, the steps involved in the discovery of explanations could be represented by 
the following scheme, where P is the predicate whose occurrence we seek to explain, M is the 
putative explanation and S is a universal kind comprising all instances of P, while s1, s2, …, s
n are 
subspecies of S: 
Induction: 
P holds of s1, s2 … sn, S holds of s1, s2 … sn 
P holds of all S 
 
M holds of s1, s2 … sn, S holds of s1, s2 … sn 
M holds of all (and only) S 
 
Abduction: 
P holds of all S, M holds of all S 
P holds of all M 
 
Deduction from induction (converting the minor premise): 
P holds of all S, S holds of all M 
P holds of all M 
Thus, in APr II 23, Aristotle offers an account of the acquisition of explanations which 
is (to a certain extent) close to the one advanced by modern philosophers of science. However, 
none of the steps discussed in the chapter contain ‘ ’ in the strict sense of the term, in 
which the explanation occurs as the middle term: 
Demonstration: 
P holds of all M, M holds of all S 
P holds of all S 
Thus, the chapter leaves us without an answer to the question of how exactly can scientists learn 
by demonstration. 
Interpreters such as Kosman (1973, p. 383) and McKirahan (1992, p. 243) distinguish 
between knowing an explanation and knowing an explanation as such. Based on this distinction, 
David Bronstein (2014; 2016a, pp. 39-40) has recently argued that there is a sense in which it is 
possible to learn by demonstration: if p1 is explained by p2, demonstration is the reasoning by which 
a scientist learns that p2 is actually explanatory of p1 (and not simply that p2 is the case).
46 Let me 
                                                 
46 ‘Learning by demonstration, I suggest, does not consist in deducing a new conclusion from known premises. Rather, 
it consists in discovering a previously unknown explanatory connection among facts the scientist already knows but 
not scientifically. Prior to learning, she knows x and y, where y is the explanation of x and x is explained by y, but she 
does not know x or y as such. She learns by demonstration when she apprehends y as explanatory of x, or—what is 
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endorse Bronstein’s interpretation in the following terms. Inductive and abductive arguments 
merely make it reasonable to accept their conclusions as true, since what they infer is not a necessary 
consequence of their premises. On the other hand, the argument Aristotle calls ‘deduction from 
induction’, despite having premises that do necessitate the conclusion, does nothing more than 
establishing that the explanans is true, which is quite different from establishing that it is the adequate 
explanation of the explanandum in question. Knowing that all bileless animals are long-lived is 
different from knowing that this is the reason why horses and mules are long-lived. For Aristotle, 
only the second case is qualified as scientific knowledge and only demonstrations are able to 
provide it. A true expert scientist not only assents to a set of true propositions, but also organizes 
it in terms of explanatory priority. When she demonstrates a given proposition taken as 
explanandum, the scientist not only knows that the correspondent explanans is true, but also (and 
more importantly) makes scientific discourse reproduce the causal order of reality by choosing as 
premises propositions that are explanatorily prior to the respective conclusions. Hence, the 
syllogistic inference that would count as a good explanation would run as follows: 
Syllogism V: 
Longevity holds of all bileless animals, Being bileless holds of all Ks 
Longevity holds of all Ks 
The question of how exactly we are able to recognize causal connections in the world 
does not seem to have bothered Aristotle (in the same way as it has bothered Hume, for instance). 
As a result, he never explains in a clear way (as far as I know) how the scientist realizes that a 
proposition p1 is explanatory of p2. However, if my interpretation of APr II 23 is correct, we can 
at least affirm that this recognition occurs at some point between Syllogism IV and Syllogism V. If 
it happens after Syllogism IV, by the time the scientist recognizes p1 as explanatory of p2, she already 
knows that p1 and p2 are true. Therefore, what she learns ‘by demonstration’ cannot be the truth-
value of problematic propositions. One the other hand, if the recognition of causal relations 
happens before Syllogism V, one might object that demonstration is not the reasoning by which the 
scientist learns that something is causally prior to another, but just a way of exposing this causal 
priority in scientific discourse. If so, there is nothing the expert scientist really learns ‘by 
demonstration’. How then are we supposed to understand Aristotle’s use of the expression 
‘learning by demonstration’? Let me suggest the following solution. The term ‘demonstration’ is 
ambiguous: in one sense of the term, ‘demonstration’ is the name of a reasoning (a proof-search 
procedure, one could say) in which a scientist tries to identify propositions (already known to be 
                                                 
the same thing—x as explained by y. As a result of her learning, she now has scientific knowledge of x, which she 
previously knew only non-scientifically’ (Bronstein 2014, p. 14). 
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true) from which a given conclusion (also known to be true) can be deduced and explained; in 
another sense, ‘demonstration’ is just the name of the syllogistically structured sequence of 
sentences that results from this procedure.47 In the first sense, Aristotle could say that expert 
scientists learn ‘by demonstration’ without contradicting his claim that knowing that the 
explanandum is true is a necessary condition for investigating the explanans. The acquisition of 
demonstrative knowledge involves overcoming the ordo cognoscendi and making scientific discourse 
reproduce the ordo essendi; to demonstrate (in the first sense of ‘demonstration’) is to realize that 
and how this is possible. 
Finally, it is worth noting that even though Aristotle requires the explanandum to be a 
logical consequence of the explanans, his theory remains quite different from the deductive-
nomological models of explanation. For him, what makes a scientific proposition prior to another 
is something more than their difference in generality or the inferential connections between them 
(APo I 13, 78a 22-b3; II 16, 98b 16-24). As we can see, demonstrations include as premises the same 
sentences we would find in abductive arguments or , but the inference 
goes in the opposite direction. The inferential steps discussed in APr II 23 enable the scientist to 
grasp a set of true propositions, whereas at the demonstrative stage this body of truths is organized 
in terms of causal priority – that is, priority ‘by nature.’ In other words, a demonstration of a 
conclusion c allows us to know not only (i) that c can be logically derived from a set of true 
premises Π but also (ii) that Π presents the set of factors responsible for c being true (which are 
prior to c ‘by nature’), instead of the factors which make us believe that c is true (which are prior 
to c only ‘relative to us’).48 
What about our knowledge of first principles? Some authors have pointed out that to 
understand first principles – that is, to have  of them – is to understand them insofar as they are 
principles.49 As we have been arguing, first principles are nothing more than ultimate explanations. 
If inductions or ‘deductions from inductions’ do not make us know explanations as explanations, the 
same should apply to first principles as first principles. But what does it mean to know a principle as 
                                                 
47 Bronstein (2016a, p. 41) seems to reply to this objection with a similar distinction between two senses of 
‘demonstration’ – although it is not completely clear to me whether the senses of ‘demonstration’ he briefly discusses 
are the same two senses I have tried to discriminate. 
48 For the differences between Aristotle’s and the ‘covering law’ theory of scientific explanation, see McKirahan (1992, 
pp. 230-231). See also Brody (1972) for the advantages of the former over the latter. 
49 Kosman (1973, p. 389) argues: ‘[…] the noetic grasp we have of them [first principles] as principles concerns our 
ability to use them in explaining and making intelligible the world of phenomena.  therefore is a feature of our 
understanding of all explanatory principles or premises […] just insofar as we understand them in the act of explaining 
by them, i.e. just insofar as we understand them qua principles and not qua explicanda [emphasis in original].’ See also 
McKirahan (1992, pp. 243-244). 
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principle? Based on our discussion so far, we can define an Aristotelian first principle in the following 
terms: 
Def. (First Principle): p is a first principle iff.:  
(i) there is an Aristotelian demonstration ⟨Π, c⟩ such that p belongs in Π  
(ii) there is no set Ψ such that ⟨Ψ, p⟩ is an Aristotelian demonstration of p 
According to this definition, to know a principle p as a first principle is to know that p satisfies 
conditions (i) and (ii). Whereas condition (ii) accounts for the indemonstrability of first principles, 
condition (i) states that a principle is always a principle of something. As we know, in APo I 2, 71b 
19-22, Aristotle lists six features of demonstrative principles, of which three are relative to a 
conclusion: ‘more familiar than’, ‘prior to’ and ‘explanatory of.’50 Therefore, to grasp a first principle 
as such is to understand it as an indemonstrable premise from which one or more conclusions are 
demonstrated. 
If this account is correct,  and can be considered 
interdependent in a certain way. Demonstrative knowledge in the strict sense involves knowing not 
only the proximate causes of a given phenomenon, but the ultimate ones as well. In other words, 
if ⟨Π, c⟩ is a full-fledged demonstration, there must be a subset of Π containing only 
indemonstrable premises, of which we have not but Therefore, 
 is dependent on insofar as full-fledged demonstrative knowledge is 
impossible without the comprehension of first principles. Nevertheless, a proposition cannot be 
considered a first principle of science independently of their explanatory roles in demonstrations. 
Therefore, if is the knowledge of first principles as first principles, its acquisition depends on 
figuring out their position in the body of science as a whole, which involves the practice of 
demonstrating (or attempting to demonstrate) other, less basic propositions from them.51 This 
                                                 
50 See McKirahan (1992, p. 243). Cf. Ross (1949, p. 509); Barnes (1993, p. 93). Ferejohn (2009, pp. 78-79) criticises 
McKirahan for being ‘apparently impressed by Aristotle’s use of comparatives in APo I 2, 71b 19-22.’ Alternatively, he 
takes the three ‘relational’ conditions as reducible to a single ‘absolute’ condition: ‘intelligibility in nature.’ However, 
the notion of ‘intelligibility in nature’ seems more obscure than the conditions it is supposed to clarify. More 
significantly, Aristotle explicitly takes the condition ‘being explanatory of…’ as the fundamental one (APo I 2, 71b 29-
33). The fact that these three requirements are relational does not imply that ‘there are no objective and context-
independent features that make somethings acceptable as principles and other things not.’ Since Aristotle is not 
concerned with mere justification (as Ferejohn supposes), what makes something a principle in his theory is something 
objective: the causal order of the reality (see Hankinson 1998, p. 161). In other words, the principles are relational in 
the sense of being prior to other propositions, but objective in the sense of being prior ‘in nature’ and not ‘relative to us.’ 
For an approach that expands this ‘relational’ aspect of the notion of principle to other requirements in APo I 2, 71b 
19-22, and to the concept of ‘necessary principle’, see Angioni (2012) and Angioni (2016) respectively. 
51 Aristotle emphasizes the holistic character of scientific knowledge in APr I 30: ‘Consequently, if the facts concerning 
any subject have been grasped, we are already prepared to bring the demonstrations readily to light. For if nothing that 
truly belongs to the subjects has been left out of the collection of facts, then concerning every fact, if a demonstration 
for it exists, we will be able to find that demonstration and demonstrate it, while if it does not naturally have a 
demonstration, we will be able to make that evident [APr I 30, 46a 22-27; Smith 1989].’     
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result is in accordance with part of the secondary literature, which claims that  
(both noetic and demonstrative) involves a holistic outlook of a given body of truths. Interpreters 
such as Kosman (1973) and Myles Burnyeat (1981) have argued that to understand ( ) a 
proposition pi is to determine its place in a complex web of interrelated propositions p1, p2, … , pn 
organized in terms of explanatory priority, either as a first principle (noetic understanding) or as a 
theorem (demonstrative understanding).52 Along the same lines, McKirahan (1992, pp. 243-244) 
affirms: ‘to grasp something as a principle is to understand how the things of which it is a principle 
depend on it. […] Thus, knowing principles entails appropriate knowledge of nonprinciples, and 
this amounts to possessing the whole demonstrative science.’ 
Let me now address some objections that might be raised against my proposal. I have 
claimed that to have  of first principles is to know them as first principles, which involves 
understanding them as satisfying all the six requirements mentioned in APo I 2, 71b 19-22, including 
the relational ones: being ‘more familiar than…’, ‘prior to…’ and ‘explanatory of…’. David 
Bronstein (2016a, pp. 62-63) has argued that if this is so,  and  turn out to 
be one and the same cognitive state. If ⟨{p1, p2}, c⟩ is a demonstration, having demonstrative 
knowledge of c is to know c as explained by premises p1 and p2. On the other hand, to know that p1 
and p2 satisfy the relational criteria is to know them as explanatory of c. However, ‘knowing c as 
explained by p1 and p2’ and ‘knowing p1 and p2 as explanatory of c’ are, according to him, ‘two 
descriptions of the same cognitive state’ (Bronstein 2016a, p. 62). 
However, my claim is that having  of p1 and p2 involves determining their places in 
a given body of interrelated propositions and realizing that: (i) there are no propositions within it 
from which p1 or p2 can be demonstrated; (ii) there are one or more propositions that can be 
demonstrated from p1, as well as there are one or more propositions that can be demonstrated 
from p2 – leaving it open whether p1 or p2 can be used to demonstrate the same proposition.
53 
Thus,  depends on there being demonstrative knowledge of one proposition or another. That 
being said, we can reply to this first objection as follows. If p1 and p2 are the first principles from 
which c is demonstrated, having demonstrative knowledge of c requires having noetic knowledge 
of p1 and p2. Nevertheless, although noetic knowledge of p1 and p2 requires a comprehensive 
                                                 
52 Ferejohn (2009, p. 75) objects that interpretations like Kosman’s associate Aristotle with coherentism, in opposition 
to the foundationalist view advanced in the APo. In the same vein, one could say that our interpretation also commits 
Aristotle to some sort of coherentism. However, we would be ascribing a coherentist doctrine to Aristotle only if we 
were saying that organizing scientific propositions in a coherent body is the method by which scientists get to know 
explanatory relations. This is not what I am proposing – and, if I understand his interpretation correctly, neither is 
Kosman. What requires a holistic understanding of the body of scientific truths is not the recognition of a particular 
explanatory relation between two propositions, but the recognition of first principles as such – after all, figuring out that 
p is a principle involves realizing that there is no other proposition from which p can be demonstrated. 
53 Certainly, clause (ii) does not require a demonstrative knowledge established previously and independently of . 
Therefore, my view does not imply that there is one piece of demonstrative knowledge which is prior to  in time. 
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understanding of a given body of truths (and the explanatory role of p1 and p2 within it), it does not 
require knowing p1 and p2 as explanatory of a given conclusion c specifically. Therefore, even if the 
expressions ‘knowing p1 and p2 as explanatory of c’ and ‘knowing c as explained by p1 and p2’ 
describe the same piece of knowledge – a claim which is by itself controversial – ‘knowing p1 and 
p2 as explanatory of c’ in which ‘c’ stands for a determinate conclusion is not a good description 
of the kind of holistic cognition Aristotle calls ‘ .’ 
In fact, if the content of noetic knowledge of p1 and p2 could not be specified without 
mentioning a specific conclusion such as c, it would be difficult to sustain that an expert scientist 
could learn by demonstration in the way we agreed she could. After all, if having  of p1 and p2 
already involves knowing p1 and p2 as explanatory of c, the scientist will learn nothing when she tries 
to demonstrate c from p1 and p2.
54 On the other hand, if coming to know p1 and p2 as principles 
involves realizing that there are true propositions that can be demonstrated from them (which are 
not necessarily c), there is still room for discovering new explananda (possibly c) and trying to trace 
them back to the first principles. Let us consider, for instance, an expert biologist who discovered 
(through the inferences and capacities described in APo II 23 and APo II 19) that absence of bile 
causes animals such as horses, mules and camels to be long-lived. Let us also say that it has already 
been established that all these species are essentially blooded animals (which involves knowing that 
some of their properties are explained by their being blooded). If the biologist tries to explain their 
longevity from first principles, she will eventually find out that absence of bile is the cause of their 
being long-lived because the liver (of which bile is a residue) is vital and necessary to blooded 
animals. Thus, she will have learned by demonstration that certain blooded animals are long-lived 
having previous noetic knowledge that their essence involves their being blooded.55 This example 
illustrates how an account of scientific knowledge in terms of ‘interrelatedness’ does not require a 
scientist to know absolutely all the facts in the domain in order to have . The 
acquisition of scientific expertise is not an all-or-nothing situation. As long as the scientist knows 
a set of indemonstrable propositions as such – knowledge that involves recognizing their 
explanatory connections with at least some demonstrable facts–, there is still room for discovering 
new facts and explaining them from these immediate principles. 
However, even if there is a way of distinguishing one cognitive state from the other, a 
second objection could be raised. In APo II 19, Aristotle claims that  is ‘more accurate’ 
( ) than demonstrative knowledge. One might argue that we cannot explain this claim 
                                                 
54 As Bronstein (2016a, p. 65) himself notes. 
55 See PA IV 2, 677ª-b10. In PA IV 5, 678a 33-34. Aristotle affirms: ‘that some animals are blooded while some are 
bloodless will belong in the account defining their substantial being’ (translation by Lennox 2001). If this pattern 
describes Aristotle in his biological treatises, it might count as further evidence for my interpretation the fact that it is 
in accordance with his scientific practice. 
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if we take these two cognitive states as interdependent. On the other hand, the rationalist 
interpretation would take this claim in purely subjective terms: the first principles are self-evident 
and accepted as true without any justification, whereas the respective conclusions become evident 
to us only through the evidence of the principles. Thus, the rationalist interpretation is able to 
explain how the ‘accuracy’ of demonstrative knowledge depends on the ‘accuracy’ of  but not 
vice-versa. 
First, the claim that  is the most ‘accurate’ type of knowledge does not need to be 
understood in subjective or psychological terms, as if the content of noetic knowledge were 
somehow ‘more evident’ than the content of other cognitive states. As we have seen, Aristotle 
describes the premises of a demonstration as being ‘more familiar’ or ‘more intelligible’ 
( ) than the conclusion. At first sight, this vocabulary might suggest that our mental 
attitudes towards these premises are at stake. Nevertheless, the feature of demonstrative premises 
Aristotle wants to stress is fully objective: by ‘more familiar’ he means not ‘more familiar to us’ (a 
subjective notion) but ‘more familiar by nature’, which amounts to the objective notion of causal 
or explanatory priority (APo I 2, 71b 31). Lesher (2010), for instance, has convincingly argued that 
‘clarity’ ( ) is not necessarily a psychological notion, the same being true for the notion of 
‘accuracy’ ( ). He points out that in several contexts Aristotle uses the term ‘ ’ and 
correlate expressions to refer to ‘the attainment of full scientific knowledge.’56 Barnes (1993, p.189) 
also argues that ‘ ’ can be used to describe whatever is of ‘good epistemic quality’, not 
necessarily what is certain or evident. According to Liddell/Scott/Jones, the word is used to qualify 
what is ‘consummate’ or ‘in perfect condition’. Along the same lines, Zabarella had already noted 
that ‘ ’ means not only certainty, but completeness or perfection.57 Now, as I have argued, 
if ⟨{p1, p2}, c⟩ is the demonstration of c, one cannot have demonstrative knowledge of c without 
having noetic knowledge of p1 and p2. However, having  of p1 and p2 does not require 
demonstrative knowledge of c specifically. Therefore, the content of noetic knowledge (e.g. 
knowing p1 and p2 as principles) is more comprehensive and complete in comparison with the more 
specific content of the correspondent piece of demonstrative knowledge (e.g. knowing c as 
explained by p1 and p2)
58 – and this could be what Aristotle had in mind when he claimed that  
is the most ‘accurate’ of all cognitive states. 
                                                 
56 Lesher (2010, pp. 148-156).  
57 ‘[...] akribeiam, quae non solam certitudinem significat, sed cum perfection [Zabarella 1582, 168B].’ 
58 This use of ‘ ’ corresponds to the second sense of the term discussed by Salmeri (2014, p. 2): 
‘“epistēmē”(and “epistasthai”) can refer to a certain estimable cognitive state: the state in which the possessor of a science 
stands toward each of its theorems, in virtue of a demonstration of the theorem from the appropriate principles.’ 
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Thus, we have strong reasons to believe that, for Aristotle, noetic and demonstrative 
knowledge are, in a way, interdependent cognitive dispositions. This account of the relation 
between and  also helps us elucidate in which way definitions are first 
principles. In APo II 10, the philosopher distinguishes definitional sentences that are mere accounts 
of meaning (93b 19-37) – or ‘nominal definitions’ – from definitions as accounts of essence – or 
‘real definitions’ (93b 38-94a 7). According to Aristotle, a definition of the second kind is ‘an account 
which displays the reason why’ ( , 93b 39). We know first principles are not 
self-evident propositions from which problematic beliefs can be justified, but causal explanations 
acquired after a complex process of inquiry (involving perception, memory, experience, induction 
etc.). Therefore, in virtue of their causal or explanatory content, real (and not merely nominal) 
definitions are the propositions playing the role of first principles in Aristotle’s theory. In APo II 
8-10, it becomes clear that causal definitions of this sort are not grasped independently of the 
practice of demonstrating. They are made clear by syllogistic demonstrations (
, APo II 8, 93b 17-18) and described as demonstrations ‘differing in 
arrangement’ ( , APo II 10, 94a 2). This interdependence between definition and 
demonstration is in accordance with our account of the relation between and 
. As has been claimed, this is not just a peculiarity of Aristotle’s methods for explaining 
phenomena and grasping definitions. The epistemic interdependence between defining and 
explaining – and between comprehension and demonstrative knowledge – is grounded in a 
metaphysical interdependence between the notion of essence and the notion of cause (or primary 
cause).59 In the next chapter, I shall discuss the connections between definition and demonstration, 
essence and causation. Not only in Chapter 2 but also in the following chapters, I will be particularly 
concerned with the ontological distinction between subjects and attributes, their differences as 
essence-bearers, and the influence of this distinction in Aristotle’s model of demonstrative science.  
                                                 
59 Kung (1977, pp. 168-172); Charles (2000; 2010b, pp. 268-328); Williams & Charles (2013); Peramatzis (2011, pp. 
180-188; 2013); Angioni (2012; 2014b; 2014c; 2016); Koslicki (2012). 
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CHAPTER 2 
CAUSE, ESSENCE, AND ESSENCE-BEARERS 
  
 
 
 
 
2.1 – The Four Objects of Inquiry and Knowledge: Fact, Cause, Existence, and 
Essence 
At the beginning of APo II, Aristotle affirms that the things we seek ( ) are 
equal in number to those we know ( ) (APo II 1, 89b 23-4): 
(1) ‘the fact’ ( ) 
(2) ‘the reason why’ ( ) 
(3) ‘if something is’ ( ) 
(4) ‘what something is’ ( ) 
Each of these four objects of inquiry and knowledge corresponds to one question: 
[T5] 
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When we seek whether this our that is the case, setting down a plurality of 
terms (e.g. whether the sun is eclipsed or not), we are seeking the fact. 
Evidence for this: on finding that it is eclipsed, we stop; and if from the 
beginning we know that it is eclipsed, we do not seek whether it is. When 
we know the fact we seek the reason why (e.g. knowing that it is eclipsed 
or that the earth moves, we seek the reason why it is eclipsed or why it 
moves). These things we seek in this way; but certain items we seek in 
another way – e.g. if a centaur or a god is or is not. (I mean if one is or is 
not ‘without qualification’ and not if one is white or not.) And having 
come to know that it is, we seek what it is (e.g.: Then what is a god? or 
What is a man?) [APo II 1, 89b 25-35; Barnes 1993, with changes]. 
The philosopher groups these questions into two pairs based on a typical Aristotelian division 
between subjects and attributes.60 The first couple of questions concern the presence of an attribute 
in a given subject: 
(Q1) Does the attribute P belong to the subject S? 
(Q2) Why does P belong to S? 
Questions Q1 and Q2 ask whether and why a given subject S is ‘something or not something’ (
, 90a 3-4), is ‘partially’ ( , 89b39; 90a2) or is ‘one of the items which 
hold of it in itself or incidentally’ ( , 90a 11): ‘Is the earth moving?’ 
or ‘Why is the sun eclipsed’?’. Aristotle also notes that Q1 is prior to Q2 in the order of inquiry, 
since we can only ask why S is P when we already know that it is P. 
On the other hand, the other two questions address the subjects themselves: 
(Q3) Does S exist? 
(Q4) What is S? 
Question Q3 does not ask whether a subject S is or is not something, but whether S is ‘without 
qualification’ ( , 89b 39; 90a 4) – i.e. whether it exists61 –, whereas Q4 asks about its nature or 
essence. Questions Q3 and Q4 no longer concern attributes, but the ‘substance’ ( , 90a10) 
and the ‘underlying subject’ ( 90a 12) to which they belong: ‘Is there such a thing as 
a centaur?’ or ‘What is a god?’. Question Q3 is also epistemologically prior to Q4: in order to know 
what a subject S is, says Aristotle, we need to know in advance that S ‘is’ or ‘exists’. 
As one would expect given the definition of knowledge in T1 (APo I 2, 71b 9-12), 
Aristotle argues that looking for an answer to these four questions is equivalent to seeking for a 
                                                 
60 This reading is a traditional one, with the support of modern interpreters such as Ross (1949, pp. 609-10), Tredennick 
(1960, p. 11), Mansion (1976, p. 63), Barnes (1993, pp. 203-4), and Bronstein (2016a, pp. 89-107).   
61 For a different account, see Gomez-Lobo (1980). However, the examples ‘god’ and ‘centaur’, whose existence is 
controversial, strongly suggests the existential meaning of the verb ‘to’ be.’ 
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cause (APo II 2, 90a 6-7). However, the ‘cause’ ( ) is now identified with the ‘middle term’ 
( ): 
[T6] 
When we seek the fact or if something is without qualification, we are 
seeking whether or not there is a middle term for it; and when, having 
come to know either the fact or if it is – either partially or without 
qualification –, we seek the reason why or what it is, we are seeking what 
the middle term is [APo II 2, 89b37-90a1; Barnes 1993, with changes]. 
The expression ‘ ’ comes from the vocabulary of the APr, which suggests that the four 
questions listed in APo II 2 are limited to syllogistic propositions – hence, they are formulated 
within the framework of Aristotle’s model of demonstrative science.62 One of Aristotle’s claims 
here is that Q1 and Q3 are reduced to a question about the existence of a middle term: 
(Q1*/Q3*) Is there a middle term? 
On the other hand, we answer the questions Q2 and Q4 when we find out what that middle term 
is: 
(Q2*/Q4*) What is the middle term? 
In a context where the  is identified with the , asking about the existence of a middle 
term for a given categorical sentence is asking whether this sentence is likely to be scientifically 
explained.63 At this point, the inquirer is not looking for a middle term that simply establishes the 
truth of the conclusion, but ‘the actual ground in reality of the fact to be explained.’64 Inquiring 
into the existence of such ground is to examine whether the phenomenon in question presents the 
kind of regularity and consistency that suggests the presence of an underlying causal structure.65 
Asking what that middle term is, on the other hand, is asking what that actual ground is after all. 
Therefore, first we have: 
(Q1*/Q3*) Is there an M such that PaM, MaS ⊦ PaS & M is the reason why PaS?66 
                                                 
62 Barnes (1993, p. 203).  
63 Barnes (1993, p. 205). 
64 Ross (1949, p. 611). 
65 Charles (2000, p. 71). 
66 Our formulation of Q1* is motivated by the fact that, according to Aristotle, scientific explanations are preferably 
structured in Barbara (see APo I 14, 79a 24-29; II 8, 93a 3-9). Still, our interpretation is compatible with other syllogistic 
moods. 
41 
 
Once we know that PaS is scientifically explainable – i.e. once we have an affirmative answer to 
Q1* –, we are able ask: 
(Q2*/Q4*) What is M such that PaM, MaS ⊦ PaS & M is the reason why PaS? 
It is important to note that an affirmative answer to Q1 is compatible with a negative answer to 
Q1* if ‘PaS’ is indemonstrable. Therefore, Aristotle is assuming that Q1 and Q2 in APo II 1-2 are 
restricted to demonstrable propositions, which excludes tautologies and definitions.67 
At this juncture, it could be argued that limiting Q3 and Q4 to subjects was an 
unfortunate move. Apparently, nothing prevents us from asking what an eclipse is or whether there 
is such a thing as an eclipse, which means Aristotle should have included the following two 
questions in his account: 
(Q3.1) Does P exist? 
(Q4.1) What is P? 
However, Aristotle does not say that we cannot ask questions of existence and essence about 
attributes. Actually, his claim is that, for the purpose of scientific investigation, those questions are 
equivalent to, and in fact better phrased in the form of, Q1 and Q2:68 
[T7] 
In all these cases it is clear that what it is and why it is are the same. What 
it is an eclipse? Privation of light from the moon by the screening of the 
earth. Why is there an eclipse? Or Why is the moon eclipsed? Because the 
light leaves it when the earth screens it [APo II 2, 90a 14-18; Barnes 1993]. 
According to Aristotle, an attribute is said to ‘exist’ insofar as it is predicated of a subject. Knowing 
the existence of the lunar eclipse is the same as knowing that it is predicated of the moon. On the 
other hand, there is a correspondence between the definition of an attribute and the explanation 
of its occurrence in the relevant subject. For instance, the lunar eclipse is defined as follows: 
Def. (Lunar eclipse): 
Lunar eclipse is(df.)the privation of light from the moon in virtue of it being screened from the sun by the 
earth. 
                                                 
67 See Barnes (1993, p. 205); Gomez-Lobo (1980, p.73, n.10).  
68 This could explain why ‘night’ ( ) appears as an example of Q3 in APo II 2, 90a 5. 
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On the other hand, we explain why lunar eclipse belongs to the moon through the middle term being 
screened by the earth (APo II 8, 93a 29-b14): 
Syllogism VI: 
Eclipse (or privation of light) holds of earth-screening, Earth-screening holds of the moon 
Eclipse (or privation of light) holds of the moon69 
Such isomorphism between definition and demonstration is what probably made Aristotle think 
that formulating Q3.1 e Q4.1 in APo II 1-2 was unnecessary, since the following equivalencies hold 
good: 
(Q1) Does P holds of S? ≡ (Q3.1) Does P exist? 
(Q2) Why does P holds of S? ≡ (Q4.1) What is P? 
One may think that such correspondence is just the result of a successful inquiry. If there is an 
equivalence between the questions ‘why is the moon eclipsed?’ and ‘what is eclipse?’, a successful 
attempt to define eclipse will have its result somehow corroborated by a successful demonstration 
of the fact that the moon is eclipsed. For Aristotle, however, the correspondence between 
definitions and demonstrations should not be taken just as a mutual corroboration between the 
results of two independent practices. On the contrary, defining and explaining are interdependent 
scientific tasks, as we shall see in the next section. 
2.2 – Interdependence between Defining and Explaining 
As we have seen, as long as the APo is understood as advancing not a theory on 
epistemic justification, but a theory on causal explanations (and on how these explanations are 
grasped and displayed in scientific discourse), Aristotle can be correctly described as a 
foundationalist philosopher of science. His foundationalism lies in the fact that an Aristotelian 
demonstration ⟨Π, c⟩ always contains a subset of indemonstrable premises Π’ from which all the 
demonstrable premises in Π (and consequently c) are demonstrated. The set Π’ includes 
definitions, i.e. propositions specifying essences or essential features. Therefore, Aristotle’s 
foundationalism would not be viable if there were demonstrations of the form ⟨Π, c⟩ in which c 
is a definitional proposition. In other words, definitions should be principles of demonstrations, 
but not themselves demonstrated. 
                                                 
69 Aristotle uses as the major term sometimes the definiendum (e.g. ‘thunder’ or ‘eclipse’; APo II 8, 93a 35-b6; b8-9), 
sometimes a brief and preliminary elucidation of what the definiendum is (e.g. ‘noise’ or ‘privation of light’, 93b 11-12). 
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Given the importance of the matter, in APo II, Aristotle engages in a long discussion 
about whether or not definitions can be demonstrated. His final answer is negative. Although it is 
possible to elaborate sound syllogisms whose conclusions are definitional sentences, such 
arguments are merely ‘logical’ ( ), without real explanatory force (APo II 8, 93a 9-15). 
However, Aristotle raises and discusses several puzzles in APo II 3-7, of which one is of particular 
interest to us: ‘you might puzzle over whether you can know the same thing in the same respect 
both by a definition and by a demonstration, or whether this is impossible’ (APo II 3, 99b 1-3). This 
puzzle is not solved until APo II 8. According to Aristotle, although real definitions (i.e. accounts 
of essences) cannot occur as conclusions of demonstrations, they are ‘made clear by syllogism and 
demonstration’ ( , APo II 8, 93b 17-18), being similar 
to demonstrations, but ‘differing in arrangement’ ( , APo II 10, 94a 2). In the 
following, I shall spell out how Aristotle reaches this result. 
After denying that conclusions of demonstrations can be definitional sentences (APo 
II 8, 93a 9-15), Aristotle announces his aim in APo II 8: ‘let us say in what way a demonstration [of 
what something is] is possible, starting again from the beginning’ (93a 15-16). ‘Starting again from 
the beginning’ ( ), in this context, refers back to the four questions discussed in APo 
II 1-2, which Aristotle resumes in APo II 8: 
[T8] […]
Just as we seek the reason why when we grasp the fact […], in the same 
way we plainly cannot grasp what it is to be something without grasping 
that it exists; for we cannot know what something is when we do not know 
whether it exists [APo II 8, 93a 16-20; Barnes 1993]. 
As we know, questions of the form 
(Q1) Does P belong to S?/(Q3.1) Does P exist? 
are epistemologically prior to questions of the form 
(Q2) Why does P belong to S?/(Q4.1) What is P? 
That is to say, we cannot start investigating what something is before we know that it exists. 
However, as several interpreters have noted70, the priority of Q3 and Q3.1 over Q4 and Q4.1 gives 
                                                 
70 See Bolton (1976); Ackrill (1981, pp. 364-366); Bayer (1995, p. 246); Charles (2000, p. 76); Bronstein (2010; 2016a, 
pp. 84-88, pp. 93-94).  
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rise to an epistemological problem close to the one discussed in Plato’s dialogue Menon.71 I shall 
call it the ‘Inquiry Problem’: 
The Inquiry Problem: If I do not know that x exists, I cannot start investigating what x is 
(according to APo II 1-2). On the other hand, if I do not know what x is, how could I inquire 
whether x exists or not? 
This question is motivated by the following assumption: if the essence of x is unknown 
to me, I do not have the means to identify eventual instances of x, and hence cannot investigate 
whether x exists. In APo II 8, Aristotle offers his solution to the Inquiry Problem by undermining 
the assumption that motivates it. He writes as follows: 
[T9] 
  
But as to whether it exists, sometimes we grasp this incidentally, and 
sometimes by grasping something of the object itself – e.g. of thunder, 
that it is a sort of noise in the clouds; of an eclipse, that it is a sort of 
privation of light; of man, that he is a sort of animal; of soul, that it is 
something which moves itself [APo II 8, 93a 21-24; Barnes 1993]. 
If I intend to know what a lunar eclipse is, I need at least some information with which I could 
start off my inquiry. In one scenario, what I know about eclipse holds of it ‘incidentally’ (
). Here, Aristotle probably has in mind the notion of  defined in Top. I 5, 
102b 6-7, i.e. a predicate that ‘can belong or not belong to one and the same thing.’ If everything I 
know about eclipse is contingently connected to it, I would not be able to recognize its instances 
with the kind of consistency that scientific investigation requires. 
At this point, it is worth stressing that, according to the doctrine of APo II 1-2, 
questions of the form 
(Q1) Does P belong to S?/(Q3.1) Does P exist? 
  are equivalent to a question about the existence of a cause or middle term: 
(Q1*/Q3*) Is there an M such that PaM, MaS ⊦ PaS & M is the reason why PaS? 
Therefore, inquiring whether the lunar eclipse ‘exists’ is not just a matter of investigating whether 
or not it happens to the moon, but of realizing that it occurs frequently and regularly enough to 
                                                 
71 ‘How will you look for it, Socrates, when you do not know at all what it is? How will you aim to search for something you 
do not know at all? If you should meet with it, how will you know that this is the thing that you did not know?’ [Meno, 80d-
e; G.M.A Grube in Cooper 1997]. 
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suggest the presence of an underlying cause – a cause that could be used not only to explain why 
the moon is regularly eclipsed, but also to formulate a causal definition of eclipse. Therefore, Q2 
should be interpreted not as asking whether (e.g.) eclipse exists without further qualification, but 
whether it exists as a definable unity or a genuine kind.72 If all I know about the lunar eclipse is 
something that may or may not belong to it, I could always mistake its instances for something 
else. Even if I eventually recognise as a case of eclipse something that actually happens to be one 
of its instances, I would not have an answer to Q3.1 ‘except incidentally’ ( , 
APo II 10, 93b 35). In other words, I would never be able to determine whether all the cases to 
which I apply the word ‘eclipse’ are actually instances of the same, unified phenomenon. 
Our inquiry is more promising, says Aristotle, if we ‘grasp something of the object 
itself’ ( ), as when we know of thunder that it is a sort of noise in the clouds, 
or of eclipse that it is a sort of privation of light from the moon. These vague descriptions seem to 
be preliminary accounts of the words ‘thunder’ and ‘eclipse’ without which no one could use them 
with linguistic competence. In APo II 10, this step of the inquiry is identified with knowing the 
meaning of words – i.e. knowing their ‘nominal definitions’73 –, without knowing yet that they refer 
to genuine existing kinds:74 
[T10] 
Since a definition is said to be an account of what something is, it is clear 
that one type will be an account of what its name, or some other name-
like account, means – e.g. what ‘triangle’ means. When we grasp that this 
exists, we seek why it is [APo II 10, 93b 29-32; Barnes 1993, with changes].  
Based on this passage (and its connection to APo II 8), David Charles (2000, pp. 23-76) argued 
that, according to Aristotle, the inquiry of essences can be divided into three stages: 
Stage 1: One knows an account of what a name (or a name-like expression)75 signifies, without 
knowing whether the name denotes a genuine existing kind. 
Stage 2: One knows that the thing denoted by the name (or the name-like expression) exists (as a 
genuine kind). 
                                                 
72 See Upton (1991, pp. 322-323); Charles (2000, pp.40-41; p.203); Bronstein (2010, pp.109-110; p. 112; 2016a, pp. 
104-107). 
73 See Ross (1949 p. 635); Demoss & Devereux (1988, p. 136); Barnes (1993, p. 222). 
74 See Charles (2000, pp. 24-24). For a different view, see Bolton (1976, pp. 522-526). 
75 I am following Ross (1949, p. 635) and taking ‘  as referring to complex nominal phrases to 
be contrasted with simple names. 
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Stage 3: One knows the essence (i.e. the cause) of the thing denoted by the name (or name-like 
expression). 
At stage 1, the scientist has the kind of basic information about (e.g.) eclipses that 
regulates the (standard) use of the word ‘eclipse’ in ordinary discourse: if there is such a thing as a 
lunar eclipse, it will be a certain privation of light from the moon. As Charles (2000, p. 35) puts it, 
the scientist can use this preliminary information as a sort of ‘springboard’ to move from Stage 1 
to Stage 2. By knowing that (e.g.) thunder is a certain noise in the clouds, one might perform 
induction-based inferences – like Syllogisms I to IV, discussed in Chapter 1 – to gather more 
information about the phenomenon: for instance, that it happens under certain meteorological 
conditions, that it follows lightning, etc. Thus, the indefinite pronouns ‘ ’ and ‘ ’ in APo II 8, 93a 
22-24 stand for ‘place-holders’ to be filled in with the kind of information needed to move from 
Stage 1 to Stage 2 – i.e. that the phenomenon under investigation presents (in a regular basis) 
distinguishing features that suggest we are not dealing with a chance event. If so, there must be an 
underlying cause to be grasped at Stage 3. 
Aristotle gives a helpful example of how one may move from Stage 1 to Stage 2 without 
yet knowing the cause (i.e. the essence) of the phenomenon at stake. 
[T11] 
When we discover it [i.e. the account of eclipse], we know at the same time 
the fact and the reason why – if we proceed through immediates.76 
Otherwise, we know the fact but not the reason why: moon C, eclipse A, 
not being able to produce a shadow during full moon although nothing 
visible is between us and it B. If B, not being able to produce a shadow 
during full moon although nothing visible is between us and it, holds of 
C, and A, being eclipsed, holds of B, then it is plain that it is eclipsed but 
not yet why; and we know that there is an eclipse but we do not know what 
it is [APo II 8, 93a 35-b2; Barnes 1993, with changes]. 
Suppose a scientist at Stage 1 knows that eclipse is some sort of loss of light from the moon. As 
she proceeds with her investigation, she realises that it is not any kind of privation of light from 
the moon that can be correctly called ‘eclipse’. If, in a cloudy night, the moon becomes unable to 
cast shadows, she will probably take into account that the clouds might be blocking the light from 
the moon and would avoid concluding that an eclipse is taking place. If, however, a full moon 
                                                 
76 Reading ‘ ’ with Ross (1949) instead of ‘ ’, like most MSS. 
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becomes unable to produce shadows even if there is nothing intermediate that could be blocking 
its light, the following syllogism could be formulated: 
Syllogism VII: 
Eclipse holds of inability to cast shadows etc., Inability to cast shadows etc. holds of the moon 
 Eclipse holds of the moon 
Syllogism VII establishes that the moon is eclipsed – and establishes it in a way that its 
conclusion is now seen as a legitimate explanandum. Now, we can investigate why this is the case, 
and hence move from Stage 2 to Stage 3: 
[T12] 
When it is plain that A holds of C, then to seek why it holds is to seek 
what B is – whether screening or rotation of the moon or extinction. And 
this is the account of the one extreme, i.e. in this case of A; for an eclipse 
is a screening by the earth [APo II 8, 93b 3-7; Barnes 1993]. 
At Stage 3, then, the scientist finally discovers the cause of eclipse, which is signified by the middle 
term of our Syllogism VI: 
Syllogism VI: 
Eclipse (or privation of light) holds of earth-screening, Earth-screening holds of the moon 
Eclipse (or privation of light) holds of the moon 
Here, the middle term is said to be the definition of the major term ‘eclipse’ (
). Strictly speaking, the middle term is the causal part of the definition, which was missing in 
the preliminary account used at Stage 1. Thus, a Stage 3-definition of eclipse would be isomorphic 
to Syllogism VI: 
Def. (Lunar eclipse): 
Lunar eclipse is(df.)the privation of light from the moon in virtue of it being screened from the sun by the 
earth. 
Even if Syllogism VI is not a demonstration of the definition – in the sense of having the definiendum 
as the minor term and the definiens as the major –, it displays or reveals the essence of eclipse. 
Therefore, Aristotle can conclude his reasoning as follows: 
[T13] 
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We have said how what something is is taken and becomes familiar. 
Although there are no syllogisms and no demonstrations of what 
something is, nevertheless what something is is made plain through 
syllogisms and through demonstrations. Hence without a demonstration 
you cannot get to know what something is [APo II 8, 93b 15-18; Barnes 
1993]. 
The isomorphism between the definition of eclipse and Syllogism VI is not just a coincidence of 
results of two independent scientific practices: defining and explaining. On the contrary, we cannot 
know the essence of something independently of the explanatory role it plays in a demonstration: 
(93b 19-18). In other words, the way we acquire 
knowledge of definitions intrinsically involves the act of explaining a phenomenon by 
demonstration.77 This result is in accordance with the claim we advanced in Chapter 1. is the 
cognitive state that knows definitions. Since demonstrations are based on definitions, 
 is dependent on . However, if we cannot get to know a definition independently 
of the act of demonstrating, one cannot have  without having . The 
interdependence of the two kinds of understanding ‘without qualification’ just mirrors the 
interdependence between defining and explaining.
2.3 – The Essence of Subjects vs. The Essence of Attributes: Two Models of 
Definition-Based Explanation 
Pairing up Q1 and Q2 with Q1* and Q2* seems unproblematic. The presence of an 
attribute in a subject can easily be phrased in a categorical sentence liable to occur as the conclusion 
of a syllogistic inference. Thus, it is easy to understand why Aristotle takes questions such as 
(Q1) Does P belong to S?/(Q3.1) Does P exist? 
(Q2) Why dos P belong to S?/(Q4.1) What is P? 
as equivalent to questions about a middle term: 
(Q1*) Is there an M such that PaM, MaS ⊦ PaS & M is the reason why PaS? 
(Q2*) What is M such that PaM, MaS ⊦ PaS & M is the reason why PaS? 
However, Aristotle makes it clear that a middle term is sought not only in questions about 
attributes, but also in questions about subjects (APo II 2, 89b37-90a5). Therefore, questions like 
(Q3) Does S exist? 
                                                 
77 See Kung (1977, pp. 168-172); Charles (2000; 2010b, pp. 268-328); Williams & Charles (2013); Peramatzis (2011, pp. 
180-188; 2013); Koslicki (2012); Angioni (2014c; 2016). 
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(Q4) What is S? 
would also be reduced to questions about the existence and identity of middle terms. However, 
several interpreters have noted that, at first sight, it does not seem natural to talk of middle terms 
when we are asking whether a given subject is ‘without qualification’: 
How can and applied to a substance be supposed to be 
concerned with a middle term? A substance does not inhere in anything; 
there are no two terms between which a middle term is to be found. A. 
[Aristotle] gives no example of what he means by the in such a case, 
and in this chapter the application of the questions and to 
substances is overshadowed by its application to attributes and events, 
which is amply illustrated (90a 15-23) [Ross 1949, pp. 611-2]. 
It seems clear from Aristotle’s first examples that his questions are (1) Is 
X Y? (2) Why is X Y? (3) Does X exist? What is X? – X being a substance 
(centaur, god, man). But when he goes on to say that in every case we are 
looking for a middle term or cause, doubts arise; because it is not obviously 
true that when we ask whether a substance exists, or what is it, we are 
inquiring for its cause [Tredennick 1960, p. 11]. 
Once we know that ( ) C is A, we know that there is a middle term 
holding the extreme terms together. When we ask why ( ) C is A, we 
ask what is the . If it is B, then we know that C is A because ( ) 
C is B and B is A. But how can there be a middle term between a single 
term and the predicate ‘exists’? [Gomez-Lobo 1980, p. 73]. 
This difficulty comes from the general view that the existence of subjects, unlike that 
of attributes, cannot be reduced to their presence in a more basic entity. Thus, one could say that 
Q3 and Q4 cannot be translated into subject-predicate sentences (as Q3.1 and Q4.1 can), which 
makes it difficult to understand why Aristotle takes them as tantamount to questions about a middle 
term. After reading APo II 1-2, we have the impression that it would be more congenial to 
Aristotle’s theory if Q3 and Q4 were not answered by means of syllogistic demonstrations, letting 
subjects and their essences fall exclusively within the competence of . If so, in the case of 
subjects at least, defining and explaining would not be interdependent practices. 
One could argue that it makes perfect sense to take Q3 and Q4 as questions about a 
middle term if we understand existence as a first order predicate. In that case, the existence of a 
subject would be verified insofar as there would be a middle term proving that the predicable 
‘existing’ belongs to it. The cause signified by this middle term, on the other hand, would be the 
essence of the subject, providing in this way an answer to Q4. However, a few considerations about 
Aristotle’s theory of demonstration shall make it clear that a predicate such as ‘being’ or ‘existing’ 
could hardly occur as the major term in a typical Aristotelian demonstration. 
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Aristotle describes demonstrable attributes as ‘per se accidents’ (
)78, i.e. as predicates belonging to a subject ‘in itself’ ( ), but not as a part of its 
‘essence’ ( ).79 Aristotle intends to account for the fact that science is above all concerned with 
attributes that, unlike existence, are proper to their subjects and hold of them by necessity. 
Nevertheless, their presence in the relevant subject is not a trivial fact about it, knowable a priori 
through the analysis of what it is to be that subject. As several interpreters have noted, for Aristotle, 
necessary predicates are either part of the essence of the subject or follow from its essence.80 Since 
it is not a part of the essence of its subject, a per se accident is a necessary consequence of and is 
explained by the subject’s essence. 
It is at least unlikely that this picture could apply to a predicate such as ‘existing.’ 
However, this approach not only fails to solve the inconsistency found in APo II 1-2, but also 
brings into focus another (potential) problem in Aristotle’s theory: the philosopher appears to 
sustain two different (and perhaps incompatible) models of explanation. Since definitions are 
crucial to Aristotle’s foundationalist project, it is mandatory for us to determine what role they play 
in syllogistic demonstrations. This task involves addressing a long-standing and important question, 
for many years neglected and recently revived in the secondary literature.81 Definitions are 
principles of demonstrations insofar as the middle term is the  of the extreme and therefore 
signifies an essence of a certain kind. However, is the middle term the  (i.e. the definitional 
account) of the major or the minor term? The answer depends on whether, for Aristotle, the cause 
of a subject S being P is the essence of the attribute P or of the subject S. 
As we have seen, in the second book of the APo, Aristotle is overtly committed to 
what I shall call the ‘A-Model’: the reason why ‘PaS’ is true is the essence (or the causal part of the 
essence of) of the attribute P.82 In that case, a syllogistic explanation will have the following form: 
PaDef.(P), Def.(P)aS 
PaS 
in which ‘Def.(P)’ stands for the definition of P (or the causal part of its definition). Let us say, for 
instance, that the syllogism explaining the occurrence of thunders runs as follows (APo II 8, 93b 7-
14):  
                                                 
78 See APo I 6, 75a 18-19; I 7, 75b 42-b2; I 10, 76b 11-15; Ph. II 2, 193b 22-30; Metaph. III 1, 997a 19-25. For other 
occurrences of the notion, see Bonitz 713b43-71a3.  
79 Metaph. V 30, 1025a 10-34. 
80 Loux (1991, p. 73); Barnes (1993, p. 120); Charles (2000, p. 203); Malink (2013, pp. 124-126); Bronstein (2015, pp. 
724-725); Shields (2016, pp. 84-85). 
81 Ferejohn (2013); Angioni (2016, pp. 103-107); Bronstein (2015; 2016a, 48-50). See also my Zuppolini (2014a, pp. 
103-145).   
82 APo II 2, 89b 36 - 90a 14; 90a 31-35; II 8, 93a31-33; APo II 16, 98b 21-24; II 17 99a 21-22, 25-26 
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Syllogism VIII: 
Thunder (or such-and-such noise) holds of extinction of fire, Extinction of fire holds of clouds 
Thunder (or such-and-such noise) holds of clouds 
In that case, the complete (causal) definition of thunder would be isomorphic to Syllogism VIII: 
Def.(Thunder): 
Thunder is(df.) noise of fire being extinguished in the clouds (APo II 10, 94
a 5-6). 
However, according to the traditional account of per se accidents, a demonstrable 
attribute P is a necessary property of its subject S, which follows from, and is explained by the 
subject’s essence. If so, Aristotle would also be committed to what I shall call the ‘S-Model’: the 
reason why a demonstrable proposition ‘PaS’ is true is the essence of the subject S.83 According to 
this model, a syllogistic explanation will be structured as follows: 
PaDef.(S), Def.(S)aS 
PaS 
in which ‘Def.(S)’ stands for the definition of S. 
Some passages (especially in APo I) can be interpreted as being in accordance with the 
S-Model. Here is one of them: 
[T14] 
We understand something [S being P] non-incidentally when we know it 
in virtue of that in virtue of which it holds and from what are its principles 
as such [M]. E.g. we understand that having angles equal to two right 
angles [P] holds of something [S] when we know it from the principles [M] 
of that of which it holds in itself [S qua S] [APo I 9, 76a 4-7; Barnes 1993, 
with changes]. 
Aristotle might be taken to affirm that an attribute P belongs to a subject S in itself ( ) when 
S is P in virtue of a cause M that is among the constitutive principles of S as S (
; ). The jargon used in this 
passage suggests that being a principle of S is equivalent to being one of its essential features.84 
                                                 
83 The S-Model and the A-Model correspond to David Bronstein’s Model 1 and Model 2, respectively (see Bronstein 
2016a, pp. 48-50). 
84 Although this passage is highly controversial, I think it is useful for introducing this debate given the fact that 
Aristotle’s use of the expression ‘ ’ is usually taken to favour the S-Model, since ‘ ’ refers to the subject of 
per se predications, as I am going to argue below. For a different understanding, see Angioni (2014c; 2016), who takes 
the ‘in itself’ formula and similar expressions to refer to the explanandum as such. For other readings of T14, see Ross 
(1949, p. 537); Barnes (1993, p. 135); Angioni (2014c; 2016, p. 93). 
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Here, the expression ‘ ’ in 76a 6 is replaced by the well-known formula ‘ ’ in 76a 7. 
The shift shall not surprise the reader: 
[T15] 
To hold of something in itself and to hold of it as such are the same thing: 
e.g. point and straight hold of line in itself  – for they hold of it as line; and 
two right angles hold of triangle as triangle  – for the triangle is in itself 
equal to two right angles [APo I 4, 73b 28-32; Barnes 1993, with changes]. 
The passage above shows that, in the formula ‘S is P’, ‘ ’ refers anaphorically to the 
subject S. First, the pronoun is in the same gender and number as the subject-terms of the 
predications cited as examples, ‘ ’ with ‘ ’ and ‘ ’ with ‘ ’. Second, the 
pronoun ‘ ’ in the expression ‘ ’ is replaced in both cases by the respective subject-terms, 
‘ ’ and ‘ ’. Nevertheless, as we can see in the preceding quotation (APo I 9, 76a 4-7), 
the pronoun ‘ ’ in ‘S is P’ may refer anaphorically to the subject S, but not tautologically. 
Rather, we may say that it refers back to S by introducing another item that is, in the relevant way, 
the ‘same as’ S ( ) – that is, the essence of S. If this reading is correct, the reason why triangles 
have 2R is not something different from what it is to be a triangle, i.e. the essence of triangle. 
Hence, the corresponding demonstration would run as follows: 
Syllogism IX 
2R holds of all three-sided closed plane figures, three-sided closed plane figure holds of all triangles 
2R holds of all triangles 
Other passages in the Analytics favour the S-Model. In APo II 16, 98a35-b4, Aristotle affirms that 
broad-leaved plants such as vines and fig-trees shed their leaves precisely because they are broad-
leaved ( ).85 In APr I 35, 48a 33-36, 2R is said to hold of triangle ‘in itself’ 
( ) because anything that has 2R has it ‘in virtue of’ ( ) triangle, whereas triangle has 2R 
‘not in virtue of something different’ ( ).86 In other passages, the same general idea is 
formulated with a ‘ ’ or a (explanatory) ‘ ’ instead of ‘ ’ (APo I 5, 74b 2-4; I 24, 85b 5-13).87 
Passages from outside the Analytics also suggest something along the lines of the S-Model: 
                                                 
85 See Ferejohn (2013, p. 104). 
86 In APr I 35, Aristotle addresses the mistake of taking a primary demonstrandum – in which we have the appropriate 
subject-term from an explanatory point of view – as an immediate proposition. Although there is not a kind-term that 
is, in respect of the property 2R, explanatorily prior to ‘triangle’, a complex expression (maybe the definition of triangle) 
could be used as a middle term to explain why all triangles have 2R. 
87 For an interpretation that also takes the occurrences of ‘ ’ in the first half of APo I 24 as explanatory, see Angioni 
(2016, pp. 96-100). 
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[T16] 
For the soul is a sort of first principle of animals. We aim to consider and 
ascertain its nature and essence, and then its properties, of which some 
seem to be affections peculiar to the soul itself, while others belong to 
animals as well because of the soul [De An. I 1, 402a 6-10; Shields 2016]. 
[T17]
The fish do not have distinct limbs, owing to the fact that the nature of 
fish, according to the account of their essence, is to be able to swim, and 
since nature makes nothing either superfluous or pointless. And since they 
are blooded in virtue of their essence, it is on account of being swimmers 
that they have fins, and on account of not being land-dwellers that they 
do not have feet [PA IV 13, 695b 17-22; Lennox 2001, with changes]. 
[T18] 
They are two-footed of necessity; for the essence of the bird is that of the 
blooded animals, but at the same time that of the winged animals, and 
blooded animals do not move by more than four points [PA IV 693b 5-8; 
Lennox 2001, with changes].88 
Therefore, we have textual evidence (from the Analytics and from other works in the corpus) 
favouring both the A-Model and the S-Model. Thus, a satisfactory account of Aristotle’s theory of 
demonstration must address the question of whether he endorses the A-Model, the S-Model, or a 
combination of both (if they are compatible in the first place). However, this question cannot be 
properly answered unless the distinction between subjects and attributes is clearly drawn. Although 
Aristotle takes this distinction as a datum in APo II 1-2, several issues remain obscure: 
(A) What are the criteria for distinguishing between subjects and attributes? How does the 
metaphysical distinction between subjects and attributes relate to the linguistic or logical 
distinction between subject- and predicate-terms? 
(B) How do subjects relate to their attributes from a metaphysical point of view? Does this 
metaphysical relation affect the roles they play in scientific explanations? 
                                                 
88 See also Ph. IV 4, 211a 7-11; PA IV 5, 678ª 26-34; IV 6, 682a 35-b32; IV 8, 684a 32-b1. 
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(C) Is there a place for definitions of subjects in demonstrative sciences? Can their 
definitions be used to explain their demonstrable attributes? Can their definitions be used 
to explain their existence in syllogistic arguments? 
In the next chapters, I intend to approach these three topics by analysing some of the metaphysical 
views that underlie Aristotle’s philosophy of science. We shall see that this ontological framework 
accomplishes three basic tasks: (i) it imposes certain semantic rules for scientific discourse; (ii) it 
plays a crucial role in Aristotle’s conception of causation and scientific explanation; (iii) it provides 
particular sciences with a set of criteria for linking together and organizing their propositions in 
terms of explanatory priority. 
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CHAPTER 3 
A METAPHYSICAL DEFENCE AGAINST INFINITE REGRESS 
 
 
 
 
 
3.1 – Aristotelian Foundationalism Challenged and a Metaphysically Loaded 
Response 
We have seen that the metaphysical distinction between subjects and attributes is a 
crucial part of Aristotle’s model of demonstrative science. However, the philosopher was accused 
of selecting an underlying logic that overlooks this very distinction. Peter Geach (1972, p. 44) 
argued: ‘Aristotle, like Adam, began right, but soon wandered into a wrong path, with disastrous 
consequences for his posterity.’ In order to promote his Syllogistic, says the author, Aristotle 
rejected a healthy theory of predication – already sketched by Plato in the Sophist and explored by 
Aristotle himself in the De interpretatione – which could have anticipated notions and theses that 
would be achieved only by Frege and Russell.89 Following Plato, Aristotle argued that the simplest 
propositions available are composed of two basic elements, a ‘verb’ ( ) and a ‘name’ ( ). 
Names and verbs have distinct and mutually exclusive logical roles. A verb is always ‘a sign of 
things said of something else’ (Int. 3, 16b 7-8.), like ‘thinks’ or ‘runs’, whereas a name, like ‘Socrates’ 
or ‘Secretariat’, refers to the object to which the verb is applied. Together, name and verb compose 
                                                 
89 See also Harari (2004, pp. 81-82). 
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meaningful propositions such as ‘Socrates thinks’ or ‘Secretariat runs’, which does not happen 
when we have a sequence of names (‘Socrates Secretariat’) or of verbs (‘thinks runs’). In addition, 
Aristotle says that ‘there is no difference between saying that a man walks and saying that a man is 
walking’ (Int. 12, 21b 9-10). Thus, the logical asymmetry that holds between subject and predicate 
is present in sentences with a bipartite syntax of the form ‘S Ps’ (‘Secretariat runs’) as well as in 
sentences with a tripartite structure such as ‘S is P’ (‘Secretariat is running’).90 
However, at first sight, there seems to be no asymmetry between subject and predicate 
in the logic of the APr, since all the terms involved in a syllogistic reasoning must be able to play 
both logical roles. As Geach points out, a combinatory analysis shows us that, in all syllogistic 
figures, at least one of the three terms (the major, the middle and the minor) must occur as subject 
in one of the propositions and as predicate in another – in the first figure, the middle term is the 
subject of the major premise and the predicate of the minor; in the second figure, the major term 
is the subject of the major premise and the predicate of the conclusion; in the third figure, the 
minor term is the predicate of the minor premise and the subject of the conclusion. Additionally, 
the Syllogistic contains a set of conversion rules that change the logical role of the terms of the 
proposition to which they apply.91 Russell (1961, pp. 195-198) had already criticised the same aspect 
of Aristotle’s Logic, arguing that such shift in the logical role of a term within the same argument 
makes room for a large-scale production of equivocation fallacies.92 Following Russell’s criticisms, 
Peter Geach (1972, pp.51-54) claimed that abandoning the distinction between name and verb 
initiated a gradual deterioration of Logic, with harmful consequences for its development. 
In the same vein, one could claim that Aristotle’s model of demonstrative science 
embraces an underlying logic that is insensitive to the distinction between subjects and attributes, 
whose importance to his theory is made clear in APo II 1-2, as we have seen. Nevertheless, the 
APo compensate the loss of logical asymmetry between subject and predicate in syllogistic 
propositions with a set of (metaphysically loaded) theses on predication. These theses are part of a 
sophisticated argument presented in APo I 19-22, which we shall analyse in the present chapter.93 
In APo I 3, as we have seen in Chapter 1, Aristotle describes a group of sceptics who 
believe that scientific knowledge is not possible since it would require demonstrations to go on ad 
                                                 
90 Barnes (2007, p.111) notes: ‘There is no reason to question the equivalence which Aristotle and his followers 
proclaim – although it is perhaps worth insisting that the claim does not concern the English continuous present (for 
which, of course, it would be quite false) but rather a certain Greek paraphrastic idiom. So (the Greek form for) “sang” 
means the same as (the Greek form for) “was singing”; and in general “VERBs” means the same as “is VERBing”.’ 
91 The conversions are the following: AaB ⊦ BiA; AiB ⊦ BiA; AeB ⊦ BeA.     
92 See also Harari (2004, p. 92). 
93 I presented a full reconstruction of Aristotle’s proof in Zuppolini (2014a), in which some of the claims I advance in 
this chapter can be found. Nevertheless, the interpretation presented there is significantly different from the one I am 
proposing now. 
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infinitum. In APo I 19-22, the philosopher presents a very complex argument meant to show that 
his model of demonstrative science is not vulnerable to this kind of sceptical attack. In other words, 
the argument is meant to establish that all Aristotelian demonstrations of the form ⟨Π, c⟩ contain 
a limited number of inferential steps, the set Π being finite.94 
Aristotle begins his proof by questioning the possibility of there being infinite series 
of predications. These series can be of two kinds, the first of them being specified as follows: 
[T19]
Then let C be such that it itself no longer holds of anything else and B 
holds of it primitively (i.e. there is nothing else between them). Again, let 
E hold of F in the same way, and F of B. Now must this come to a stop, 
or is it possible for it to go on ad infinitum? [APo I 19, 81b 30-33; Barnes 
1993] 
Later on, in 81b 39-40, the philosopher describes this series as going ‘upwards’ (
): such a series – which I shall call ‘U-series’ – begins with a ‘fixed’ subject and the predicate 
of each categorical sentence occurs as subject in the next predication: 
Infinite Upwards Series (U-series): M1aS, M2aM1, M3aM2, ... , such that ∀n(Mn+1aMn) 
The other kind of predicative series runs as follows: 
[T20] 
Again, if nothing is predicated of A in itself and A holds of H primitively 
and of nothing prior in between, and H holds of G and this of B, must this 
come to a stop, or is it possible for this to go on ad infinitum? [APo I 19, 81b 
33-37; Barnes 1993] 
This second series goes the opposite direction: it starts from a given predicate and the subject of 
each predication becomes the predicate in the next sentence. In 82a 1-2, Aristotle refers to this 
sequence of predications as going ‘downwards’ ( ) – thus, I shall call it ‘D-series’: 
Infinite Downwards Series (D-series): PaM1, M1a M2, M2aM3, ... , such that ∀n(MnaMn+1) 
To these first two questions, Aristotle adds a third one: 
                                                 
94 This has been called Aristotle’s ‘compactness proof.’ See Lear (1980, pp. 15-34), who admits that Aristotle’s concern 
is not exactly the same as the one we understand nowadays as the compactness problem. On this, see Scanlan (1983). 
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[T21] 
Again, is it possible for the terms in between to be infinite if the extremes 
are determined? I mean e.g. if the A holds of C, and B is a middle term 
for them, and for B and A there are different middle terms, and for these 
others, is it possible or impossible for these to go on ad infinitum? This is 
the same as to inquire whether demonstrations can proceed ad infinitum 
and whether there can be demonstrations of everything, or whether terms 
are bounded by one another [APo I 19, 82a 2-8; Barnes 1993]. 
At first sight, one might read the first two lines of this passage as referring to the two limits S and 
P ( ) and the intermediate terms Mis ( ) in U- or D-series. However, what 
characterises these series seems to be the fact that each of them has only one boundary – an 
ultimate subject S and an ultimate predicate P respectively. Actually, the occurrence of ‘ ’ in 
82a4 suggests that Aristotle has in mind a categorical proposition that requires an infinite number 
of middle terms in order to be demonstrated. By asking about the possibility of there being infinite 
middle terms between two (extreme) terms, Aristotle is again addressing the sceptical objection 
raised in APo I 3. In fact, what he will try to prove in APo 19-22 is precisely that demonstrations 
cannot be extended ad infinitum. On the other hand, if ‘ ’ and ‘ ’ refer to the terms 
of the conclusion and to the middle terms of a demonstration, respectively, the connection between 
this third question and the other two becomes far from obvious. 
It is worth stressing that the three questions are raised in a context in which the 
Syllogistic is always present in the background as a fundamental presupposition of Aristotle’s 
argumentation, a point interpreters often neglect. In the first paragraph of APo I 19, 81b 10-29, 
Aristotle reminds his readers of some of the features of syllogistic reasoning, making comments he 
would not bother to make if they were not to be taken into account in the next paragraphs. In fact, 
the first paragraph of APo I 19 and the following chapters make it clear that the first two questions 
are, more precisely, about whether infinite series of universal affirmative predications can occur in 
syllogistic demonstrations. 
Aristotle’s point can be illustrated as follows. If a demonstration could go ad infinitum, 
at least one of its branches would contain infinitely many steps. Thus, the two questions raised in 
APo I 19 can be taken as exploring two minimum scenarios in which an infinite demonstration would 
be possible. Suppose, for instance, that an infinite sequence of inferences in Barbara would be 
necessary to demonstrate a given universal affirmative sentence ‘PaS’. In the first minimum 
scenario, the minor premise of each syllogistic inference in the demonstration would be 
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indemonstrable, which means, in Aristotle’s vocabulary, that each predicate of each of these minor 
premises would belong to their respective subjects ‘primitively’ – see ‘ ’, ‘ ’
(81b31) and ‘ ’ (81b32). In this situation, a U-series would be generated from the bottom 
minor term:95 
PaMω                      MωaMω-1 
    PaMω-1 
             (...) 
                  
                     PaM3                   M3aM2         
                                     PaM2                       M2aM1               
                                               PaM1                           M1aS 
                        PaS 
In another scenario, the demonstration would proceed ad infinitum through its other branch. In this 
case, the major premises would be such that the predicate holds of the subject ‘primitively’ – see 
again ‘ ’ and ‘ ’ (81b35). Thus, a D-series would emerge from the 
bottom major term: 
             Mω-1aMω                      MωaS 
                                  Mω-1aS 
                                  (...) 
                  
                                  M2aM3                   M3aS         
     M1aM2                       M2aS            
PaM1                           M1aS 
                 PaS 
 
Of course, U- and D-series do not emerge necessarily from the bottom minor and major terms 
(the subject and the predicate of the conclusion). The picture we find in these two minimum 
scenarios can also be found in any other demonstrable premise in the proof, so that these series 
might well begin with the minor or major term of any of the syllogistic inferences within it. 
It can be proved that, if at least one of the branches of a demonstration, in any 
combination of syllogistic moods, contains infinitely many steps, an infinite sequence of universal 
affirmative sentences will be generated – either a U- or a D-series. Although Aristotle himself does 
not present a sound argument for it, the chapters APo I 20-21 seem to offer at least a proof sketch 
that, if properly followed, will make it clear that no demonstrations can be extended ad infinitum 
without containing infinite series of predications.96 Therefore, with the first paragraph of APo I 19 
                                                 
95 Reading from the bottom (the conclusion) to the top of the deductive tree. 
96 It is highly implausible that Aristotle would make the whole argument of APo I 19-22 rely on a premise that is far 
from trivial without bothering to verify it himself. Lear (1980, pp.25-30) claims that Aristotle’s argument is invalid and 
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(81b 10-29) providing the appropriate context, the three questions raised in the chapter can be 
rephrased in the following terms: 
I) If ⟨Π, c⟩ is an Aristotelian demonstration, can there be a U-series – let it be Φ – such 
that Φ Π? (T19, APo I 19, 81b 30-33) 
II) If ⟨Π, c⟩ is an Aristotelian demonstration, can there be a D-series – let it be Ψ – such 
that Ψ Π? (T20, APo I 19, 81b 33-37) 
III) Can there be an Aristotelian demonstration ⟨Π, c⟩ with infinitely many inferential 
steps, the set Π being infinite? (T21, APo I 19, 82a 2-8) 
Under these formulations, the connection between the three questions is clear. As we have seen, 
the possibility of there being an infinite chain of syllogistic inferences in a demonstration entails an 
affirmative answer to at least one of the first two questions. Thus, Aristotle argues that the answer 
to both of them is negative, which allows him to give a negative answer to the third question as 
well. 
The arguments for negative answers to questions I and II are found in APo I 22. In 
this chapter, Aristotle formulates a set of constraints limiting the logical roles of certain terms in 
demonstrative syllogisms. These constraints are at the core of Aristotle’s defence of his 
foundationalist project against the sceptics of APo I 3. On the other hand, they also provide an 
answer to criticisms (mentioned at the beginning of this chapter) made against the Syllogistic: at 
least in scientific contexts, the terms involved in syllogistic inferences cannot play the roles of 
predicate and subject regardless of their semantic contents. 
These constraints rely on a set of strong metaphysical theses including the doctrine of 
ontological categories. One could ask why Aristotle’s argument follows a metaphysical approach if 
he intends to deny the occurrence of infinite series of predicative sentences, a purpose that is better 
described as having a formal or linguistic character. At this point, it is helpful to bring in a distinction, 
set out in the literature, between ‘linguistic’ and ‘metaphysical’ predications.97 What I shall call 
‘linguistic predication’ is an item of a given language and has a syntactical structure of the form ‘S 
is P’ – or ‘S Ps’ or equivalents –, where ‘S’ and ‘P’ are called ‘subject’ and ‘predicate’ for no other 
reason than the grammatical roles they perform in the sentence in which they occur. Metaphysical 
predication, on the other hand, is not a linguistic item, but the state of affairs that determines the 
truth-value of linguistic predications. The subject of a metaphysical predication S (and not ‘S’) is 
                                                 
offers his own proof of this result. For evidences that Aristotle came up with a sound strategy on his own, see Crager 
(2013, pp. 38-62; 2015, pp. 100-124). 
97 Bogen & McGuire (1985, pp. 1-2); Code (1985); Lewis (1985; 1991). 
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no longer a term or expression, but an object to which a given attribute P (and not ‘P’) belongs. In 
the following, I shall call subjects and predicates of linguistic predications ‘grammatical subjects’ 
and ‘grammatical predicates’, whereas the subjects and predicates of metaphysical predications will 
be called ‘metaphysical subjects’ and ‘metaphysical predicates’. 
Aristotle’s proof is based on the distinction between two kinds of predicative relation. 
At the very beginning of APo I 22, he discusses essence-specifying sentences, when there is a 
definitional connection between the (grammatical) subject and the (grammatical) predicate (see 
APo I 22, 83b 5-8). He argues that there cannot be infinite series of predications of this kind because 
the essence of a given (metaphysical) subject cannot be composed of infinitely many (metaphysical) 
predicates: 
[T22]  
For items predicated in what something is, the case is plain: if it is possible 
to define anything, or if what it is to be something can be known, and if 
you cannot survey infinitely many items, then the items predicated in what 
something is must be finite [APo I 22, 82b 37-83a 1; Barnes 1993]. 
After these brief words, Aristotle goes on to examine sentences in which the 
grammatical predicate is not mentioned in the definition of its grammatical subject; the 
corresponding metaphysical predicate, in turn, would not be part of the essence of the respective 
metaphysical subject:98 
[T23]  
 
 
 
 
 
You can say truly that the white thing is walking, and that that large thing 
is a log, and again that the log is large and the man is walking. When you 
speak in these two ways you make different sorts of statement. When I 
assert that the white thing is a log, I say that something which is 
                                                 
98 For a similar division of the chapter, see Philoponus (235.10-236.23); Barnes (1993, p. 175); Angioni (2007b, pp. 
108-109). Someone may think that ‘ ’ in 83a1 indicates that the rules formulated in 83a1-23 apply 
both to essential and non-essential predications. Even if this sentence is read as recognizing the need to deal with both 
kinds of predication (essential and non-essential), this does not entail that one single argument for both kinds must be 
provided. Neither is it necessary to read ‘ ’ in 83a20-21 as implying the same result, 
since ‘ ’ may very well be read as meaning ‘without containing (non-essential) unnatural predications.’ 
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incidentally white is a log, and not that the white thing is the underlying 
subject for the log. For it is not the case that, being white or just what is 
some particular white, it came to be a log – hence it is not a log except 
incidentally. But when I say that the log is white, I do not say that 
something different is white and that that is incidentally a log, as when I 
say that the musical thing is white (I am then saying that the man, who is 
incidentally musical, is white). Rather, the log is the underlying subject 
which came to be [white] not in virtue of being something different from 
what is a log or a particular log [APo I 22, 83a 1-14; Barnes 1993, with 
changes]. 
Here, Aristotle draws a distinction between two sorts of non-definitional predicative sentences, 
which I shall call ‘natural’ and ‘unnatural’ predications.99 A natural (linguistic) predication like ‘the 
log is white’ and ‘the man is walking’ is such that the grammatical subject denotes the metaphysical 
subject of the associated metaphysical predication appropriately. On the other hand, unnatural 
(linguistic) predications such as ‘the white thing is walking’ and ‘that large thing is a log’ have as 
their grammatical subjects terms that fail to refer to the corresponding metaphysical subjects in a 
proper way. 
Aristotle makes it clear that we can state truths about the world with unnatural 
predications. Such sentences are very common in ordinary discourse and, in most cases, they turn 
out to be perfectly intelligible. Scientific discourse, however, should avoid sentences of this kind 
and be limited to natural predications (see APo I 22, 83a 20-21). In the sentence ‘the log is white’, 
the grammatical subject ‘(the) log’ is an appropriate denoting phrase100 because the corresponding 
metaphysical subject is white ‘without being something different from just what is a log or a 
particular log’ (  , APo I 22, 83a 13-14). Terms that capture just 
what a given metaphysical subject is ( ) are said to ‘signify substance’ ( , APo 
I 22, 83a 24-25). This is congenial to Aristotle’s well-known thesis that substances are the 
metaphysical subjects par excellence, which makes them the primary realities on which everything 
else ontologically depends.101 Thus, science should avoid unnatural predications because scientific 
propositions are supposed to describe and explain the world as it is, which involves referring to 
the basic metaphysical subjects as what they are, namely, substances.102 
Therefore, the argument in APo I 22 is underpinned by a metaphysical theory that 
identifies substances – humans, horses, logs and so on – as the primary subjects based on which 
                                                 
99 See Philoponus 235.17-23; Barnes (1993, pp. 114; 175). 
100 We are using the expression ‘denoting phrase’ as it is defined in Russell (1905). For a comparison between Aristotle’s 
and Russell’s theories of descriptions see Williams (1985). 
101 We shall discuss in more detail the notion of ontological dependence in Chapter 4.  
102 For a similar view, see Barnes (1993, p. 176); Angioni (2006, pp.114-117); Angioni (2007b). Of course, this semantic 
principle needs to be qualified. As we are going to see below, depending on the science in question, the basic subjects 
in a scientific domain will not be, strictly speaking, substances, but still have their essence specified independently of 
mentioning more basic subjects to which they belong. 
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reality is metaphysically structured. In order to understand the claims of the chapter, interpreters 
usually resort to the Categories. In the next section, we shall analyse the main theses of this treatise 
before we continue to examine Aristotle’s proof in APo I 22. 
3.2 – The Categories: Inherence and Said-of Relations 
We have seen that the argument in APo I 22 relies on the distinction between essential 
and non-essential predications. In Cat. 2, 1a 20-b9, Aristotle uses a technical vocabulary to draw a 
similar distinction: linguistic predications of the form ‘S is P’ are split into two groups depending 
on the metaphysical relation that holds between the entity introduced by ‘S’ and the one introduced 
by ‘P’. A sentence like ‘Socrates is white’ is analysed as expressing, between the (metaphysical) 
subject Socrates and the (metaphysical) predicate whiteness, a relation Aristotle describes with the 
expression ‘ ’. We shall call it the ‘inherence relation’: 
Inherence Relation: ‘Socrates is white’ is true iff. whiteness is in the subject Socrates. 
On the other hand, a sentence like ‘Socrates is a man’ signifies a predicative connection that 
Aristotle describes by the phrase ‘ .’ In spite of Aristotle’s misleading 
vocabulary, this kind of predication is metaphysical rather than linguistic.103 We shall call it the ‘said-
of relation’: 
Said-of Relation: ‘Socrates is a man’ is true iff. man is said of the subject Socrates. 
Aristotle does not elaborate clear definitions of these predicative connections, but their 
basic features are well known. In said-of relations, the (metaphysical) predicate is part of the essence 
or nature of the (metaphysical) subject, consisting in its species or genus.104 If it signifies a relation 
of this type, the sentence ‘S is P’ is a good answer to the question ‘what is S?’ and should be 
interpreted as expressing a ‘definitional truth’ (Ferejohn 1991, p. 82). In inherence relations, on the 
other hand, the (metaphysical) predicate is not a part of the essence of the (metaphysical) subject, 
but an ‘incidental’ attribute ( ). Thus, if it expresses an inherence relation, the (linguistic) 
predication ‘S is P’ would not be an answer to the question ‘what is S?’, but to other questions like 
‘of what quality is S?’, ‘of what quantity is S?, ‘where is S?’ and so on. 
In Cat. 2, Aristotle classifies ‘beings’ ( , 1a 20) using as a criterion the roles they 
play in said-of and inherence relations: 
                                                 
103 See ‘ ’ in 1a 20. See Ackrill (1963, p. 75) and, for another reading, Moravcsick (1967). Cf. Ferejohn (1991, 
pp. 78-79). On the distinction between inherence and said-of relations, see Chen (1957). 
104 See Ackrill (1963, pp.74-75). 
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[T24] 
…
Of things that are: [1] some are said of a subject but are not in any subject. 
For example, man is said of a subject, the individual man, but is not in any 
subject. [2] Some are in a subject but are not said of any subject. […] For 
example, the individual knowledge-of-grammar is in a subject, the soul, 
but is not said of any subject; and the individual white is in a subject, the 
body (for all colour is in a body), but is not said of any subject. [3] Some 
are both said of a subject and in a subject. For example, knowledge is in a 
subject, the soul, and is also said of a subject, knowledge-of-grammar. [4] 
Some are neither in a subject nor said of a subject, for example the 
individual man or individual horse – for nothing of this sort is either in a 
subject or said of a subject [Cat. 2, 1a 20-b9; Ackrill 1963]. 
The types of being classified in this passage have the following distinctive features: 
1- Beings that are said of a subject, but are not in a subject. 
2- Beings that are not said of a subject, but are in a subject. 
3- Beings that are said of a subject and are in a subject. 
4- Beings that are not said of a subject, nor are they in a subject. 
Items of the first type are the genera and species in the category of substance – Aristotle calls them 
‘secondary substances’ ( ) –, which are said of substances without being in them or in 
any other subject – as man (1a 21) or animal (2a 19) taken universally. Entities of the second type 
are in certain subjects, but are never said of anything, which means they are never an essential 
attribute of the subject to which they belong. These are particulars in categories other than 
substance – for instance, a particular knowledge of grammar (1a 25-6) or a particular white (1a 27). 
The third type of being includes universals belonging in non-substantial categories – as, for 
example, knowledge (1b 1), which is in the soul and is said of a particular knowledge of grammar. 
Finally, entities of the fourth type are individuals in the category of substance – as, for instance, a 
particular human being (1b 4), like Socrates or Churchill, or a particular horse (1b 4-5), like 
Bucephalus or Secretariat. These are called ‘primary substances’ ( ). Although the 
Categories are not clear about what kind of things can be taken as primary substances, Aristotle’s 
examples made some interpreters describe them as ‘concrete individual living things’ (Ferejohn 
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1991, p. 81) and ‘familiar concrete particulars of common sense’ (Loux 1991, p. 23). In any case, 
the most distinguishable characteristic of primary substances is the fact that they never play the 
role of predicate in neither of these two predicative relations. 
It is true that Aristotle does not give us an elaborate account of these four kinds of 
beings just by identifying their roles in inherence and said-of relations. Nevertheless, the four-fold 
division in Cat. 2 involves two important principles of Aristotle’s ontology. First, primary 
substances are never the predicate in neither of these predicative relations, while all the other beings 
occur as predicate in at least one of them. Second, every metaphysical predicate bears a predicative 
relation with a primary substance (Cat. 5, 2b 3-6). Therefore, beings of the fourth type are taken as 
the most fundamental realities (i.e. the primary ‘beings’ or ‘substances’) because the other entities 
only take part in reality insofar as they are predicated of them. At least according to the view 
Aristotle advances in the Categories, what makes entities like courage and whiteness depend on a 
certain collection of individuals like Socrates and Secretariat is the fact that the former can only be 
part of reality as long as there are individuals like the latter of which they are (metaphysically) 
predicated, but which are not themselves (metaphysically) predicated of (and hence are not 
ontologically dependent on) anything else.105 
The dependent items of types 2 and 3 can be classified into further different kinds of 
being, which, together with substance (types 1 and 4), make up the list of Aristotelian categories: 
‘of things said without any combination, each signifies substance or quantity or quality or a relative 
or place or time or being-in-a-position or having or doing or being affected.’106 In a famous passage 
of his commentary, Ackrill (1963, pp. 78-81) argued that Aristotle might have followed two 
alternative strategies for arriving at this list. The first strategy consists in distinguishing different 
kinds of question that can be asked about a given substance x: ‘what is x?, ‘of what quality is x?’, 
‘where is x?’ and so on – in fact, Aristotle uses single-word interrogative pronouns to designate 
some of the categories ( etc.). We shall then notice that each of these 
questions admits only a limited range of appropriate answers and therefore corresponds to one of 
the categories into which beings can be classified (substance, quality, place etc.). Thus, if ‘x is in the 
Lyceum’, for instance, is an appropriate answer to the question ‘where is x?’, then the metaphysical 
predicate being in the Lyceum belongs in the category of place ( ). It is worth noting that this 
strategy already presupposes an intuitive way of distinguishing substances (the concrete particulars 
of common sense) from incidental beings.107 If the object in question is, for instance, a number or 
                                                 
105 At least, this seems to be the kind of ontological dependence that is in question in the Categories. We shall discuss in 
detail below (see Chapter 4) the problems involved in formulating ontological dependence in these terms and consider 
other kinds of ontological dependence and their impact in Aristotle’s philosophy of science. 
106 Cat. 4, 1b 25-27. Ackrill (1963) with changes. 
107 Ferejohn (1991, p. 85).  
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a Platonic form, questions like ‘where?’ and ‘when?’ would not make sense, which would render 
the list of categories incomplete. 
The second method suggested by Ackrill consists not in asking several questions about 
a given substance, but in asking the ‘what is x?’ question about any entity whatsoever, a strategy 
which seems to be operating in Top. I 9:  
[T25] 
   
It is clear at once that an expression signifying the what-it-is will 
sometimes signify a substance, sometimes a quantity, sometimes a quality, 
and sometimes one of the other categories. For, supposing the example 
under consideration is a man, if it says that the example is a human or an 
animal, then it says what it is and signifies a substance. On the other hand, 
supposing the example under consideration is a white colour, if it says that 
the subject is a white or a colour, then it says what it is and signifies a 
quality. Similarly, supposing that the example under consideration is a 
foot-long length, if it says that the example is a foot-long length, then it 
says what it is and signifies a quantity. And likewise with the other 
categories [Top. I 9, 103b27-35; Smith 1997]. 
The species or the genus (or higher genus) of Socrates and courage would be appropriate answers 
to the questions ‘what Socrates is?’ and ‘what is courage?’. If we repeat the same question in respect 
of the species or genus mentioned in these first answers, and continue thus, we will eventually end 
up with conceptually simple terms naming one of the categories – substance, quality, quantity etc. 
–, which would be summa genera to which the ‘what is x?’ question would not apply. Ackrill (1963, 
p. 80) argues that, since there is no overlap between the ranges of possible answers to the questions 
of the first strategy, no item analysed in the second strategy could fall under more than one highest 
genus if defined by genus and differentia, which explains why these two methods are supposed to 
produce the same results. 
It is hard to know whether Aristotle actually adopted these strategies and to which 
extent they are effective. However, they can still help us understand some important features of 
inherence and said-of relations. In the first strategy, a set of questions about a given substance is 
formulated, one of which is answered by a sentence signifying a said-of predication (the ‘what is x?’ 
question), whereas all the others are answered by sentences expressing inherence relations. We have 
also seen that questions corresponding to non-substantial categories are meaningless unless they 
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ask something about an item in the category of substance. All these facts already point to an 
important metaphysical principle in the Categories: 
MP 1: if P is in the subject S, then S and P belong in different categories and S is a substance.108 
On the other hand, as Ackrill’s second strategy and Top. I 9 make it clear, the ‘what is x?’ question 
applies not only to substances, but to items in other categories as well. And again, the same being 
cannot belong in more than one branch of the porphyrian tree, and all the elements in the same 
branch fall under one and the same summum genus. This gives us another metaphysical principle: 
MP 2: If P is said of the subject S, then S and P belong in the same category. 
Something along the lines of MP1 and MP2 seems to underlie Aristotle’s 
argumentation in APo I 22. First, a thesis similar to MP1 underpins the distinction between natural 
and unnatural predications. For Aristotle, science is supposed to portray reality as it is in a very 
precise sense: linguistic predications in scientific discourse must correspond to the metaphysical 
predications they intend to signify. In a non-essential predication between an attribute P and a 
subject S – that is to say, when P is in the subject S –, S will be an item in the category of substance, 
whereas P will belong in a non-substantial category. Therefore, the corresponding sentence ‘S is P’ 
would be a natural predication only if the grammatical subject ‘S’ is a substance-term like ‘log’ or 
‘man’, since otherwise it would not refer to S as what S precisely is. In a linguistic predication like 
‘the musical [thing] is white’ – [ ], 83a10 –, we do not have ‘one thing 
predicated of one thing’ (  , APo I 22, 83a 22-23), but a complex sentence with two 
coincidental attributes (being musical and being white) being predicated of the same underlying subject. 
As Aristotle points out, what we mean by a sentence like ‘the musical [thing] is white’ is ‘that the 
man, who is incidentally musical, is white’ (  
APo I 22, 83a 11-12). Still, items in non-substantial categories can also be subject of metaphysical 
predication. As long as P is part of the essence of a subject S – that is, P is said of S –, S may well 
be in a non-substantial category. In that case, according to MP 2, P will belong in the same category 
as S and none of them will ‘signify substance.’ In summary: if the sentence ‘S is P’ signifies a non-
essential predication, S is in the category of substance while P is in a non-substantial category. 
Alternatively, if ‘S is P’ expresses an essential predication, S is either in the category of substance 
or in a non-substantial category, the predicate P being, in both cases, in the same category as S. 
Thus, the distinction between homocategorical and heterocategorical predications in the Categories 
                                                 
108 Furth (1988, p. 14); Ferejohn (1991, p. 82).  
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mirrors Aristotle’s strategical distinction between essential and non-essential predicates in APo I 
22.109 
3.3 – A Defence against Infinite Regress: The Traditional Interpretation 
Several interpreters believe that the theoretical background of the Categories enables 
Aristotle to justify negative answers to questions I and II (see T19 and T20 above). In the ontology 
of the Categories, all kinds of being can occur in metaphysical predications both as subjects and as 
predicates, with the exception of particular substances (type 4 entities in our analysis of T24) and 
summa genera (the conceptually simple items that come up at the end of Ackrill’s second strategy). 
Thus, a ‘downwards’ sequence of predications of the form {PaM0, M0a M1, M1aM2, ... } would 
always end up with a sentence like ‘MiaS’ in which ‘S’ names a particular substance and therefore 
cannot occur as grammatical predicate in another predication. In conformity with Top. I 9 and 
Ackrill’s second strategy, these interpreters also believe that every ‘upwards’ sequence like {M0aS, 
M1aM0, M2aM1, ... } would be interrupted by a predication of the form ‘PaMi’ in which ‘P’ signifies 
a summum genus (substance, quality, quantity etc.) and would not be qualified to occur as subject in 
another predicative statement.110 Let us call this reading the ‘Traditional Interpretation’ of APo I 
19-22. 
This interpretation is in accordance with what Aristotle says in APr I 27: 
[T26]  
 
 
 
 
Now of all the things there are, some are such that they cannot be 
predicated truly and universally of anything else (for instance, Cleon or 
Calllias, that is, what is individual and perceptible), but other things may 
be predicated of them (for each of these is both a man and an animal). 
Some things are themselves predicated of others, but nothing else is prior 
and predicated of them. And some things are both predicated themselves 
of others and others of them, as man is predicated of Callias and animal 
of man [APr I 27, 43a25-32; Striker 2009]. 
Here, Aristotle divides things into three groups: those that are not predicated of anything else, but 
of which some things can be predicated; those that are predicated of other things but of which 
                                                 
109 See Philoponus (236.5-8), who believes that Aristotle relies on MP 1 and MP 2 in APo I 22. 
110 Philoponus 233.28-29, 244.28-32, 247.17-22; 250.21-251.9; Demos (1944, pp. 257-258); Ross (1949, pp. 578-579); 
Hamlyn (1961, p.119); Loux (1991, p. 23); Bronstein (2016a, pp. 41-42) 
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nothing can be predicated; and finally those that can be both predicated of other things and other 
things of them. The first class is exemplified by particular and perceptible objects such as Callias 
or Socrates (APr I 27, 43a 32-36), while the third class covers intermediary items such as man, 
which are predicated of things like Callias and of which things like animal are predicated. Aristotle 
does not give an example of the second class, but just announces that he will argue ‘later’ (
) that ‘one also comes to a halt if one goes upwards’ (APr I 27, 43a 36-37). The occurrence 
of the phrase ‘ ’ here does suggest that this passage refers to APo I 19-22 and it is easy to 
see why anyone advocating the Traditional Interpretation of these chapters would like to take the 
summa genera as examples of the second class listed in T26.111 
Indeed, Aristotle seems to accept in his ontology items that function as boundaries in 
the complex structure of predicative connections of which reality is made. However, there is no 
reliable evidence that this aspect of his metaphysical theory is crucial (or even relevant) to his 
argument in APo I 19-22. In addition to the lack of textual evidence, there are also three positive 
reasons to reject the Tradition Interpretation: 
(i) First of all, this reading makes names and descriptions of particular substances the 
basic subject-terms of scientific discourse. However, Aristotle seems hostile to the presence 
singular terms in demonstrative sciences. In the Categories, a universal kind K is said to be 
ontologically dependent on its particular members in the sense that it could not exist if there were 
no individuals of which K could be predicated. Therefore, particular substances are said to be 
‘primary’, while their species and genera only get the status of ‘secondary’ substances. Nevertheless, 
the type of dependence between attributes and subjects that demonstrations are supposed to 
account for is not existential, but explanatory. For Aristotle, the knowledge that the triangle has 2R is 
in some way prior to the knowledge that ‘a given figure in a semi-circle’112 or the isosceles triangle113 
have the same property, since 2R belongs to them as triangles. Thus, particular objects x, y, z (…) 
have the demonstrable properties they have qua members of a universal kind K, i.e. in virtue of being 
members of K – even if the existence of K depends on the existence of its particular members. As 
we shall see in the next chapters, one fundamental task of demonstrative sciences is to identify the 
relevant kinds on which a given property relies from an explanatory point of view. For that reason, 
the corresponding (universal) kind-terms will be the basic subjects in demonstrative sciences, not 
names and descriptions of particular substances.114 
                                                 
111 For a careful discussion of T26, and the presence of singular terms and summa genera in Aristotle’s syllogistic, see 
Almeida (2013). 
112 APo I 1, 71a 19-21. 
113 APo I 4, 73a 28-34; 73b 25 APo I 24, 85b 5-7 APo I 9, 76ª 4-9. 
114 See my Zuppolini (2014c, pp. 15-17). 
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(ii) On the other hand, being a substance, a quality or a quantity does not seem to be 
the kind of feature Aristotle would take as a demonstrable attribute. In ideal cases, a demonstrable 
attribute is peculiar to its subject and belongs to it in virtue of the subject being the specific subject 
it is.115 This could hardly be the case of highly abstract and generic predicates such as summa genera. 
Although they are relevant to metaphysical speculation, these concepts seem to be associated with 
classificatory practices rather than scientific explanation. It is hard to see how a scientist could tell 
a clear-cut causal story explaining why they are connected to a specific subject and not another – 
as a geometer is able to explain why 2R belongs to the triangle and no other figure. If there is such 
causal story to be told, it is certainly not the kind of explanation departmental sciences are supposed 
to provide. 
(iii) There is a third and final reason to reject the Traditional Interpretation of APo I 
19-22. As we have noted, the aim of Aristotle’s argumentation in these chapters is to provide an 
answer to a group of sceptics described in APo I 3, who believe that scientific knowledge is not 
possible because demonstrations would proceed ad infinitum. As we know, this sceptical objection 
relies on the false assumption that every proposition in demonstrative sciences is known by 
demonstration. Without this assumption, it is possible to insist on a foundationalist solution and 
hold that every demonstration is ultimately based on propositions which do not need to be 
demonstrated from explanatorily prior premises in order to be known. However, in addition to the 
abstract epistemological discussion in APo I 3, Aristotle found it necessary to make sure his own 
model of demonstrative science was safe from infinite regress, a task he tried to accomplish in APo 
I 19-22. Since syllogistic demonstrations with an infinite set of premises would contain infinite 
series of predications, Aristotle believed that showing the impossibility of infinite predicative series 
was tantamount to proving that no demonstration in his model could proceed ad infinitum. 
However, the sceptic from APo I 3 might well argue that the connection between infinite chains 
of predications and infinite regress is a peculiarity of Aristotle’s metaphysics and its underlying 
logic, whereas his challenge concerns the existence of ultimate explanations. Therefore, unless we 
are able to show a relation between Aristotle’s theses on predication and the existence of 
explanatorily basic premises, the philosopher (at least in APo I 19-22) would have failed to protect 
his model against infinite regress. Certainly, the Traditional Interpretation does not explain the 
connection between particular substances and summa genera being boundaries of predicative chains, 
on one hand, and the existence of ultimate explanations, on the other. 
                                                 
115 See APo I 4 73b32-74a3; I 5, 74a16-b4; I 24, 85b4-15; 85b23-27; 85b38-86a3. This aspect of Aristotle’s theory will be 
clarified in the next chapter. 
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3.4 – A Defence against Infinite Regress: An Alternative Interpretation 
As I have argued, the three questions raised in APo I 19 concern the occurrence of 
predicative series within syllogistically structured demonstrations: 
I) If ⟨Π, c⟩ is an Aristotelian demonstration, can there be a U-series – let it be Φ – such 
that Φ Π? (T19, APo I 19, 81b 30-33) 
II) If ⟨Π, c⟩ is an Aristotelian demonstration, can there be a D-series – let it be Ψ – such 
that Ψ Π? (T20, APo I 19, 81b 33-7) 
III) Can there be an Aristotelian demonstration ⟨Π, c⟩ with infinitely many inferential 
steps, the set Π being infinite? (T21, APo I 19, 82a 2-8) 
Aristotle formulates question III with a typical syllogistic vocabulary: can there be an 
infinite set of middle terms {M1, M2, M3, ... , Mω} between two extremes P and S? Let us follow the 
scenario described in T19 and suppose the following sequence of inferences in Barbara, in which 
the minor premises are ‘immediate’, whereas the major premises are always demonstrated from 
more basic propositions: 
PaMω                      MωaMω-1 
    PaMω-1 
             (...) 
                  
                     PaM3                   M3aM2         
                                     PaM2                       M2aM1               
                                               PaM1                           M1aS 
                        PaS 
In this context, asking whether the demonstration could proceed ad infinitum is equivalent to asking 
whether a U-series could be formed from the minor term S.116 This question, however, is the same 
as asking whether there is a middle term Mi which is ‘immediately’ or ‘indemonstrably’ connected 
to P. Here, question III is equivalent to the following question:117 
III.1) Is it the case that ∀i∃j((PaMj, MjaMi├ PaMi) & Mj is the reason why PaMi) ? 
                                                 
116 Of course, in a different context, with a different combination of syllogistic moods, a U-series may emerge (e.g.) 
from the bottom major term instead of the bottom minor term (see the sequence of Camestres in APo I 21, 82b13-21), 
as well as a D-series may begin with (e.g.) the bottom minor term instead of the bottom major term (see the sequence 
of Bocardo in 82b 22-28). It is worth noting that the same reasoning applies to all demonstrable premises within the 
chain, which means a U-series or a D-series may emerge from any minor or major term in the demonstration. 
117 See my Zuppolini (2014a, p. 48). Cf. Lear (1980, p. 22). 
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Suppose now a sequence of syllogisms in Barbara in which the minor premises are 
demonstrable, while the major premises are immediate – like the scenario suggested in T20: 
             Mω-1aMω                      MωaS 
                                  Mω-1aS 
                                  (...) 
                  
                                  M2aM3                   M3aS         
     M1aM2                       M2aS            
PaM1                           M1aS 
                 PaS 
Asking whether this demonstration have infinitely many steps is the same as asking whether a D-
series could emerge from the major term P. Such question, however, is equivalent to asking whether 
there is no middle term Mi to which the bottom minor term S is ‘immediately’ connected: 
III.2) Is it the case that ∀i∃j((MiaMj, MjaS├ MiaS) & Mj is the reason why MiaS) ? 
If this interpretation of APo I 19 is correct, Aristotle is not raising an abstract 
metaphysical question about the existence of ultimate subjects (such as particular substances) and 
ultimate predicates (such as summa genera). On the contrary, he is interested in denying that U- or 
D-series could be part of a demonstration proving the relation between two ‘fixed’ or ‘determined’ 
extremes ( ) – i.e. any major and minor terms in the syllogistic chain, and not 
necessarily names and descriptions of particular substances or general terms naming ontological 
categories. But how does Aristotle establish this result? What are the premises of his argument? 
As we have seen, the ontology of the Categories contains the following metaphysical 
principles: 
MP 1: if P is in the subject S, then S and P belong in different categories and S is a substance. 
MP 2: If P is said of the subject S, then S and P belong in the same category. 
These two principles (or some close version of them) seem to motivate the distinction between 
natural and unnatural predications in APo I 22. A categorical sentence ‘PaS’ – ‘every S is P’ – is a 
natural predication when the grammatical subject ‘S’ refers to the metaphysical subject S by 
signifying just what S is ( ). In contemporary terms, we would say that ‘S’ is a sortal or 
individuative term, whose distinguishing feature is what Quine calls ‘divided reference.’118 By 
specifying what the denoted objects essentially are, such terms provide us with a criterion for 
counting these objects as discrete entities, which makes them suitable to be attached to 
                                                 
118 Quine (1960, pp. 90-95).  
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quantificational expressions such as ‘every S’ or ‘some S’. In other words, these terms signify 
119 (and not etc.), i.e. they specify the essence of the basic subjects of a given 
domain, which are substances or substance-like entities on which all the other entities in the domain 
depend.120 
Part of Aristotle’s argumentation in APo I 22 consists in a discussion of the constraints 
MP 1 and MP 2 impose on scientific discourse. Let us call ‘E-sentences’ all essence-specifying 
predications (i.e. linguistic predications signifying said-of relations), while ‘A-sentences’ will refer to 
‘accidental’ predications (i.e. linguistic predications signifying inherence relations). Thus, the linguistic 
correlates of MP 1 and MP 2 could be formulated as follows: 
LP 1: If ‘AaB’ is an A-sentence, then ‘A’ signifies a non-substantial entity & ‘B’ signifies substance. 
LP 2: If ‘AaB’ is an E-sentence, then ‘A’ and ‘B’ signify entities in the same category. 
The fact that a subject-term ‘signifies substance’ tells us something about the roles it can perform 
in U- and D-series: 
[T27] 
 
 
  
Again, terms which mean substance mean, of what they are predicated of, 
just what is that thing or just what is a particular sort of it. Terms which 
do not mean substance but are said of some other underlying subject 
which is neither just what is that thing nor just what is a particular sort of 
it, are incidental. E.g. white of a man: a man is neither just what is white 
nor just what is some particular white – rather, presumably, animal: a man 
is just what is an animal [APo I 22, 83a 24-30; Barnes 1993, with changes]. 
The sentence ‘every man is musical’ is a natural predication because the logical predicate used in 
the denoting phrase ‘every man’ specifies what the denoted objects (Socrates, Callias, Coriscus etc.) 
essentially are ( ). The reason is that ‘man’ stands for a metaphysical item that is essentially 
                                                 
119 APo I 22, 83a 24-25. See Furth (1988, p. 30); Loux (1991, p. 132) and my Zuppolini (2014c, pp. 30-37). 
120 The qualification ‘substance-like’ is meant to account for basic subjects in mathematical sciences (such as line, 
surface, figure etc.), which are studied independently of the material elements in which they inhere in the real world. 
My point is that attributes such as straight is ontologically dependent on lines, even if lines are not substances in the 
strict sense of the term. What we mean by ‘substance-like entities’ is what Ross (1949, p. 633) describes as ‘entities 
which are not substances but exist only as attributes of subjects, viz. those which a particular science considers as if 
they had independent existence and treats as its own subjects’ [emphasis in original]. 
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predicated of everything of which it is predicated – like type 1 entities in the four-fold division of 
Cat. 2 (see T24). Therefore, Aristotle is allowed to use the following premise in his argument: 
P1: If ‘AaB’ is an A-sentence & ‘BaC’ is a scientific predication, ‘BaC’ is an E-sentence.121 
On the other hand, the adjective term ‘white’, for instance, does not specify what white objects 
essentially are, which means it is not qualified to occur as subject in A-sentences, but only in E-
sentences: 
P2: If ‘AaB’ is an A-sentence & ‘CaA’ is a scientific predication, ‘CaA’ is an E-sentence. 
A third premise can be obtained from this passage. Aristotle affirms that a term such 
as ‘white’ does not ‘signify substance’ insofar as it fails to specify what (e.g.) a white man essentially 
is ( ). Here, Aristotle relies on a sort of test to determine whether a word signifies substance 
or not. If ‘white’ signified substance, a white man, for instance, would be just what white is (
), i.e. a colour of a certain kind. Since this is not the case, ‘white’ does not signify 
substance. ‘Animal’, on the other hand, signifies substance insofar as every animal, man included, 
is just what animal is ( ).122 This test reminds us of what is said in Cat. 3, 1b 10-16, 
where Aristotle endorses another metaphysical principle: 
MP 3: If P is said of the subject S & S is said of the subject S’, then P is said of the subject S’. 
If said-of relations are transitive, as stated in MP 3, Aristotle can include the following 
premise in his argument: 
P3: If ‘AaB’ is an E-sentence & ‘BaC’ is an E-sentence, then ‘AaC’ is an E-sentence. 
Finally, as we know, Aristotle repeatedly denies the possibility of one single subject having infinitely 
many essential predicates.123 If so, he also accepts the following premise: 
P4: There cannot be infinitely many E-sentences ‘A1aB’, ‘A2aB’, …, ‘AnaB.’ 
I shall now argue that the metaphysical framework of the Categories together with P1, 
P2, P3 and P4 can be used to prove that U-series and D-series cannot occur within syllogistic 
demonstrations. Unlike the Traditional Interpretation, our proposal does not involve including 
names and descriptions of particular substances and summa genera in scientific demonstrations.  
                                                 
121 Let us say that ‘AaB’ is a scientific predication if and only if ‘AaB’ is true & ‘AaB’ is not an unnatural predication. 
122 See Philoponus (240.14-24); Angioni (2006, pp. 124-125) and my Zuppolini (2014a, p. 96). 
123 APo I 22, 82b 37-83a 1; 83b 8; 13-16; 26-27.’ 
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Let us first analyse the following predicative series, going ‘upwards’ from a subject S: 
Φ = {M1aS, M2aM1, M3aM2, … , such that ∀n(Mn+1aMn)} 
The first predication of the series, ‘M1aS’, is either an E-sentence or an A-sentence, i.e. either M1 is 
part of the essence of S or not. I shall now analyse each of these two alternatives. 
Suppose first that ‘M1aS’ is an E-sentence. Now, we have to ask whether the other 
predications in the series are also E-sentences or whether an A-sentence comes up at some point. 
Let us say, for the sake of argument, that all the other predications in Φ are E-sentences as well. If 
‘M1aS’ and ‘M2aM1’ are E-sentences, ‘M2aS’ is also an E-sentence (by P3). For the same reason, if 
‘M2aS’ and ‘M3aM2’ are E-sentences, ‘M3aS’ is also an E-sentence, the same being true for every Mi 
in Φ. Thus, if the series Φ were infinite, there would be infinitely many E-sentences, each of which 
attributing a different essential predicate to S. 
Φ = {M1aS, M2aM1, M3aM2, …} 
  
            M2aS 
 
                       M3aS 
 
            (…) 
According to P4, this result is impossible, which means Φ could not be infinite in this way. 
Therefore, Φ must contain at least one A-sentence. Let us say that the first A-sentence in Φ is 
‘M2aM1’. In that case, the next sentence ‘M3aM2’ would have to be an E-sentence, since a predicate 
in an A-sentence does not ‘signify substance’ and therefore cannot be itself subject in another A-
sentence (P2). If ‘M3aM2’ is an E-sentence, ‘M4aM3’ would also be an E-sentence, since ‘M3’, as an 
essential predicate of ‘M2’, does not signify substance either (see LP 2), and hence cannot be subject 
in an A-sentence (see LP 1). Thus, if Φ were infinite, there would be infinitely many E-sentences 
starting from ‘M3aM2’, from which infinitely many E-sentences with ‘M2’ as subject would follow 
(P3). Since this result is impossible (P4), we must conclude again that Φ is finite. Therefore, if 
‘M1aS’ is an E-sentence, the series of predications Φ cannot be infinite. 
Even if we assume (alternatively) that ‘M1aS’ is an A-sentence, Φ could not be infinite 
either. If ‘M1aS’ is an A-sentence, the next sentence in the series, ‘M2aM1’, would have to be an E-
sentence (P2). In that case, however, the next proposition ‘M3aM2’ and all the other predications in 
Φ will also be E-sentences, since none of the Mis would signify substance (LP 2 and P2). If so, 
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there would be infinitely many E-sentences with ‘M1’ as subject-term (by P3), which is impossible 
according to P4. Since the first predication in Φ is either an E-sentence or an A-sentence, it follows 
that U-series cannot occur in syllogistic demonstrations. Therefore, Aristotle has the theoretical 
resources to justify a negative answer to question I without postulating the presence of summa genera 
in scientific demonstrations. 
However, a negative answer to question III requires a negative answer not only to 
question I but also to question II. In other words, a demonstration ⟨Π, c⟩ could still have infinitely 
many steps if nothing prevented D-series from occurring in Π. We must then analyse a predicative 
series going ‘downwards’ from a predicate P: 
Ψ = {PaM1, M1a M2, M2aM3, ... , such that ∀n(MnaMn+1)} 
The first predication of the series, ‘PaM1’, will be either an E-sentence or an A-sentence. Let us 
assume first that ‘PaM1’ is an E-sentence. Suppose, in addition, that all the other predications in Ψ 
are also E-sentences. Under this supposition, one could think that it is possible to argue as we did 
in the case of U-series, and use P3 to show that, if Ψ is infinite, there will be infinitely many E-
sentences with one of the terms in Ψ as subject (which would be impossible according to P4). 
However, this line of reasoning does not work for D-series: for any Mi in Ψ there will be finitely 
many sentences from ‘Mi-1aMi’ back to ‘PaM1’, as we can see in the following diagram:124 
 Ψ = {PaM1, M1a M2, M2aM3, …} 
  
            M1aM3 
 
                                     PaM3 
 
     × 
Nevertheless, it can be shown that, if Ψ were infinite, there would be infinitely many 
essential predicates belonging to the same subject, even if this subject is not mentioned in Ψ. If Ψ 
contains only E-sentences, it would be limited to a single category – either substance or a non-
substantial category (LP 2). Let us say that every term in Ψ signifies a non-substantial category – 
e.g. ‘sensible quality’, ‘colour’, ‘white’ etc. According to Aristotle’s ontology, each of these terms 
would be predicated of a type 2 entity (as defined in Cat. 2) – e.g. a particular sort of white. 
Therefore, if Ψ were infinite, it would be possible to derive from it infinitely many E-sentences 
                                                 
124 Barnes (1993, p. 180) makes a similar point about 84ª7-28. 
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with (e.g.) ‘seashell white’ as subject-term (even if ‘seashell white’ does not occur in Ψ): ‘sensible 
quality holds of seashell white’, ‘colour holds of seashell white’, ‘white holds of seashell white’ etc. Similarly, 
if all terms in Ψ are restricted to the category of substance – e.g. ‘living being’, ‘animal’, ‘man’ etc. 
–, each of them would be predicated of a type 4 entity – e.g. a particular man. Therefore, infinitely 
many E-sentences with (e.g.) ‘Socrates’ as subject-term would follow from Ψ (even if ‘Socrates’ 
does not occur in Ψ): ‘living being holds of Socrates’, ‘animal holds of Socrates’, ‘man holds of Socrates’ 
etc. Since none of these results is possible (by P4), Ψ cannot be infinite if it is composed only of 
E-sentences. 
Suppose then that an A-sentence comes up at some point – let it be ‘M1a M2’. In that 
case, the next predication ‘M2aM3’ is necessarily an E-sentence: as subject of an A-sentence, ‘M2’ 
signifies substance and therefore can only be predicate in E-sentences (according to P1). Given LP 
2, the same is true for any ‘Mi’ in Ψ provided that i ≥ 2. Again, if it were infinite, Ψ would contain 
infinitely many substantial predicates – e.g. ‘living being’, ‘animal’, ‘man’ etc. –, from which 
infinitely many E-sentences about any particular substance in the domain could be obtained: ‘living 
being holds of Socrates’, ‘animal holds of Socrates’, ‘man holds of Socrates’ etc. In any case, it follows 
that Ψ is finite if its first predication is an E-sentence. 
For similar reasons, the same result follows from the assumption that ‘PaM1’ is an A-
sentence. In that case, the next predication ‘M1a M2’ is necessarily an E-sentence, given P1. In fact, 
if Ψ begins with an A-sentence, every ‘Mi’, starting from ‘M1’, would signify substance. Once again, 
Ψ would contain infinitely many substantial predicates, all of which are predicated of any of the 
particular substances in the domain – even if none of them is individually mentioned in Ψ. Since 
‘PaM1’ is either an A-sentence or an E-sentence, Ψ is necessarily finite. Therefore, no 
demonstration contains D-series, a conclusion which is possible to reach without including names 
and descriptions of particular substances in scientific demonstrations. 
We have identified premises from which Aristotle could have justified negative 
answers to questions I and II. In APo I 22, 83b 17-30, the philosopher not only endorses those 
premises, but actually obtains from them the conclusion he was trying to prove – albeit in a 
convoluted and excessively concise way, we must admit. In this passage, Aristotle summarizes his 
argument and reaffirms at least three of the four premises we formulated above: 
[T28]  
 
We have supposed that one thing is predicated of one thing, and that items 
are not predicated of themselves when they do not signify what something 
is. For these are all incidental (though some hold of things in themselves 
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and some in another way), and we say that all of them are predicated of an 
underlying subject, and that what is incidental is not an underlying subject 
[APo I 22, 83b 17-22; Barnes 1993, with changes]. 
 [T29] 
 
The incidentals are said of items in the substance of each thing, and these 
latter are not infinite [APo I 22, 83b 26-27; Barnes 1993]. 
In T28, Aristotle endorses P2: items in non-substantial categories cannot be predicated of one 
another unless the predicate is part of the ‘what-it-is’ (the essence) of the subject (
). In T29, the philosopher reaffirms P1 (
) and P4 ( ). 
Probably assuming P3, which had already been stated in 83a 24-30 (quoted above), Aristotle 
concludes his argument and denies that U- and D-series can occur in scientific demonstrations (83b 
24-25; 27-28) – i.e. the answers to questions I and II are negative. If so, no demonstration could 
have infinitely many steps, which means the answer to question III is also negative. 
If our interpretation is correct, the two ‘determined’ extremes Aristotle mentions in 
T21 (APo I 19, 82a 2-8), the passage in which question III is formulated, are not ultimate subjects 
and ultimate predicates (particular substances and summa genera in the Traditional Interpretation), 
but any major and minor term in an extended syllogistic demonstration. Thus, it becomes easier to 
understand Aristotle’s argument in APo I 19-22 as a defence of his foundationalist project. As we 
have seen, his argument relies heavily on the claim that no subject has infinitely many essential 
predicates. Aristotle bases this metaphysical claim on an epistemological thesis: essences can be 
known, and since we cannot ‘survey infinitely many items in thought’ (83b 6-7), it follows that no 
subject can have an infinite number of essential attributes.125 As we have seen, essences are the 
primary causes studied by demonstrative sciences, with the corresponding definitions playing the 
role of first principles. Thus, it is not surprising that the thesis that every demonstration contains a 
finite number of steps is ultimately grounded in the belief that essences are knowable. 
Moreover, as we can see in III.1 and III.2, a negative answer to question III entails 
that (i) for any major term P in a demonstration ⟨Π, c⟩ there will be a middle term Mi ‘immediately’ 
or ‘indemonstrably’ connected to P, and (ii) for any minor term S in ⟨Π, c⟩ there will be a middle 
term Mj which is ‘immediately’ or ‘indemonstrably’ connected to S. If to be ‘immediately’ or 
‘indemonstrably’ connected to a term means to be ‘definitionally’ connected to it, we may have an 
                                                 
125 APo I 22, 82b 37-83a 1; 83b 8. Aristotle defended the metaphysical thesis that no essence is composed of infinitely 
many predicates based on the epistemological claim that essences are knowable. Nevertheless, he might well have 
thought that, in reality, the epistemological thesis is grounded in the metaphysical one, and not the other way around. 
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answer to one of the questions we raised in the previous chapter: the A-Model and the S-Model 
are not mutually exclusive; on the contrary, a combination of both would be part of Aristotle’s 
strategy to defend his model of science against the threat of infinite regress. This result, however, 
is not final. The ontology of the Categories and the way Aristotle uses some of its theses in APo I 
19-22 may give us a preliminary account of the distinction between subjects and attributes and the 
role their essences play in scientific explanations. However, as we shall see in the next chapter, 
Aristotle’s model includes a much more sophisticated theory of predication, with distinctions that 
are more fine-grained than the one between ‘essential’ and ‘accidental’ attributes. 
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CHAPTER 4 
PER SE BEINGS AND PER SE PREDICATIONS 
 
 
 
 
 
4.1 – Kinds of Being and Ontological Priority 
The Categories gives us a preliminary account of the distinction between (metaphysical) 
subjects and (metaphysical) predicates. The doctrine of ontological categories helps us understand 
the semantical constraints imposed on demonstrative discourse: the logical roles a term can play in 
scientific propositions depend on the category it signifies. Thus, although some critics take 
Aristotle’s Logic to be completely blind to the logical asymmetry between names and verbs, the 
concrete use of syllogistic inference in demonstrative sciences is limited and governed by a 
metaphysical distinction between subjects and attributes. 
In the ontology of the Categories, beings are hierarchically related depending on the 
roles they can play in predicative connections. An entity like Socrates is ontologically prior to an 
entity like whiteness insofar as the latter cannot be part of reality unless there are individuals like 
the former of which it is (metaphysically) predicated, but which are not (metaphysically) predicated 
of (and hence are not ontologically dependent on) anything else. It is beyond the purpose of the 
present study to provide a detailed account of the notion of ontological priority or ontological 
dependence. However, if these notions are specified purely in existential terms, Aristotle’s doctrine 
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of ontological categories can become (if not unattractive on its own) inadequate to the task of 
providing his model of science with satisfying metaphysical underpinnings (or so I shall argue). 
In Metaph. V 11, Aristotle characterises ontological priority – in his words, priority ‘in 
nature and being’ (  ) – in terms of an asymmetrical independence relation: 
[T30]     
 
Besides things called prior and posterior in this way, a thing is prior 
in nature and being when it is possible for it to be without other things 
but not them without it. This division was used by Plato [Metaph. V 11, 
1019a 1-4; Kirwan 1993, with changes]. 
The Aristotelian notion of ontological priority has been explained in different manners depending 
on how the verb ‘to be’ ( ) is understood. The most usual construal is given in terms of modality 
and existence. This is, for instance, how contemporary metaphysicians like Kit Fine read T30: 
Aristotle in the Metaphysics (1019a1-4) takes things to be ‘prior and 
posterior… in respect of nature and substance’ when the priors ‘can be 
without the other things, while the others cannot be without them’; and 
the obvious way to construe him is by reference to the notions of existence 
and modality [Fine 1995, p. 270]. 
At first sight, it seems reasonable to read T30 in this way, especially if we have in mind the core 
theses of the Categories. In the four-fold division of Cat. 2, the distinguishing feature of particular 
substances – the ‘primary substances’ or ‘primary beings’ ( ) – is the fact that they are 
not predicated of more basic subjects, whereas all the other beings are predicated of them. Thus, 
secondary substances and non-substantial beings could not exist if there were no particular 
substances of which they were predicated (see Cat. 5, 2ª34-b6). If understood in this way, ontological 
priority can be defined as follows: 
Priority in Existence (PIE):126 A is ontologically prior to B iff.  
1. A can exist without B 
2. B cannot exist without A. 
The reference to Plato in 1019a 14 might be taken to indicate that the notion of ontological priority 
in T30 is existential. Gail Fine, for instance, argued that this kind of priority is closely related to 
one of the senses of ‘separation’ ( ) in Aristotle, understood as a ‘capacity for independent 
existence’.127 In Metaph. VII 1, 1028a 31-b2, she argues, substance is said to be prior ‘in nature’ 
                                                 
126 I draw the acronym ‘PIE’ from Peramatzis (2008; 2011).  
127 Fine (2003, p. 256) 
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because it is separate, while the other categories are not. Moreover, Aristotle criticises Plato for 
having ‘separated’ the forms128, attributing to him a notion of separation formulated in terms of 
existence.129 Thus, Gail Fine puts the passages together to conclude that A is separate from B just 
in case A is ‘naturally prior to’ B, i.e. ‘just in case A can exist without, independently of, B’ (Fine 
2003, p. 256).130 
However, it has been claimed that, if T30 is read in existential terms, particular 
substances do not fulfil the condition for being ontologically primary entities. Interpreters such as 
Michail Peramatzis (2008; 2011), Phil Corkum (2008) and Lucas Angioni (2010) argued that 
individuals in the category of substance do not satisfy PIE in relation to non-substance items. In 
some cases, PIE.1 is satisfied, but not PIE.2. For instance, Socrates may exist without being 
courageous, but courage may also exist without Socrates’ existing, as long as it is predicated of 
another substance (e.g. Callias). In other cases, not even PIE.1 is satisfied: Socrates may exist 
without some of his determinate accidental attributes (e.g. being white or weighing 71kg), but not 
without the corresponding determinables (e.g. having complexion or having weight). 
One may think that the issue can be solved by understanding the priority of particular 
substances collectively: non-substance beings are not ontologically dependent on one specific 
particular substance or other, but on particular substances in general – e.g. courage may exist 
without Socrates or Callias, but not without any particular substance whatsoever. However, PIE 
would not be, properly speaking, an asymmetrical relation if the ontological independence that is 
affirmed in PIE.1 were not the same one denied in PIE.2. Hence, the relata in PIE must be both 
understood in the same way, either collectively or individually. However, as we have seen, PIE.1 is 
false if the relata are understood collectively: particular substances may exist without having one 
specific accidental attribute or other, but not without any accidental attribute whatsoever. On the 
other hand, if the relata are taken individually, PIE.2 is not satisfied: in the same way as Socrates 
can exist without being white, whiteness can also exist without Socrates’ existing, provided that 
there is another particular substance which also happens to be white.131 
There might be alternative ways to explain the claim (made in the Categories,) that 
particular substances are prior to all other beings, including non-substance items and secondary 
substances. This task, however, is beyond our present concerns.132 However, when it comes to 
                                                 
128 Metaph. XIII 4, 1088b 30-31; XIII 9, 1086ª32-b7.   
129EE I 8, 1017b 10-15. 
130 Fine (2003, p. 256). 
131 See Corkum (2008, p. 74) for an elucidating exposition of this problem. 
132 For interpretations that avoid understanding the notion of ontological priority in terms of existence, see Corkum 
(2008); Peramatzis (2008; 2011, pp. 229-248); Angioni (2010).  
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address the metaphysical underpinnings of Aristotle’s philosophy of science, the Categories frustrate 
us at least with respect to the following two topics: 
(1) As we have seen, a subject like man may exist independently of some determinate 
accidental feature such as being white, but not independently of the correspondent determinable, 
such as being coloured. Unlike the determinate features, the corresponding determinables are 
demonstrable properties and belong necessarily to their subjects133, which explains why they are 
particularly problematic for the existential construal of the notion of ontological priority. However, 
the ontology of the Categories focuses on the distinction between essential and accidental predicates. 
Inherence and said-of relations are the only types of connections into which predications are classified. 
On the other hand, science deals with a very specific kind of non-essential predicate: the 
demonstrable attribute, also known as ‘per se accident’. As we have seen, per se accidents are 
significantly different from other (merely contingent) accidental predicates, since they belong to 
their subjects ‘in themselves’ and ‘by necessity’ without being part of their essences. Hence, 
Aristotle’s model of demonstrative science must adopt a theory of predication that elucidates the 
nature of per se accidents and explains how they differ from non-demonstrable attributes. 
(2) As we have seen in Chapter 3, one of the problems in reading APo I 19-22 
according to the Traditional Interpretation was the fact that singular terms naming particular 
substances would become the basic subjects in scientific discourse. However, we have argued that 
in Aristotle’s philosophy of science the priority is given to universals. Whatever has a given 
demonstrable attribute has it in virtue of being a member of a universal kind which is explanatorily 
connected to the attribute in question. For instance, the property 2R belongs primarily to the 
triangle, while it belongs to (e.g.) the isosceles or to a given triangle in a semi-circle134 only in a 
derivative way: the universal triangle is the primary subject for the predicate 2R. In the Categories, 
however, priority is given to individuals over their species and genera: particular substances, for 
instance, are said to be ‘primary’, while their species and genera are only ‘secondary’ substances. 
There is no need to assume that there is a conflict between the priority of individuals in the Categories 
and the priority of universals in the APo. The two treatises were written with very different 
purposes, and the relevant kind of priority in each of them might be different as well. Still, the APo 
require a theory of predication that takes into account the explanatory priority of universal 
expressions over singular terms, a task the theory of predication of the Categories is not able to 
accomplish.  
                                                 
133 Lowe (2013, p. 197). 
134 APo I 1, 71a 19-21; APo I 4, 73a 28-34; 73b 25 APo I 24, 85b 5-7 APo I 9, 76ª 4-9. 
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Aristotle’s model of demonstrative science adopts an alternative (and, in a way, more 
sophisticated) theory of predication. This theory can be found in APo I 4, where Aristotle discusses 
four uses of the expression ‘in itself’ (per se or ). In Section 4.2 below, I intend to elucidate 
each of these uses. I shall argue that Aristotle’s discussion in APo I 4 assumes the existence of 
priority relations among the subjects and attributes in a given scientific domain – relations that are 
different from existential priority and more relevant to his theory of science. In section 4.3, I shall 
discuss some of the views on per se predications and per se accidents available in the secondary 
literature. In section 4.4, I shall indicate how the theory of per se predications should be interpreted 
in order to fill in the two gaps left by the Categories – (1) and (2) discussed above. First, I shall clarify 
the nature of per se accidents and explain how they fit in APo I 4 (gap 1). In addition, I shall argue 
that one of Aristotle’s aims in APo I 4 is to emphasize that, in order to achieve a full-fledged 
demonstration, a scientist must identify the relevant kind which is explanatorily connected to the 
demonstrable attribute (gap 2). 
4.2 – The four uses of ‘per se’: Posterior Analytics I 4 
In APo I 4, the first of the four senses of ‘in itself’ ( ) is introduced as follows: 
[T31] 
Some things hold of an item in itself both if they hold of it in what it is – 
e.g. line of triangles and point of lines (their essence comes from these 
items, which inhere in the account which says what they are) [APo I 4, 73a 
34-37; Barnes 1993, with changes]. 
As we can see, this first use of ‘ ’ or ‘per se’ (hereafter, ‘per se1’) concerns a predicative 
connection in which the predicate is part of the ‘essence’ ( or ) of the subject, and hence 
appears in its definition: 
Per se1 : P is a per se1 predicate of S iff. P is part of the essence [  of S and P ‘inheres 
in’ [ ] the account that shows what S is. 
Line, for instance, is part of the essence of the triangle, ‘inheres in’ its definition, and hence is 
predicated of it in the per se1 manner.
135  
                                                 
135 Zabarella 1582, 23B suggests that we should read the examples sano modo: though line is said to belong in the what-
it-is of triangles, Aristotle probably means that something like ‘bounded by lines’ is predicated of them. For this and 
other ways of interpreting the examples, see Barnes (1993, p. 112-113). 
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One may ask whether per se1 predications are sentences (or linguistic predications) or 
real connections between entities (metaphysical predications). On one hand, the per se1 predicate is 
described as an element in the ‘essence’ of the subject, which indicates that the connection defined 
in T31 is a metaphysical predication (like the said-of relation in the Categories). On the other hand, 
the predicate is also said to ‘inhere in’ ( ) the subject’s definition, which suggests that per 
se1 connections are linguistic predications (like our E-sentences in Chapter 3). This question can be 
answered if the meaning of ‘ ’ is properly specified. In 73a 35-37, Aristotle describes per 
se1 predicates as components of the ‘essence’ ( ) of their subjects: ‘
.’ Certainly, essences and their components are not linguistic but real-world items. Aristotle’s 
appeal to the notion of ‘ ’ (or ‘definition’) in 73a 36 is no reason to take the predicative 
connection described in the passage as linguistic and not metaphysical. First, as an essentialist, 
Aristotle accepts that not only words have definitions (in the sense of having accounts of their 
meanings), but also things have definitions (in the sense of having accounts of their essences). 
Second, the pronoun ‘ ’ in 73a 36 refers back to ‘ ’ in ‘
’ (73a 34-35). Therefore, if ‘ ’ refers to extra-linguistic items (the components of a given 
essence), so does ‘  [...]’ in 73ª34. However (and this is the crucial point), ‘  [...]’ also 
introduces the subject of the verb ‘ ’ in ‘ ’ (73a 36-
37). Therefore, if ‘ ’ and ‘  [...]’ refer to extra-linguistic items (the components of a given 
essence), the things which ‘inhere in the definition’ ( ) – that is, the per se1 
attributes – are not linguistic, but real-world items. On the other hand, if ‘ ’ stands for a ‘real’ 
definition (i.e. an account of essence), both relata of per se1 relations are extra-linguistic items. 
Therefore, if Aristotle is not committing a use-mention confusion, the text gives us no 
option but to take the locution ‘ ’ (73a 34-35) (i) as referring to extra-
linguistic entities and (ii) as introducing the subject of ‘ ’ in 73a37. Since ‘
’ (73a 36-37) refers to a linguistic item (namely, a given definition), the verb 
‘ ’ picks out what we can describe as a ‘world-language relation’, i.e. a relation of the form 
‘xRy’ in which the variable ‘x’ ranges over extra-linguistic entities such as objects and attributes, 
whereas ‘y’ ranges over items of  language such as words or definitions – e.g. the point inhering in 
the definition of line is a relation of this sort, since point (and not ‘point’) is a non-linguistic entity, 
whereas the definition of line is a linguistic one.136 Other examples of world-language relations 
would be ‘x is denoted by y’ or ‘x has the  y’ (where ‘ ’ stands for a ‘real’ definition). On 
                                                 
136 In this sense, ‘x  …’ is close to ‘x is mentioned or referred to …’. However, we do not translate the verb 
in this way to avoid the suggestion that, if triangle ‘ ’ in the definition of 2R (and therefore 2R is a per se2 of 
triangle), the term ‘triangle’ must be included in the definition of 2R. Since I shall argue that this conditional is false, I 
prefer the neutral and vague expression ‘inhering in’. 
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the other hand, world-world relations would have only extra-linguistic items as values for their 
variables. As we saw, the text of APo I 4 makes it clear that per se1 connections – in contrast to the 
inhering in relation that is used to define it – are world-world relations or, to stick to the vocabulary 
we have been using, metaphysical predications. 
Let us now analyse Aristotle’s characterization of the second kind of ‘per se’ connection 
(hereafter, ‘per se2’): 
[T32]
And also if the things they hold of themselves inhere in the account which 
shows what they are – e.g. straight holds of lines and so does curved, and 
odd and even of numbers, and also prime and composite, and equilateral 
and oblong [APo I 4, 73a 34-b1; Barnes 1993, with changes]. 
Per se2 connections are also definition-based. Now, however, it is the definition of the predicate 
that includes a reference to the subject: 
Per se2  : P is a per se2 predicate of S iff. S ‘inheres in’ [ ] in the account that shows what it 
is to be P. 
Odd, for instance, is a per se2 attribute of number insofar as number ‘inheres in’ the definition of 
what odd is. There is no reason to believe that the verb ‘ ’ works differently in the 
characterization of per se2 connections. Thus, if the verb picks out a world-language relation in T32 
as well, the fact that the subjects of per se2 predications ‘inhere in’ the  of the predicates does 
not make them linguistic items. Furthermore, since the word ‘ ’ denotes here the definition of 
an entity (and not of a term), neither the predicates (i.e. the corresponding definienda) are linguistic 
items. Therefore, per se2 connections are also world-world relations (or metaphysical predications). 
Per se2 predications play an important role not only in Aristotle’s model of 
demonstrative science but also in his metaphysical theory. As we have seen, in the Categories and 
the Topics, Aristotle applies the question ‘what is x?’ indifferently to all categories, overlooking the 
very hierarchy he is willing to establish (see Top. I 9, 103b28-35). Even when an entity x is a non-
substantial being, the answer to the question ‘what is x?’ is a homocategorical predication without 
a sign of the subject on which x depends. On the other hand, in the APo and the Metaphysics, 
Aristotle introduces the notion of per se2 predication: definitions of attributes must register their 
status as dependent entities by referring somehow to the items of which they are predicated: the 
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definition of odd must refer to numbers, the definition of male should mention animals, the 
definition of white must contain a reference to bodily surfaces etc.137 
However, which kind of ontological priority should definitions account for? As we 
have seen, interpreting the notion of ontological priority in T30 in purely existential terms is 
problematic. Although we do not intend to offer a definitive interpretation of Aristotle’s concept 
of ontological priority, alternative readings of T30 may shed some light on the metaphysical 
framework adopted by Aristotle’s model of demonstrative science. Some authors tried to preserve 
an existential construal of the notion of ontological priority by adding important qualifications. 
According to them, Aristotle understands existence with some sort of essentialism in the 
background: to be is always to be with regard to a certain nature; to exist for x is to be a member 
of a certain kind that states what x is.138 Others avoid the existential construal all together. Michail 
Peramatzis (2008; 2011), for instance, claims that ontological priority can be understood as what 
he calls ‘Priority in Being’:139 
Priority in Being (PIB): A is ontologically prior to B iff.  
     1. A can be what it is without B being what it is. 
                                         2. B cannot be what it is without A being what it is. 
Peramatzis argues that, although the claim put forward in T30 ‘is neutral or open as it can be 
understood either as PIE or PIB’140, several of Aristotle’s metaphysical views inside and outside the 
context of Metaph. V are successful if ontological priority is understood as PIB, and false or 
misleading if interpreted in terms of PIE (as we have seen above). 
With either PIB or an essentialist approach to the concept of existence, ontological 
priority would be intrinsically connected to the notion of essence. In Aristotle’s vocabulary, x’s 
essence is ‘what being is for x’ (  + noun in the dative + ). The philosopher talks of essence 
as a way of being 141 – either in the sense of existing as something of a certain kind or in the sense of being 
what something is. If we follow this approach, we could say that an attribute P (a non-substance entity) 
is ontologically dependent on the relevant subject S (a substance or substance-like entity) in the 
sense that P does not have the essence it has (i.e. cannot perform the way of being that distinguishes 
it as such) independently of S having the essence it has. Thus, a definition of P would fail to describe 
what it is to be P if it does not refer to S. Bodily surfaces, for instance, are the proper subjects of 
                                                 
137 Metaph. VII 1, 1028a 35-36; VII 5, 1030b 23-24; APo I 4 73a 37-b5; II 2, 90a 14-18; II 10, 93b 38-94a 7. 
138 Loux (1991, p. 3-6; pp. 27-28; pp. 34-35); Irwin & Fine (1995, p. 569); Zillig (2010, p. 41). 
139 Compare with Corkum (2008) who also avoids reading T30 in terms of asymmetrical existential independence. 
140 Peramatzis (2008, p. 191). 
141 Loux (1991, p. 85); Peramatzis (2011, pp. 3-4); Charles (2011). 
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colours, with the relevant features that make colours what they are. Therefore, doing science about 
colours and explaining how they come about involves doing science about bodily surfaces as well, 
of which colours are per se2 predicates. 
We can say then that the linguistic correlate of ontological priority (understood as PIB) 
is what Aristotle calls ‘Priority in Definition’ (PID):142 
Priority in Definition (PID): A is prior in definition to B iff.  
      1. A is (correctly) defined without mentioning B 
      2. B is not (correctly) defined without mentioning A. 
Subjects are ‘prior’ to their per se2 attributes precisely in the sense formulated in PID. Odd cannot 
be defined without mentioning numbers, nor can white be defined without mentioning bodily 
surfaces. Satisfactory accounts of what it is to be odd or white – the kind of account scientists 
should provide – must somehow refer to the way of being of numbers and surfaces, without which 
the phenomena of oddness or whiteness could not be properly explained or even identified. 
A significant number of interpreters argue that only the first two uses of ‘per se’ are 
relevant to Aristotle’s theory.143 However, there are strong reasons to believe that the other two 
uses also play significant roles in his model of demonstrative sciences. The third sense of ‘per se’ 
(hereafter, ‘per se3’) is defined as follows: 
[T33]
Again, certain items are not said of some other underlying subject: e.g. 
whereas what is walking is walking being something different (and 
similarly for white), substances and whatever signifies this something are not 
just what they are being something different. Well, items which are not 
said of an underlying subject I call things in themselves, and those which 
are said of an underlying subject I call incidental [APo I 4, 73b 5-10; Barnes 
1993, with changes]. 
                                                 
142 Again, I am borrowing the acronym ‘PID’ from Peramatzis (2011, p. 6; p. 23). See Fine’s notion of ontological 
dependence as ‘the real counterpart to the nominal notion of one term being definable in terms of another’ (Fine 1995, 
p. 275). 
143 For interpretations arguing that the other two senses of ‘per se’ are totally or partially irrelevant to Aristotle’s purposes 
in the APo, see Ross (1949, p. 519); Sorabji (1981, pp. 210-211); McKirahan (1992, pp. 94-95); Barnes (1993, pp. 110-
1120; Ebert (1998, p. 154); Porchat Pereira (2001, pp. 142-143); Tierney (2004, p. 5, n.8). For another view, see Code 
(1986, pp. 350-351); Furth (1988, p. 237); Ferejohn (1991, pp. 123-128; 2013, pp. 90-05); Angioni (2004); Terra (2009; 
2014); Ribeiro (2011). 
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T33 is an obscure and controversial passage. Aristotle seems to be distinguishing not predicative 
relations but things: those that are ‘in themselves’ from those that are ‘incidentally’.144 An entity x 
is a per se3 being if x is what it essentially is – Aristotle uses the expression ‘ ’ again – 
without (i.e. independently of) being predicated of a different underlying subject. Substances, which 
satisfy PIB in relation to all other beings, are what they are (i.e. have the essences they have) 
independently of being predicated of something else, whereas ‘incidental’ beings could not be what 
they are without being predicated of their proper subjects: 
 Per se3 : S is a per se3 being iff. S is what it is (i.e. S has the essence it has) independently of being 
predicated of another underlying subject. 
One might think that only particular substances are per se3 beings, since they are the 
only entities which are not predicated of anything else. In that case, the expressions ‘ ’ and 
‘ ’ in 73b 7-8 would refer to their substantiality and particularity, respectively.145 
However, Aristotle does not say that per se3 beings are not predicated of anything whatsoever. 
Actually, what is said in T33 is that they are never predicated of something different ( ), i.e. if x is 
a per se3 being, there is no y such that x is predicated of y as a non-essential predicate.
146 If so, the 
secondary substances of the Categories can also be classified as per se3 beings: as we have seen in 
Chapter 3, for Aristotle, substantial (and substance-like) beings are essential predicates of 
everything of which they are predicated. If understood in this way, per se3 is certainly connected to 
the other two uses of ‘per se’. The first use (per se1) covers all essential predicates of all kinds of 
essence-bearers (substances and non-substances). The second (per se2) presupposes the distinction 
between prior and posterior essence-bearers (as stated in PIB), the former being defined without 
mentioning the latter, but not the other way around (as stated in PID). Finally, the third use of per 
se (per se3) applies precisely to the primary essence-bearers, which are what they are independently 
of being predicated of items which differ from them in essence. 
                                                 
144 Peramatzis (2010) and Ferejohn (2013, pp. 92-93) are exceptions. Ferejohn (2013, pp. 92-93) argues that this third 
use of ‘per se’ applies to predications (or, more precisely to what we have called ‘natural’ predications): ‘man is walking’ 
is a per se predication in this sense because ‘man’ is the proper ‘logical’ subject of the predicate ‘white’. As Barnes (1993, 
pp. 114-117) has shown, the third use of per se is relevant to the distinction between natural and unnatural predications, 
since per se beings (substances and substance-like entities) are the proper subjects of ‘incidental’ beings (non-
substances); hence, the grammatical subjects of natural predications must be substance-terms. However, the expression 
‘ ’ and the formula ‘  ’ indicate that Aristotle’s point is that (e.g.) white is not what it is 
independently of it being predicated of another subject (see Angioni 2006, pp. 112-113). 
145 See Ross (1949, p. 519). 
146 See Angioni (2007b, pp. 119-122); Zuppolini (2014c, pp. 33-37). 
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There are several reasons to believe that the fourth use of ‘per se’ (hereafter, per se4) is 
also relevant to Aristotle’s model of demonstrative science. This use is explained in the following 
passage: 
[T34] 
 
Again, in another way what holds of something because of itself holds of 
it in itself, and what does not hold because of itself is incidental. E.g. if 
there was a lightning while he was walking, that was incidental: it was not 
because of his walking that there was lightning – that, we say, was 
incidental. But what holds because of itself holds in itself – e.g. if 
something died while being slaughtered, it died in the sacrifice since it died 
because of being slaughtered, and it was not incidental that it died while 
being slaughtered [APo I 4, 73b 10-16; Barnes 1993, with changes]. 
It has been argued that this kind of per se relation takes place between two events causally linked:147 
the event E1 (slaughtering) relates to the event E2 (death) in itself whenever E2 occurs because of E1 
itself ( ). Nevertheless, Aristotle would be comfortable with a reduction of events to 
predications in the following terms:148 an event E1 (slaughtering) would be reducible to a 
predication of the form ‘S is P1’ (S undergoes a certain slaughtering procedure), whereas E2 (death) 
would correspond to a predication ‘S is P2’ (S dies). Therefore, a per se4 connection is more properly 
understood not as holding between a predicate and a subject, but between two predicates occurring 
to the same subject (or subjects): 
Per se4 : if P1 and P2 are per se4 related, P2 holds of a given S because [ ] P1 holds of S. 
We are going to argue in more detail in favour of this interpretation in the next section. 
However, we can say in advance that if every occurrence of P1 (being slaughtered) causes the 
occurrence of P2 (dying), the causal link between E1 and E2 could be expressed by a universal 
predicative statement with ‘P1’ as in the subject-term and ‘P2’ as the predicate-term: ‘every P1 is P2’: 
everything that undergoes a slaughtering procedure dies.149 If this use of ‘per se’ is interpreted as we 
propose, it becomes easier to understand its relevance to the theory of the APo. The explanatory 
character of demonstrations is partially due to the fact that their categorical propositions have 
subjects and predicates explanatorily connected. Such connection can be understood as a per se4 
relation: ‘triangle’ is the appropriate grammatical subject for the predicate ‘2R’ because the 
                                                 
147 Ross (1949, p. 520). 
148 See Barnes (1993, p. 117); Angioni (2004, p. 16); Ferejohn (2013, p. 93) 
149 For a similar interpretation of the example, see Ferejohn (2013, p. 93). 
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metaphysical predicates being a triangle and having 2R are per se4-related: if a given figure in a semi-
circle has 2R, it has 2R because it is a triangle. However, a complete understanding of this aspect of 
Aristotle’s theory depends on a satisfactory account of the notions of per se accident and primary 
universality. 
4.3 – Per Se Accidents and Primary Universality: the Debate 
As we know, Aristotle describes demonstrable attributes as per se accidents (
).150 In Metaph. V 30, a per se accident is defined as a predicate that belongs to a subject 
‘in itself’ ( ), but not as a part of its ‘essence’ ( ): 
[T35]           
          
‘Accident’ has also another sense, namely, whatever belongs to each thing 
in virtue of itself, but is not in its essence; e.g. as having the sum of its 
angles equal to two right angles belongs to the triangle [Metaph. V 30, 1025a 
30-32]. 
The paradigmatic example is the predicate 2R, i.e. the property of having the sum of internal angles 
equal to two right angles, a per se accident of triangles. Although in APo I 4 Aristotle discusses 
several ways in which a predicate holds of a subject ‘in itself’, he was accused of not having 
elucidated the crucial notion of per se accident.151 
Since Aristotle defines the per se accident as a predicate belonging to its subject ‘in 
itself’, but not as an item in its essence, we are apparently prevented from taking it as a per se1 
attribute. In the APo, the philosopher speaks as if all scientific propositions signify either a per se1 
or a per se2 connection.
152 If so, by elimination, we feel inclined to classify 2R and all per se accidents 
as per se2 predicates.
153 In addition to the APo, passages from other parts of the corpus substantiate 
this result. In Ph. I 3, 186b 18-23, for instance, Aristotle divides ‘accidents’ ( ) attributes 
into two types, one of which is a predicate that may or may not belong to its subject (which 
demonstrative sciences do not study) while the other is a ‘per se’ accident: the per se2 attribute. 
Certainly, Aristotle secured a place for per se accidents in demonstrative sciences, which precludes 
any possibility of understanding them as contingent attributes. The most intuitive reaction to this 
                                                 
150 See APo I 6, 75a 18-19; I 7, 75b 42-b2; I 10, 76b 11-15; Ph. II 2, 193b 22-30; Metaph. III 1, 997a 19-25. For other 
occurrences of the notion, see Bonitz 713b43-714a3.  
151 Barnes (1993, p. 114). 
152 See APo I 4, 73b 3-4; 73b 16-18; I 6, 74b 5-12; I 22, 84a 11-14. As I shall clarify soon, this does not mean that the 
other two uses of ‘per se’ are irrelevant to Aristotle’s theory. 
153 See, for instance, Ross (1949, p. 580); Wedin (1973); Graham (1975); Mignucci (1975, p. 64); Granger (1981); Sorabji 
(1980, p. 18); Terra (2009, pp. 55-121; 2014). 
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passage is to understand per se accidents as per se2 predicates. I shall refer to this interpretation as the 
‘Natural Solution’ to the problem of whether and how per se accidents fit in APo I 4.  
Nevertheless, many commentators feel uncomfortable about classifying per se accidents 
and especially the 2R-attribute as per se2 predicates.
154 Their reasons are basically two. First, it is hard 
to see why ‘triangle’ should be part of the definition of 2R. Second, Aristotle’s examples suggest 
that, if P belongs to S as a per se2 predicate, then P is a member of a pair of opposites (like odd and 
even, straight and curved, male and female) of which one or the other must belong to S. However, 
2R is not a member of a pair of opposites and seems to work more like a proprium ( ), since it is 
coextensive with ‘triangle’ and cannot fail to hold of it (see Top. I 5, 102a 18-20).155 Thus, several 
alternatives to the Natural Solution have been offered in the secondary literature.  
The first alternative to the Natural Solution I shall consider (hereafter, ‘A1’) consists 
in understanding the notion of per se accident according to the first sense of ‘per se’ defined in APo 
I 4. A systematic defence of this interpretation comes from Richard Tierney (2001a), who argues 
that, for Aristotle, a predicate can belong in a subject’s ‘what-it-is’ ( ) without belonging in 
its ‘essence’ ( ), which allows him to classify 2R and other demonstrable attributes as per se1 
predicates without contradicting Aristotle’s statement in T35 (Metaph. V 30, 1025a 30-32).156 It is 
hard to believe that Aristotle used his vocabulary as rigorously as Tierney’s claim requires. In fact, 
it would be necessary to recognize in Aristotle’s texts a distinction even more subtle than the one 
between ‘ ’ and ‘ . On one hand, we would have the items ‘from which the essence 
comes’ ( ), which are per se1 attributes according to T31 (APo I 4, 73ª34-
37). On the other, there would be items ‘in the essence’ (    ), which are not per se 
accidents according to T35. Therefore, if it were a per se1 predicate, 2R would be one of the items 
the essence of triangles comes from, but not an element in their essence (  ), since otherwise it 
would not be a per se accident. 
                                                 
154 See Inwood (1979, p. 323); Ferejohn (1991, pp. 123-128); McKirahan (1992, pp. 98-100); Barnes (1993, pp. 113-
114); Tierney (2001a, pp. 74-78) and even Granger (1981, p. 119, n.2) and Sorabji (1981, p. 189), who nevertheless are 
willing to classify per se accidents as per se2 predicates. For a detailed discussion of the 2R example, see Tiles (1983).  
155 Inwood (1979, p. 323) argues that in APo I 7, 75b1-2 Aristotle recognizes two kinds of explananda:  
and . According to him, only  would be coextensive with their subjects. 
However, Aristotle does not seem to be distinguishing between two classes of predicates in this passage, but rather 
using two different expressions to refer to the same class of predicates: the per se accidents, attributes that belong to 
their subjects in themselves but not as a part of their essences. See also Bronstein (2016a, pp. 46-48), who also 
distinguishes between two kinds of demonstrable attributes: per se2 predicates and ‘in itself incidentals’ (or per se 
accidents).  
156 It should be noted that the  Tierney classifies as per se1 predicates are demonstrable attributes such as 
2R – or, as he calls them, ‘logical incidentals’ –, which follow demonstratively from the essence of their subjects. These 
should be distinguished from ‘inhering incidentals’, which belong to underlying subjects (but are not themselves 
underlying subjects). ‘Inhering incidentals’, in turn, are distinguished into two types: ‘inseparable inhering incidentals’ 
(per se2 predicates) and ‘separable inhering incidentals’ (purely ‘accidental’ or ‘contingent’ predicates). 
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The difficulties A1 has to face are not only textual but also theoretic. According to 
Tierney (2001a, pp. 75-76), some per se1 predicates are ‘immediate’ and therefore belong not only in 
the what-it-is of the subject, but also in its essence: namely, the proximate genus and the proximate 
differentia. Since the relation belonging in the what-it-is is transitive – Tierney quotes APo II 4, 91a 9-
21 –, the genera and differentiae of the initial genus and differentia would be also (non-immediate 
or derivative) per se1 predicates of the subject in question. It is not clear how it follows from these 
considerations that 2R can be taken as part of the ‘what-it-is’ of triangles. One may suggest that 2R 
would be a non-immediate (or a second-level) differentia of one of the immediate (first-level) 
differentiae of the triangle – see the discussion on ‘intermediate’ differentiae in Tierney (2001b, pp. 
157-158).157 Relying on Ph. II 9, 200a 16-17, for instance, we could think that the first-level 
differentia in question here is being a figure bounded by straight lines, of which 2R would be some 
sort of second-level differentia (see Tierney 2001a, pp. 77-78).  
However, if this is how A1 is underpinned, other objections can be raised. A differentia 
seems to specify a determinate way of being a member of the corresponding genus. Although being 
a rectilinear closed figure entails having internal angles equal to a certain amount or another, having 
2R is not a specific way of being a rectilinear figure in the same manner as being three-sided, for 
instance, is.158 Aristotle seems concerned with this distinction in the Parts of Animals: 
[T36]
 One ought to divide by features in a thing’s substantial being, and not by 
its per se accidents, as would happen if someone were to divide figures on 
the ground that some have angles equal to two right angles, while others 
have angles equal to more; for having angles equal to two right angles is a 
sort of accident of the triangle [PA I 3, 643a 27-31; Lennox 2001, with 
changes]. 
James Lennox comments on the passage: 
Within that context, Aristotle is probably thinking of the error of dividing 
a general difference by sub-differences that are only incidentally related to 
it. For example, if figures are divided into those enclosed by straight lines 
and those enclosed by curved lines, then dividing rectilinear figures based 
on the equivalence or non-equivalence of the interior angles to two right 
angles will be incidental. In essence, it is to begin a new division, based on 
angle-sum equivalencies rather than the nature of lines [Lennox 2001, p. 
163]. 
                                                 
157 See also McKirahan (1992, pp. 169-171) for an interpretation along the same lines. He argues that such implicit 
definitional predicates are part of what he calls a ‘fat definition’. 
158 See Ferejohn (2013, pp. 175-176). 
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If Lennox is right about T36, Tierney’s arguments in favour of A1 are not convincing. Another 
passage challenges Tierney’s interpretation more directly. In APr I 27, 43b 6-11, Aristotle 
distinguishes the predicates in the what-it-is ( ) from the so called ‘propria’ ( ). 
This passage is particularly troublesome for A1 since it draws a distinction between the propria and 
the items in the ‘ ’ – and not items in the ‘ ’ as in T35 and T36. Therefore, Tierney needs 
either to reject the plausible view that 2R is an  of the triangle or to postulate that in APr I 27 
the clause ‘ ’ is used in a stronger sense than the one we find in APo I 4. 
There is a further objection to consider. Tierney believes that the transitivity of the 
relation belonging in the what-it-is is what enables us to know, by demonstration, that a subject has a 
certain derivative essential attribute (a per se accident) by means of another and more basic essential 
predicate occurring as the middle term. However, the passages Tierney quotes in support of the 
demonstrative status of such a deduction are clearly diaporematic (APo II 4, 91a 18-21 and II 6, 92b 
2-13). In fact, Aristotle’s final word is that such deduction would be nothing more than a non-
demonstrative  (see APo II 8, 93a 9-15) – even though the relation belonging in 
the what-it-is remains transitive.  
A second alternative to the Natural Solution (hereafter, A2)  is an interpretation which 
argues that per se accidents are covered by the fourth sense of ‘per se’ defined in APo I 4.159 The 
proponents of A2 take per se4 connections to take place between a subject and a predicate (and not 
between two predicates belonging to the same subject, as we have argued). In APo I 4, 73b 3-5, 
Aristotle says that predicates that are not per se1 or per se2 are ‘accidents’ ( ). If so, they 
argue that the other kind of per se connection discussed in the chapter (per se4)
 should be understood 
as occurring between a given subject and one of its ‘accidents’, one that nevertheless belongs to it 
‘in itself’.160 More precisely, the per se4 connection would take place between a subject and a predicate 
that are explanatorily linked in a certain way: 
Per se4 (according to A2): P is a per se4 predicate of S iff. P holds of S because [ ] S is what it is. 
Dying (P) happens to an animal that has been slaughtered (S) precisely because it has been slaughtered 
( ). Interpreters who advocate A2 argue that this is the relation that obtains between triangle 
and 2R. The triangle has 2R because it is what it is, namely, a triangle. Given that per se accidents 
belong by necessity to their subjects, but are not part of their essences, it seems reasonable to 
understand them as something that necessarily follows from their subjects being what they are.  
                                                 
159 See Code (1986, pp. 350-351); Furth (1988, p. 237); Ferejohn (1991, pp. 123-128; 2013, pp. 91-94) and, less 
empathically, Tiles (1983, p. 13). 
160 See Code (1986, p. 350); Furth (1988, p. 237). 
95 
 
Although A2 seems promising, anyone willing to accept it must overcome two crucial 
difficulties. The first one regards lines 73b3-4, in which Aristotle says that every item that is not 
predicated of something as a per se1 or a per se2 predicate is an ‘accident’. We can infer that per se4 
predicates are ‘accidents’ in the same sense which occurs in 73b4 only if we take the four senses of 
‘per se’ to introduce heterogeneous classes of predicative sentences with no intersection between 
them.161 However, sentences expressing a per se4 connection could not take part in science unless 
they signify in addition a per se1 or a per se2 connection. Some passages deserve our attention: 
[T37] 
 
Thus, with respect to what is knowable without qualification, whatever is 
said to hold of things in themselves (in the sense of inhering in what is 
predicated or of being inhered in) is also said to hold of them because of 
themselves and from necessity [APo I 4, 73b 16-18; Barnes 1993, with 
changes]. 
[T38] 
If demonstrative understanding proceeds from necessary principles (since 
what you understand cannot be otherwise), and if whatever holds of an 
object in itself is necessary (since either it holds in what it is, or else the 
object holds of what is predicated of it in what it is and the predicate are 
opposites one of which necessarily holds), then it is clear that 
demonstrative deductions will proceed from certain items of this sort; for 
everything holds either in this way or incidentally, and what is incidental is 
not necessary [APo I 6, 74b 5-12; Barnes 1993]. 
[T39] 
  
Demonstration applies to what holds of the objects in themselves – in 
themselves in two ways: both items which hold of the objects and inhere 
in what they are, and also the items for which the objects of which they 
hold inhere in what they are [APo I 22, 84a 11-14; Barnes 1993]. 
In T37 and T38, Aristotle affirms that scientific knowledge concerns predicative 
connections in which either the predicate inheres in the definition of the subject or the subject 
                                                 
161 See Terra (2014, p. 42), who argues that per se1 and per se2 connections are also per se4, which would be a more general 
kind of per se relation (a solution I reject). This is quite different from saying that a single sentence can signify a per se2 and 
per se4 connection at the same time, as I shall argue. 
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inheres in the definition of the predicate. Aristotle’s words seem to imply that all scientific 
propositions express either a per se1 or a per se2 connection. Tiles (1983, pp. 11-12) conjectured that 
T37 and T38 might be only about the axioms or primary principles of science, so that nothing 
would commit us to classify the corresponding conclusions (or theorems) as per se1 or per se2 
predications. Although viable for T37 and T38, such a hypothesis would not work for T39. As we 
have seen in Chapter 3, Aristotle intends to deny the possibility of there being infinite chains of 
proofs in demonstrative sciences, in which all premises would be themselves demonstrated from 
more basic premises and so on ad infinitum. In the paragraph in which T39 belongs, 84ª 7-28, 
Aristotle argues that a demonstrative chain could not proceed ad infinitum insofar as it would contain 
infinite series of per se1 or per se2 predications, which is impossible according to him. The argument 
implies that only the premises that interrupt the sequence are indemonstrable, whereas the other 
premises would occur also as conclusions at some point of the chain. Therefore, Aristotle does not 
limit per se1 and per se2 connections to indemonstrable propositions.
162  
If all scientific propositions must signify either a per se1 or a per se2 connection, it seems 
more convenient to read ‘ ’ in 73b4 as referring to contingent predicates, in respect of 
which there is no demonstrative knowledge (see APo I 6, 75ª18-22). In fact, the examples we find 
in 73b 5 (musical and white said of animal) are predicates of this kind, and not per se accidents as 
readers sympathetic to A2 would expect.163 Furthermore, in T37, Aristotle states that, when we 
have knowledge ‘without qualification’ ( ), per se1 and per se2 predicates hold of their subjects 
also ‘because of themselves’. Here, the philosopher uses again the same formula ‘ ( )’ we 
find in the characterization of per se4 connections in T37. Thus, there seems to be some sort of 
overlap between these types of relations, which should prevent us from inferring that per se4 items 
are ‘ ’ in the same sense in which the word is used in 73b4.164 
                                                 
162 One could think that, in relying on T39, we are committed to at least some demonstrable per se1 connections. 
However, a demonstrative chain can proceed ad infinitum if at least one of its branches contains infinitely many 
demonstrable propositions (even if the other branch contains only indemonstrable premises). Therefore, a sequence 
of syllogisms in Barbara, for instance, would go on ad infinitum if all the major premises within it were demonstrable, 
even if all the minor premises were ‘immediate’ or indemonstrable. Aristotle seems take essence-specifying 
propositions (that is to say, per se1 predications) as indemonstrable (see, for instance, APo II 3, 90b 24-7; II 8; 93a 9-15). 
Therefore, if the minor premises in our example signify per se1 connections, our (infinite) syllogistic chain would contain 
infinitely many sentences signifying per se1 connections, even though these connections are indemonstrable. Since the 
argument assumes that all sentences involved in demonstrative chains signify either per se1 or per se2 connections, we 
can conclude that at least per se2 predications are not limited to first principles of science. Furthermore, as we have 
seen, while we have textual evidence for taking per se1 connections as indemonstrable, the same does not apply to per 
se2 connections. 
163 One could accept a version of A2 that takes per se accidents as per se2 and a per se4 predicates at the same time. 
However, as I shall argue, the per se4 connection is not a predicative relation between an object and an attribute (as a 
per se2 connection is), but a causal or explanatory relation between two attributes occurring to the same object (or 
objects). 
164 I shall clarify what kind of overlap this is. As I shall argue, the fact that all scientific propositions must signify either 
a per se1 or a per se2 predication does not mean that per se4 connections are out of the scope of science. 
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The other difficulty that interpreters advocating A2 have to face is conceptual rather 
than textual. According to them, if a per se accident is an attribute that simply follows from its 
subject being what it is, there is a way in which the per se accidents of a genus are also per se accidents 
of its species; in other words, if P is a per se accident of (the genus) S and S is a per se1 predicate of 
(the species) S’, then P is a per se accident of (the species) S’ (see Code 1986, p. 351). Therefore, if 
2R is a per se accident of the triangle, it must be a per se accident of the isosceles as well. Identifying 
per se accidents with per se4 predicates, as A2 suggests, we have that, if P is a per se4 predicate of (the 
genus) S and S is per se1 predicate of (the species) S’, then P would be a per se4 predicate of (the 
species) S’. For instance, if 2R is a per se4 predicate of the triangle, it would be a per se4 predicate of 
the isosceles as well. At first sight, this seems to be a welcome result. After all, the sentence ‘every 
isosceles (triangle) has 2R’ seems to be under the scope of science and therefore must signify a per 
se connection in one way or another.165 
However, according to Aristotle, someone who knows that the members of the genus 
triangle have 2R is in possession of a prior and more basic knowledge than someone else who 
knows only that the members of the species isosceles have the same attribute. Triangle, and not 
isosceles, is the relevant universal type – the primary universal ( ) – that comprises 
all the instances of the property 2R.166 Therefore, Aristotle says that the equilateral or the isosceles 
has 2R only ‘incidentally’ ( , Top. II 3, 110b 22-25). In the same vein, he affirms that 
a demonstration applies universally to the triangle ‘in itself’, whereas it applies to the equilateral or 
the isosceles ‘in a certain way not in itself’ (‘ ’, APo I 4, 74a 2).  
It would be inappropriate to say that 2R belongs to isosceles triangles ‘
’ in the same way in which a contingent predicate is said to be a ‘ ’. After all, 
2R is a demonstrable attribute (that is, a per se accident) of triangles in general, including isosceles 
triangles. If so, there is a sense of ‘ ’ (namely, that of ‘ ’) according 
to which 2R is a  of the (species) isosceles in the same way as it is a  of the 
(genus) triangle. However, Aristotle’s point in Top. II 3, 110b 22-25, is that there is still another 
sense of ‘ ’ according to which 2R belongs to the (species) isosceles ‘ ’, 
but not to the (genus) triangle. If there is a sense of ‘ ’ contrasting this other sense of ‘
’, we can think that a similar point is made in APo I 4, 73b38-74a3: there is a use of ‘
’ according to which 2R belongs to the (genus) triangle ‘ ’, but not to the (species) 
isosceles. Thus, we have to face a pressing question: when Aristotle affirms that a demonstration 
of the 2R-theorem applies to the isosceles ‘ ’ (APo I 4, 74a 2), which kind of 
                                                 
165 Sentences like ‘every isosceles triangle has 2R’ are demonstrated by what Lennox’s ‘type A’ syllogisms (see Lennox 
1987) and McKirahan calls ‘application arguments’ (see McKirahan 1992, pp. 177-187). 
166 See APo I 4 73b32-74a3; I 5, 74a16-b4; I 24, 85b4-15; 85b23-27; 85b38-86a3. 
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 connection is he denying? If we follow A2, the only way we can consider 2R a per se 
predicate (either of isosceles or of triangles in general) is by appealing to the notion of per se4 
connection. However, such interpretation leaves us with no grasp of the meaning of ‘in itself’ 
according to which 2R belongs to the triangle ‘in itself’, but to the isosceles ‘not in itself’. Therefore, 
at least in the terms it was proposed, A2 is not completely satisfactory.  
The three interpretations we have considered so far present disappointing results. 
Interpreters who advocate the Natural Solution fail to explain how the paradigmatic example of per 
se accidents (2R predicated of triangles) could match the characterization and examples of per se2 
predications in APo I 4. Interpretation A1 seems to violate Aristotle’s claim that essential 
predications (in which the predicate is part of the  of the subject) are not demonstrable in 
the strict sense. Interpretation A2, in turn, overlooks the passages in which Aristotle takes per se1 
and per se2 predications to cover all scientific propositions; moreover, A2 is unable to explain in 
which sense of ‘in itself’ 2R belongs to the triangle ‘in itself’, but to the isosceles ‘not in itself’. Thus, 
understanding the concept of per se accident and its role in the APo involves addressing three basic 
difficulties: 
(A) Does the 2R-example satisfy the definition of per se2 predication? If it does, is there a pattern in 
all of Aristotle’s examples of per se2 predicates (including 2R)? 
(B) What does Aristotle mean when he says that per se1 and per se2 connections cover all scientific 
propositions? Would not this make his theory excessively restricted? 
(C)  In which sense of ‘per se’ is 2R per se-related to triangle, but not to isosceles? 
4.4 – Per Se Accidents and Primary Universality: Remodelling the Natural Solution 
The discussion about the nature of demonstrable attributes is crucial for understanding 
Aristotle’s model of scientific explanation. A successful account of the relation between a subject 
and its per se accidents would help us determine whether Aristotelian demonstrations follow the S-
Model, the A-Model or a combination of both.167 For instance, each of the three interpretations 
discussed in the last section is associated with one of these models of essence-based explanation. 
The Natural Solution takes per se accidents to be per se2 predicates. As we have seen, P is a per se2 
predicate of a subject S if the definition of P somehow refers to S. Here, what grounds the per se 
relation between S and P would be the essence of the predicate P, as we have in the A-Model. 
However, demonstrable attributes are predicated of their subjects by necessity, which makes several 
                                                 
167 For a similar point, see Bronstein (2016a, pp. 46-50). 
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interpreters think that per se accidents are somehow attached to the essence of the items to which 
they belong, along the lines of the S-Model.168 In the same vein, alternatives to the Natural Solution 
take the per se accident to be either part of the essence of the subject (A1) or a consequence of the 
subject being what it is (A2). In this section, I shall defend the Natural Solution. Nevertheless, in 
my analysis of the concept of primary universality, I shall preserve some of the intuitions 
underpinning interpretation A2. As a result, our account will once again suggest that the S-Model 
and the A-Model are both part of Aristotle’s doctrine. 
As we have noted, the Natural Solution to the problem of per se accidents has met with 
resistance from interpreters of Aristotle. I believe that such resistance is due to a confusion between 
two levels of analysis in which this discussion should take place: the level of extra-linguistic 
connections between objects and their attributes (metaphysical predications), on one hand, and the 
level of sentences expressing these connections (linguistic predications), on the other. As we have 
argued, per se connections are metaphysical predications. Therefore, the proponents or opponents 
of the Natural Solution must address two distinct questions: 
The Metaphysical Question: What characterizes a per se2 connection?  
The Linguistic Question: What kinds of sentences (or linguistic predications) express per se2 
connections? 
Despite being interconnected, the Metaphysical and the Linguistic Question are substantially 
different from each other and must be addressed separately. In the following, we shall first address 
the Metaphysical Question, which involves identifying the kinds of entities that participate in per 
se2 connections and understanding the role these connections play in Aristotle’s metaphysical theory 
as a whole. 
It has been said that the subjects of per se predications are always universal (Sorabji 
1980, pp. 189-191). Aristotle affirms – in Metaph. VII 15, for instance – that it is impossible to give 
a definition of individuals, whereas per se1 and per se2 predications are such that subject and predicate 
maintain a definitional link in one direction or the other. However, the fact that definitions are only 
of universals does not entail that particulars cannot be subjects of per se1 predications, as it might 
seem at first sight. The impossibility of giving a definition of Socrates, for instance, probably means 
that there is not a definition exclusive to Socrates, with the proper name ‘Socrates’ as the definiendum. 
Nevertheless, according to 73a 36-37 in T31, in order to be a per se1 predicate of a given subject S, 
an attribute P only needs to inhere in ‘the account that says what S is’, which is not necessarily a 
                                                 
168 See, for instance, Loux (1991, p. 73); Barnes (1993, p. 120); Charles (2000, p. 203); Malink (2013, pp. 124-126); 
Bronstein (2015, pp. 724-725); Shields (2016, pp. 84-85). 
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definitional statement with ‘S’ occurring as the subject-term. If S is an individual, the account 
displaying what S is will be the definition of the species of which S is a member. As Aristotle 
himself admits, animal is a per se1 predicate of Callias insofar as animal is mentioned in the definition 
of the species man, of which Callias is a member (see Metaph. V 18, 1022a 27-29). Moreover, the 
argument that there is no definition of individuals (and therefore the subjects must be universals) 
is inconsequential in the case of per se2 predications. After all, it is the definition of the predicate 
(and not of the subject) that occurs in the characterization of this kind of per se connection.  
In a series of articles, Richard Tierney (2001a; 2001b; 2004) argued that particular 
substances – and also substance-like entities such as numbers and surfaces – are subjects of per se 
predications. According to his view, odd would be a per se2 predicate of numbers like 5 or 7, whereas 
male would be a per se2 predicate of animals such as Socrates or Secretariat. Without accepting all 
the reasons Tierney sets out in favour of his interpretation, I would like to subscribe to his 
understanding of per se2 connections in the following terms.
169 
The possibility of individuals being subjects of per se predications is congenial to 
Aristotle’s Categories, according to which the subjects of predication par excellence are particular 
substances, on which other beings are ontologically dependent. As we have seen, the ontological 
priority of substances over incidental beings (PIB) has a definitional priority (PID) as its linguistic 
correlate: definitions of non-substantial entities must somehow register their dependent status by 
containing a reference to their proper subjects. However, since an attribute can be instantiated in 
a plurality of individuals, it would be unreasonable to require its definition to provide us with a 
complete list of the particular objects to which it belongs. For that reason, all Aristotle expects is 
the presence of a kind-term that picks out the subjects to which the definiendum attribute belongs as 
a per se2 predicate (Metaph. VII 5, 1030
b 23-24).170 Animals are the sort of things that are either male 
or female and therefore the definition of male must contain the kind-term ‘animal’. In that case, 
we could say, following Tierney, that animals satisfying the relevant criteria (such as Socrates or 
Secretariat) are subjects to which male belongs as a per se2 predicate. Similarly, (bodily) surfaces are 
the sort of things that have colours. For that reason, the term ‘surface’ should be part of the 
definition of white, which makes it a per se2 attribute of surfaces of a given kind (see Metaph. V 18, 
1022ª 29-31; VII 4, 1029b 16-18). 
However, since the subjects of a given predicate can be described in many ways, it is 
not immediately clear which kind-term should be part of its definition. As Tiles (1983, p. 10) points 
                                                 
169 Yet, as we saw in the last section, Tierney would not allow us to infer from his thesis that the term ‘triangle’ does 
not need to occur in the definition of 2R if 2R is a per se2 predicate of triangles (as I shall argue). 
170 See Goldin (1996), who argues that per se accidents are things such as eclipse, thunder or deciduousness, whose 
subjects, on which their being depends, are mentioned in their definitions.    
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out, Aristotle seems to believe that definitions of attributes should determine their range of 
significance. In other words, what is expected is a sortal expression – which can be either a substance 
term, such as ‘animal’, or a substance-like term, such as ‘number’ or ‘surface’ – that refers to the 
objects it applies to as countable discrete wholes, establishing thereby a homogeneous domain of 
application for the attribute in question. For that reason, white is a  of some men (in 
the sense of being a contingent predicate of them) and nevertheless is a per se2 predicate of the 
surfaces that are part of their bodies.171 Surfaces are the primary (proximate) subjects in which 
colours are naturally found (     , Metaph. V 18, 1022a16), which means that 
the property of being a (bodily) surface or being composed of a (bodily) surface is what unifies 
very dissimilar objects (such as a pale man, a painting by Barnett Newman or a snowball) in a 
cohesive domain. Therefore, doing science about colours and explaining how they come about 
involves doing science about bodily surfaces as well, since they are the proper subjects of colours 
with the relevant features that make colours what they are. 
The fact that particular objects can be subjects of per se2 predications (provided that 
the relevant kind is mentioned in the predicate’s definition) gives us a preliminary answer to the 
Metaphysical Question. However, this picture still needs to turn out consistent with a plausible 
answer to the Linguistic Question. Naturally, the Metaphysical Question takes precedence over the 
Linguistic one, since, in order to evaluate whether a given sentence expresses a certain fact or state 
of affairs appropriately, we need to know previously – at least, in general lines – what this fact or 
state of affairs is. However, without bothering to give a precise answer to the Metaphysical 
Question, several interpreters have assumed, for instance, that all categorical statements expressing 
a metaphysical predication in which odd occurs as a per se2 predicate must have the term ‘number’ 
as their grammatical subject. Under this assumption, the options available would be the following: 
(i) ‘Every number is odd.’ 
(ii) ‘Every number is odd or even.’172  
(iii) ‘Some numbers are odd.’173 
Option (i) should be rejected as false. Option (ii), on the other hand, can hardly be extracted from 
the texts – especially from Metaph. VII 5, 1030b 18-26 – and sounds too eccentric for the important 
                                                 
171 Tierney (2004, p. 14) notes that the kind-term appearing in the definition of an attribute applies to its ‘immediate 
subjects’ (surfaces in the case of white) rather than its ‘ultimate subjects’ (a particular pale man). Mignucci (1975, p. 
63), speaks in terms of ‘condizione prossima’ and ‘condizione remota’: ‘… mentre numero è condizione prossima di 
pari o dispari, uomo è solo condizione remota (in quanto ha superficie) di bianco.’ 
172 See Ross (1949, pp. 59-62; pp. 521-522); Wedin (1974, p. 34); Mignucci (1975, p. 63); Granger (1981, p. 120). 
173 See Ferejohn (1991, p. 99-108). 
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role Aristotle ascribes to per se2 connections in his theory of demonstrative science.
174 Particular 
statements like (iii), in turn, also do not get support from the text and conflict with Aristotle’s 
preference for universal propositions in scientific demonstrations (see Barnes 1993, p. 114).  
However, there is no textual evidence forcing us to assume that, if P is a per se2 predicate 
of S, the term ‘S’ must be part of the definition of what P is. Indeed, this would be the case only if 
the verb ‘ ’ signified what we could describe as a language-language relation – that is, a 
relation assuming only linguistic items as values. Actually, we cannot take ‘ ’ as a relation 
of this kind without committing Aristotle to a theory that is based on use-mention confusions, as 
we have seen. On the other hand, if we take ‘inhering in’ as a world-language relation, the number 
of sentences that can be interpreted as signifying per se2 connections is considerably higher than it 
is usually thought. Consequently, the important place Aristotle reserves for them in his theory of 
science becomes much easier to understand. Let us clarify this point. 
The characterization of per se2 connections in T32 is the following: ‘
’ (73ª 37-38). Answering the 
Metaphysical Question requires identifying the referent of the pronoun ‘ , the grammatical 
subject of ‘ . In Metaph. V 18, 1022a 29-31, Aristotle describes white as a per se2 predicate 
of the surface, using a definite article ( ). One could say that the definite article introduces the word 
‘surface’ as the (grammatical) subject of a linguistic predication. However, we have already ruled 
out this option by reading ‘ ’ as picking out a world-language relation. Another option 
would be to take the article to introduce a universal entity (the surface), as when we say, for instance, 
that ‘the elephant is a mammal.’ However, this use of the article seems to imply a universal 
quantification (all elephants are mammals), which is not compatible with the surface/white case 
(since not all surfaces are white). A third and more viable option would be to take the article to 
introduce a particular object. When we say, for example, that ‘the chair is made of wood’, the 
referring expression ‘the chair’ denotes a particular chair. In the same vein, in sentences like ‘the 
surface is white’ or ‘white is a per se2 predicate of the surface’, the expression ‘the surface’ would 
refer to a particular surface. Therefore, not only Aristotle’s example of per se1, but also his example 
of per se2 connections in Metaph. V 18 indicates that particular objects can be taken as subjects of 
per se predications.175 A similar reasoning applies to the use of the definite articles ‘ ’ and ‘ ’ in 
APo I 4, 73b29-30.  
                                                 
174 Although sentences of this form may appear in arguments that are relevant to scientific inquiry (such as reductio ad 
absurdum or arguments relying on platonic division), they do not seem to fit Aristotle’s characterizations of (full-fledged) 
demonstrations. Barnes (1993, p. 113) correctly points out that, for Aristotle, such propositions are ‘likely to be, at 
best, rare in the sciences’. 
175 Of course, this does not imply that universals cannot be subjects of per se predications. 
103 
 
Well, if the definite article in Aristotle’s example is interpreted as implying that white 
can be taken as a per se2 predicate of some particular (bodily) surfaces, these surfaces must somehow 
‘inhere in’ the definition of white. For the same reason, if male is a per se2 predicate of animals such 
as Socrates and Secretariat, Socrates and Secretariat must somehow ‘ ’ in the definition of 
male. Certainly, this does not mean that ‘Socrates’ and ‘Secretariat’ need to be present in the 
definitional locution specifying what male is. Indeed, this absurdity comes out only for those who 
take ‘inhering in’ as introducing a language-language relation, as several interpreters seem to do. 
On the other hand, those who take ‘inhering in’ as introducing a world-language relation find 
themselves able to explore the following exegetical hypothesis: a subject S ‘inheres in’ ( ) 
the definition of a predicate P if the relevant kind-term ‘K’ applying to S appears in the definition 
of P.176 If this hypothesis is correct, we could say that insofar as ‘animal’ is part of the definition of 
male, some of the members of the kind animal (like Socrates and Secretariat) are subjects to which 
male belongs in the per se2 way. Similarly, the definition of straight contains the kind-term ‘line’, 
which makes straight a per se2 predicate not of the kind line itself – after all, not all lines are straight 
–, but of the members of the kind that satisfy the relevant criteria for being considered a straight 
line.177 
With this background in mind, we are able to address the reasons set out by those who 
oppose the Natural Solution and resist classifying per se accidents (especially the property 2R) as per 
se2 predicates. The first of these reasons states that there is no good motivation to include the term 
‘triangle’ in the definition of 2R.178 Consequently, the attribute 2R would not satisfy the most basic 
requirement to be considered a per se2 predicate of triangles. This objection to the Natural Solution 
relies on the assumption we have just undermined; namely, that if P is a per se2 predicate of S, the 
term ‘S’ must be part of the definition of what P is. As we saw, the kind-terms ‘number’ and ‘animal’ 
appearing in the definitions of odd and male are responsible for marking off their ranges of 
significance. Thus, those kind-terms do not apply exclusively to the actual instances of these 
attributes, but to all the items to which ‘odd’ and ‘male’ apply meaningfully. Similarly, there is no 
                                                 
176 Perhaps, in some special cases, the proper name of S itself will be in the definition of the predicate.  For instance, 
‘Moon’ is part of the definition of the lunar eclipse and not a generic term applying to the Moon (APo II 2, 90a 15). 
177 The interpretation that Socrates, Callias and all male animals ‘inhere in’ the definition of male (in the precise way I 
have defined the ‘inhering in’ relation) – and similarly for the other examples – is also reinforced by the irregular 
combination of a neuter plural and a plural verb in 73a37-38. As has been noted, the plural verb may be used ‘when 
variety is emphasized (distributive plural)’ (Gildersleeve 1980, p. 48, §102) and ‘when stress is laid on the fact that the 
neuter plural subject is composed of persons or of several parts’ (Smyth 1920, p. 264, §959). See De An. II 3, 415a5-6; 
II 8, 420b9-10, II 9, 421b10-11; Plato, Laches, 180e; Laws, 856d-e. For other references, see Gildersleeve (1980, pp. 48-
49).  
178 One could argue that, for Aristotle, there is indeed good reason to include the term ‘triangle’ in the definition of 2R 
because 2R and triangle have a relation of primary universality. However, Aristotle never says that if there is a relation 
of primary universality between S and P then ‘S’ should be part of the definition of P. In addition, it would be hard to 
unify Aristotle’s examples in a single pattern – and hence to answer our question (A) – if one pursues this solution.    
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need to have the term ‘triangle’ as a part of the definition of 2R in order to classify 2R as a per se2 
predicate of triangles. What is required of the definition of a predicate is no more than a reference 
to the objects to which the predicate applies with meaning, not necessarily with truth. Therefore, as 
‘number’ in the case of odd or ‘animal’ in the case of male, the kind-term that needs to be present 
in the definition of 2R shall be something like ‘rectilinear closed figure’179, since only rectilinear 
closed figures can have internal angles equal to a certain amount or another. In that case, we could 
say that triangles ‘inhere in’ ( ) the definition of 2R insofar as this definition contains a 
kind-term applying to them: ‘rectilinear closed figure’. Thus, just as odd is a per se2 predicate of 
certain numbers and male is a per se2 predicate of certain animals, 2R is a per se2 predicate of certain rectilinear 
figures, namely, triangles. 
We must also not overestimate the impact of a second objection raised against the 
Natural Solution, according to which all per se accidents (2R included) should be members of a pair 
of opposite attributes in order to be classified as per se2 predicates. As some scholars have noted, 
Aristotle is not concerned with pairs of opposites when he defines and exemplifies the per se2 
connection, but at most to a limited range of mutually exclusive attributes – otherwise, it would be 
hard to see why Aristotle takes white as an example of per se2 predicate in Metaph. V 18.
 180 Although 
2R is a not a member of a pair of opposites, it is indeed a member of a set of incompatible attributes, 
which is given, as Tiles (1983, p. 7) puts it, by the values of the function ‘having internal angles 
equal to X’. All rectilinear closed figures – i.e. all items in the domain of application of the predicate 
2R – must present one or another of the values of this function as a necessary and demonstrable 
property.  
Our answer to the Metaphysical Question allows us to answer the Linguistic Question 
in such a way that, although per se2 predicates belong to a range of mutually exclusive attributes, the 
predicate-terms that signify them may be coextensive with a given subject-term depending on the 
statements in which they occur. Let us consider the following sentences: 
(iv) ‘5 is odd’ 
(v) ‘this rectilinear figure in the semi-circle has 2R’ 
(vi) ‘every prime number other than 2 is odd’  
(vii) ‘every triangle has 2R’ 
At first sight, Tierney’s interpretation suggests that sentences like (iv) and (v) are the most likely 
candidates to be interpreted as signifying per se2 connections, but this cannot be the whole story. 
                                                 
179 For more accurate options, see Tiles (1983, p. 10). 
180 See Wedin (1973, p. 34, n. 9); Granger (1981, p. 120); McKirahan (1992, pp. 89-90); Tierney (2004, p. 11, n. 38). 
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Odd is a per se2 predicate of certain numbers and therefore a universal affirmative sentence such as 
(vi) could be interpreted as expressing, in a distributive reading, several per se2 connections between 
odd and all prime numbers other than 2. Similarly, 2R is a per se2 predicate of certain rectilinear 
figures, namely, triangles. Therefore, we can say that sentence (vii) signifies (distributively) several 
per se2 connections between 2R and each particular triangle. In this case, nothing prevents 
statements with coextensive subject- and predicate-terms from signifying per se2 connections.  
This entire debate opposes two different exegetical hypotheses. Most interpreters 
assume that P being a per se2 predicate of S entails that the term ‘S’ appears in the definition of P 
and is the subject-term of all sentences expressing a per se2 connection between S and P.  Not only 
the opponents of the Natural Solution but even some of its proponents make this assumption, 
which explains why they were unable to show how the 2R-example fits Aristotle’s characterization 
of per se2 connections.
181 We, on the other hand, suggested that P will be a per se2 predicate of S if S 
is a member of a kind K and the corresponding kind-term ‘K’ appears in the definition of P 
(determining thereby its range of significance). This second hypothesis is preferable on its own 
insofar as it interprets the verb ‘ ’ in a way that does not commit Aristotle to use-mention 
confusions. In addition, it allows particular objects to be subjects of per se predications, being 
therefore in tune with the examples and the use of definite articles in Metaph. V 18 and APo I 4. 
Moreover, our interpretation provides solutions to problems (A) and (B) raised at the end of section 
4.3: first, it enables us to understand passages in which per se accidents seem to be taken as 
equivalent to per se2 predicates and at the same time explain how the paradigmatic example of 2R 
fits the description of per se2 connections in APo I 4 (problem A); second, a larger number of 
sentences can now be interpreted as expressing per se2 connections, which allows us to explain the 
passages where Aristotle takes per se1 and per se2 connections to cover all scientific propositions 
without limiting his theory to sentences like (i), (ii) and (iii) (problem B).  
 
                                                 
181 Ross (1949, pp. 59-62) and Granger (1981, p. 120), who accept the Natural Solution, assume that a disjunction of 
exclusive attributes should appear in the predicate position, as we have in sentence (ii) above. This seems to be an 
awkward and ad hoc way out, which is unnecessary in our interpretation. Certainly, sentences with coextensive subject- 
and predicate-terms are not the only ones to express per se2 connections. For that reason, it would be wrong to claim 
that the class of propria coincides with the class of per se accidents (see Barnes 1970, pp. 139-140). Wedin (1973) adopts 
the disjunctive reading but argues that each member of the disjunction is a per se accident and not the disjunction as a 
whole, taken as a single attribute. He believes that per se accidents are always disjunctive and, therefore, cannot be 
propria. Graham (1975) has a more inclusivist view and argues that propria and per se2 attributes are subtypes of per se 
accidents. However, he assumes that per se2 attributes, unlike propria, are not counterpredicable (i.e. coextensive) with 
their subjects. As we have argued, this assumption conflates linguistic and extra-linguistic levels in which we can speak 
of predications. For a way of interpreting the necessity of per se2 predications that does not require the disjunctive 
reading, see Tierney (2007). 
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What about question (C)? According to the interpretative schema we are advancing, a 
sentence like 
(viii) ‘every isosceles triangle has 2R’  
also expresses (distributively) per se2 connections between 2R and each isosceles triangle. Insofar as 
it signifies a per se connection, (viii) is under the scope of demonstrative science, as we would expect 
(since 2R is not a contingent attribute of isosceles triangles). However, Aristotle believes that 
sentence (vii) takes precedence over (viii) because (as it is usually phrased) 2R belongs to isosceles 
triangles not qua isosceles, but qua triangles. But what does this mean exactly? In other words, in 
which sense of ‘ ’ does 2R belong to the isosceles (or equilateral) ‘ ’ (Top. 
II 3, 110b 23-25)? When Aristotle says that the demonstration of the 2R-theorem applies to the 
isosceles ‘ ’ (APo I 4, 74a 2), to which sense of ‘ ’ does the expression 
‘ ’ refer?182 
The concept of primary universality seems to be related to the fact that, for Aristotle, 
the subject-term of demonstrable propositions should somehow be explanatorily related to the 
predicate. If this is the case, the per se connection that characterizes primary universality must hold 
between a demonstrable property and another feature (expressed by the subject-term) in virtue of 
which all the objects that have such property happen to have it (see Kosman 1973, pp. 374-375).  
As we have seen, Aristotle characterizes the per se4 connection as an explanatory 
relation, as the proponents of A2 would accept. However, these interpreters do not seem to capture 
the relevant kind of explanatory relation Aristotle has in mind. According to them, P being per se4-
related to S means that P merely follows from S being what it is. Thus, they assume that a per se4 
predicate (in their view, a per se accident) of a genus would be a per se4 predicate (that is, a per se 
accident) of its species as well – since being a member of the species entails being a member of the 
genus. This result, however, leaves us with no sense of ‘per se’ in which 2R is per se-related to triangle, 
but not to isosceles, equilateral or scalene. Consequently, A2 is unable to identify the kind of per se 
connection that characterises primary universality (APo I 4, 73b26-28). We can avoid this unpleasant 
outcome if we reinterpret the per se4 connection as follows. 
First, in T34, Aristotle does not seem to describe the per se4 connection as holding 
between a subject and a predicate (as the proponents of A2 assume it to be). At first, the connection 
in question seems to take place between events causally linked: a slaughtering procedure and the 
                                                 
182 On the equivalence between the ‘ ’ in Top. II 3 and the ‘ ’ in APo I 4, 74a 2, 110b 23-25, 
see section 4.3 above. In my view, 2R is a per se accident (that is, a per se2 predicate) of all triangles, which implies that 
sentences like (vii) –‘every triangle has 2R’ – and (viii) – ‘every isosceles triangle has 2R’ – express relations between 
certain objects and one of their per se accidents. However, as I shall now argue, sentence (vii) signifies a kind of per se 
connection that (viii) does not (namely, a per se4 connection). 
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death of an animal, for instance. However, we have seen that the kind of relation between events 
Aristotle has in mind consists in an explanatory connection between two predicates occurring to 
the same subject (or subjects): being slaughtered and dying: 
Per se4 : if P1 and P2 are per se4 related, P2 holds of a given S because [ ] P1 holds of S. 
This characterization of per se4 connections might be compatible with the one advanced 
by A2. However, the presence of the concept of primary universality in the context in which this 
connection is introduced forces us to take the per se4 connection as a very precise kind of explanatory 
relation, which is stronger than the mere ‘following from’ relation that A2 suggests. That this is so 
becomes clear once we realize that in APo I 4 Aristotle intends not only to classify the meanings 
of the expression ‘in itself’, but also to hierarchize demonstrable propositions. Suppose a geometer, 
for instance, discovers that all isosceles triangles have 2R and starts looking for an explanation for 
that fact. Her investigation is likely to end up with a demonstration concerning only the cases 
examined, viz. the occurrences of 2R in isosceles triangles.183 Even if the geometer includes in his 
agenda finding explanations for the presence of 2R in scalene and equilateral triangles as well 
without unifying them in a single kind, the knowledge acquired in this way would be nothing more, 
in Aristotle’s words, than a sophistic ( ) understanding of the 2R-theorem (see APo 
I 5, 74a 25-32; I 2, 71b 9-10).184 In order to have scientific knowledge without qualification, it is not 
enough to figure out the range of significance of the attribute in question, not even the whole 
domain of its actual instances: the appropriate extension cannot be grasped only ‘in number’ (74a 
31). There is an appropriate intension to be considered, which consists in a property or cluster of 
properties explanatorily related to the attribute whose occurrence we seek to demonstrate. For 
example, whatever has the attribute 2R has it independently of having two, three or none of their 
sides equal to each other (i.e. independently of being an equilateral, an isosceles or a scalene figure), 
but ultimately because it is, by definition, a three-sided rectilinear closed figure, that is, a triangle.185 
The vocabulary used in passages where 2R is said to be per se-related to triangle, but not to isosceles, 
is close to the vocabulary used in the discussion of per se4 connections in APo I 4. As we have seen, 
Aristotle affirms that 2R belongs to triangle ‘in itself’ in the sense that whatever has the property 
                                                 
183 Smith (2009, p. 60) gives a helpful example: ‘it can be proved that every isosceles triangle has 2R as follows: bisect 
the triangle’s base and connect this to its opposite vertex, producing two congruent triangles. Invert one of these halves 
and join it to the other, producing a rectangle. It is then evident that the angles of the two triangles add up to four 
right angles, so the angles of each add up to two. From Aristotle’s perspective, this is not really a demonstration since 
it cannot explain why all triangles have 2R, even though all triangles do have 2R.’ 
184 Of course, just failing to capture the appropriate kind-term (from an explanatory point of view) is not enough to 
classify an explanation as ‘sophistic’. What makes an explanation sophistic is the intention of producing a false 
appearance of knowledge and wisdom. On this, see Hasper (2006); Angioni (2016).  
185 For similar views, see Lennox (1987, p. 91); Kosman (1973, p. 375); Hasper (2006); Angioni (2007a; 2014b, pp. 97-
98; 2014c; 2016). 
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2R has it ‘in virtue of’ ( ) triangle, whereas triangle has 2R ‘not in virtue of something different’ 
( ).186 If this is the kind of explanatory relation underlying Aristotle’s characterization 
of the per se4 connection, we can say that 2R is per se4-related to triangle, but not to its subspecies: 
for any S that has 2R, S has 2R in virtue of being a triangle and independently of being an isosceles, 
equilateral or scalene figure. 
As we have seen, Aristotle argues that demonstrable propositions like (vii) – ‘every 
triangle has 2R’ – are prior to sentences like (viii) – ‘every isosceles triangle has 2R’. The reason is 
that, for every demonstrable attribute, there is one subject-term which is the most qualified to occur 
in the corresponding (demonstrable) proposition. The per se4 connection, if understood as we 
propose, can be used to explain this aspect of Aristotle’s theory. If a per se4 connection holds 
between two predicates P1 and P2, whatever is P2 is so in virtue of being P1, and hence must fall 
under denoting phrases such as ‘the P1’ or ‘every P1’. Thus, if a sentence expresses a per se4 
connection, its grammatical subject must be a denoting phrase that is explanatorily related to the 
predicate in question in the precise way we have described. As we have argued, per se accidents such 
as 2R are per se2 predicates of the objects of which they are predicated. For instance, sentence (viii) 
– ‘every isosceles triangle has 2R’ – is demonstrable insofar as it expresses per se2 connections 
between 2R and every isosceles triangle. However, only propositions that also exhibit a per se4 
connection can be considered the primary demonstranda of science, since they have as their 
grammatical subject a denoting phrase that not only comprises all (and only) the actual instances 
of the predicate, but also stands for a set of features that are explanatorily linked to it. This is the 
case of sentence (vii), which, in virtue of having the denoting phrase ‘every triangle’ as its 
grammatical subject, not only expresses per se2 connections between 2R and all the figures to which 
2R belongs (i.e. all triangles), but simultaneously signifies a per se4 connection between being a triangle 
and having 2R. 
If our interpretation of the nature of per se4 connections is correct, the corollary of 
alternative A2 does not follow. In fact, it would be false to say that if P is per se4-related to S and S 
is per se1-related to S’, then P would be per se4-related to S’. There is a per se4 connection between 
being a triangle and having 2R. However, although being a triangle is a per se1 predicate of isosceles 
triangles, there is not a per se4 relation between having 2R and being isosceles. Therefore, we have 
our solution to problem (C): when Aristotle affirms that 2R is per se-related to triangle but not to 
isosceles or equilateral, he has a per se4 connection in mind, which is the kind of per se relation that 
enables him to take sentences like (vii) – and not (viii) – as primary demonstranda.  
                                                 
186 See APr I 35, 48a 33-36. 
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The most natural reaction to texts like Ph. I 3, 186b 18-23, and our T37, T38 and T39 
is to take per se accidents to be per se2 predicates, as several interpreters have done. However, 
Aristotle’s paradigmatic example of a per se accident in T35 (2R predicated of triangles) seemed to 
challenge this view. We advanced an interpretation that maintains the natural reading of those 
passages and explains how 2R could be taken as a per se2 predicate of triangles. In our interpretation, 
the number of sentences that can be interpreted as expressing per se2 connections is significantly 
larger than alternative interpretations would be able to admit, rendering Aristotle’s theory richer 
and more likely to apply to actual scientific cases. In addition, it is perfectly possible to make sense 
of T37, T38 and T39 without excluding per se4 connections from the scope of science: sentences 
like (vii) – ‘every triangle has 2R’ – express per se2 connections between 2R and triangles and a per se4 
connection between the predicates being a triangle and having 2R. The per se4 connection is not only 
relevant, but crucial to Aristotle’s theory, since it enables him to distinguish between primary and 
secondary demonstrable propositions. In fact, it seems Aristotle tried to make this point explicit in 
T37: ‘with respect to what is knowable without qualification, whatever is said to hold of things in 
themselves (in the sense of inhering in what is predicated or of being inhered in) is also said to hold 
of them because of themselves [ ]’ (APo I 4, 73b 16-18).187 Sentences like ‘5 is odd’ and ‘every 
isosceles has 2R’ are under the scope of science, but only propositions like ‘every triangle has 2R’, 
which signify both per se2 and per se4 connections, are scientific ‘without qualification.’  
This picture helps us determine which model of essence-based explanation Aristotle 
endorses. As we have said, the Natural Solution to the problem of per se accidents is in accordance 
with the A-Model. The definitions of per se accidents, understood as a per se2 predicates, contain a 
reference to their proper subjects. If so, we can affirm that the relation between a subject and a 
demonstrable attribute is part of the essence of the attribute. Interpretations A1 and A2 are more 
sympathetic to the S-Model: per se accidents would either be part of the essence (A1) or follow from 
the essence (A2) of the subject. Since we have argued in favour of the Natural Solution, we are 
committed to the view that the relation between a subject and a demonstrable attribute is somehow 
part of the way of being of the attribute, which is why the subject is mentioned in the attribute’s 
definition.188 If our interpretation is correct, in addition to significant textual evidence from APo 
II, the notion of per se accident in APo I also corroborates the A-Model. 
                                                 
187 Passage T37 seems to imply that sentences expressing per se1 connections can also signify per se4 connections, if they 
are knowable ‘without qualification’. Aristotle’s words in T37 seem to make sense: lines have points precisely in virtue 
of their being lines (the same seems to be true of other per se1 predicates). Of course, in our interpretation, per se1 
predications are first principles of science, and hence knowable not by demonstration. On the other hand, sentences 
expressing per se2 connections are knowable by demonstration. If, in addition, they also signify a per se4 connection, they 
are knowable by demonstration and ‘without qualification’ (i.e. as a primary demonstrandum).   
188 See Bronstein (2016a, pp. 46-50). 
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Nevertheless, we have also seen that if a (linguistic) predication is a primary 
demonstrandum, it has as its (grammatical) subject a denoting phrase (e.g. ‘every triangle’) containing 
a predicate that is explanatorily connected to the demonstrable attribute in question (e.g. ‘2R’) in a 
precise way: the corresponding (metaphysical) predicates (e.g. being a triangle and having 2R) are per 
se4-related. If triangles have 2R in virtue of being triangles, there is a sense in which the S-Model is also 
part of this picture. Although the essence of 2R involves its being predicated of rectilinear figures 
of a certain sort (namely, triangles), the occurrence of 2R in those figures is also grounded in their 
essence: if they were not essentially three-sided rectilinear closed figures, 2R would not be 
predicated of them as a demonstrable attribute. If we are right, Aristotle endorsed both the A- and 
the S-Model. However, several questions must be raised: Are these patterns of explanation 
incompatible or complementary? Could there be two (or even more) alternative and independent 
explanations of the same phenomenon? Or can the essences of subjects and attributes be parts of 
the same coherent causal story?  
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CHAPTER 5 
EXPLANATION, ESSENCE, AND PRIMARY UNIVERSALITY 
 
 
 
 
 
5.1 – Two Problems in Posterior Analytics II 16-17 
Few chapters of the APo are as elucidating as II 16-17. Aristotle spells out, with helpful 
examples, what kind of syllogism can be taken as a full-fledged demonstration – i.e. a 
demonstration of the ‘primary universal’ – and what kind of explanatory role definitions play in 
demonstrative arguments. However, these chapters also present us with at least two major 
difficulties. 
(1) In APo II 16, Aristotle raises the question of whether a scientific explanandum always 
entails and is explained by the same explanans (98a 35-98b 2). As we shall see below, the philosopher 
discusses two hypothetical scenarios, each of which leads to different answers to this question (98b 
25-28). In the first of them, different middle terms play the role of explanans depending on the 
subjects of which the explanandum attribute is predicated. Thus, the answer to the question raised 
in APo II 16 would be negative. In the second scenario, the demonstration is of the ‘primary 
universal’: the major and minor terms of a syllogism are coextensive, which entails that the major 
(explanandum) and the middle term (explanans) also counterpredicate (since demonstrations of this 
kind are in Barbara). In APo II 17, the philosopher goes on to argue that in proper scientific contexts 
– in which we demonstrate something ‘in itself’ ( ) – there cannot be several explanantia of 
the same explanandum. Hence, only instances of the second scenario, in which the three terms of 
the syllogistic demonstration are coextensive, would be properly scientific. If so, Aristotelian 
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demonstrations seem to be restricted to very specific kinds of phenomena, while certain explananda 
we would like to admit as truly scientific – some of which considered by Aristotle himself in APo 
II 17 – would be out of the scope of science. 
(2) It has been argued that in APo II 16-17 Aristotle advances two different (and 
potentially incompatible) models of scientific explanation, which correspond to what we have been 
calling the ‘S-Model’ and the ‘A-Model.’ Michael Ferejohn (2013), for instance, claims that these 
chapters present ‘two alternative ways of explaining’ the fact that certain plants shed their leaves.189 
According to Ferejohn (2013, p. 104), lines 98a35-b4 favour the S-Model: broad-leaved plants are 
deciduous precisely because they ‘have broad leaves’ ( ). This is, Ferejohn 
argues, Aristotle’s ‘canonical’ model of scientific explanation: the demonstrable attributes of a given 
subject are explained by the subject’s essence. However, lines 98b 36-8 and 99a 23-29 support the 
A-Model, which Ferejohn would describe as a ‘non-canonical’ pattern of explanation: the explanans 
(coagulation of sap) is the essence (or rather the causal or explanatory part of the essence) of the 
explanandum attribute (deciduousness). 
In the following, I shall argue that Aristotle’s solution to the first problem involves 
showing that certain problematic attributes, which appear to admit more than one explanation, 
actually fall into the privileged scenario of primary-universal demonstrations. In addition, his 
solution suggests a conciliatory way-out to our second problem (or so I shall argue): both the 
essence of subjects and the essence of demonstrable attributes can play explanatory roles in 
demonstrations. I shall indicate how these results are underpinned by two of Aristotle’s views on 
essence and causation: (i) causal or explanatory connections have a three-fold configuration, which 
means that one cannot evaluate whether a feature x is the primary explanation of a feature y unless 
the relevant domain of objects for the occurrences of x and y is properly specified; (ii) the existence 
of a demonstrable attribute as a unified phenomenon (i.e. as having such and such essence) depends 
on its subject having the essence it has. 
5.2 - The Uniqueness Requirement 
Aristotle begins APo II 16 interested in knowing whether every ‘occurrence’ of an 
attribute – the verb used is ‘ ’ – that can be scientifically explained involves the occurrence 
of its putative explanatory factor (APo II 16, 98a 35-36). In other words, does the explanandum 
always entails its explanans? We can formalize the question in the following way: 
Q1: ∀x∀y((x is explanatory of y) → (y occurs → x occurs)) [?] 
                                                 
189 Ferejohn (2013, p. 149). 
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In APo II 16, 98b 2-4, a second question, apparently less controversial, is added. It 
concerns sufficient causality as it is usually conceived: given a certain cause, does its effect follow? 
Q2: ∀x∀y((x is explanatory of y) → (x occurs → y occurs)) [?] 
If affirmative answers are given to both of these questions, there will be a mutual entailment 
between explanans and explanandum: given a certain cause, its effect follows (affirmative answer to 
Q2) and, given a certain effect, its putative explanation occurs as well (affirmative answer to Q1).190  
The use of ‘ ’ without a dative in 98ª35-b4 may suggest that, for Aristotle, causation (or 
‘being explanatory of’) is a relation that takes place between events or processes. However, the next 
lines make it clear that ‘x is explanatory of y’ is short for ‘x is explanatory of y for z’191 – that is to 
say, we have to consider not only the ‘cause’ ( ) and ‘that of which it is cause’ ( ) or ‘the 
thing caused’ ( ), but also the subject or subjects ‘for which it is cause’ ( ).192 In the 
same vein, an expression such as ‘x/y occurs’ ( ) is short for ‘x/y holds of z’ or ‘x/y is 
predicated of z’ ( plus dative). In fact, the introduction of a third item in the analysis of 
causal relations is a crucial part of Aristotle’s solution to the problems addressed in APo II 16-17. 
In 98a35-b24, for instance, the philosopher is concerned with the following difficulty: do affirmative 
answers to Q1 and Q2 entail that ‘being explanatory of’ is a symmetrical relation? His tripartite 
analysis of causation allows him to approach the problem in syllogistic terms. If x and y entail each 
other, one can prove syllogistically that ‘x holds of z’ from the premise ‘y holds of z’ and vice-versa 
(98b 4-5). Let us say, for instance, that being a broad-leaved plant is the reason why vines are 
deciduous. If Q1 and Q2 are answered affirmatively, one could formulate the following two 
syllogisms (98b 5-16): 
Syllogism X: 
Deciduousness holds of all broad-leaved trees, Being a broad-leaved tree holds of all vines 
Deciduousness holds of all vines 
Syllogism XI: 
Being a broad-leaved tree holds of all deciduousness trees, Deciduousness holds of all vines 
Being a broad-leaved tree holds of all vines 
In this passage, Aristotle addresses the mistake of taking both X and XI as demonstrative 
syllogisms. In demonstrations, the middle term explains why the major term is predicated of the 
minor. Hence, if X and XI were both demonstrative syllogisms (in the strict sense of the term), the 
                                                 
190 Barnes (1993, p. 252) notes that, in APo II 16, Aristotle is not interested in temporal relations between explanans 
and explanandum (like in APo II 12), but in logical relations. 
191 See Barnes (1993, p. 252). 
192 Angioni describes this as ‘the triadic structure’ of scientific explanations. See n. 23. 
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attributes deciduousness and being a broad-leaved tree would be ‘mutually explanatory’ ( , 
98b 17). However, says Aristotle, ‘an explanation is prior to what it is explanatory of’ (
, 98b 17). Since priority is an asymmetrical relation193, the relation ‘being 
explanatory of’ is also asymmetrical. By arguing that explanatory relations are asymmetric, Aristotle 
points out that, in demonstrations, the priority of the premises over the conclusion goes beyond 
mere inferential connections between them: although the properties being a broad-leaved tree and being 
deciduous entail each other, the former is explanatory of the latter, but not the other way around, 
which means that only Syllogism X is of ‘the reason why’ ( ς, APo I 13, 78a 
28-b4; II 16, 98b 19-21). 
As has been noted, in APo II 16-17, Aristotle takes Q2 as uncontroversial.194 From 98b 
25, the focus is on Q1 or, more specifically, on a different (and in a certain way more relevant) 
problem related to it. Let us say that, in a given context c1, x is the putative explanans of the 
explanandum y. If there is a context c2 in which y occurs without x occurring, there must be a 
different item z which is explanatory of y in c2. Thus, if Q1 is answered negatively, it follows that 
an explanandum can be explained by different explanantia. This motivates Aristotle to address the 
following requirement: 
Uniqueness Requirement (UR):  
∀x∀y((x is explanatory of y) → ∀z(z is explanatory of y → z = x)) 
Of course, Aristotle recognizes that a demonstration may be composed of several 
syllogistic inferences, which happens when one or more of the premises that contribute to explain 
the conclusion are themselves demonstrable.195 If so, all middle terms of such a syllogistic chain 
may be said to be ‘explanatory of’ the conclusion in a certain sense. However, in II 16-17, as well 
as in other key passages of the APo, Aristotle has a stronger explanatory connection in mind, in 
which the explanans is not something that merely contributes to explain the explanandum, but the 
determinant causal factor in virtue of which the explanandum is the case – or the ‘primary middle 
term’ ( , 99a 25).196 In the rest of APo II 16-17, the philosopher argues that every 
phenomenon susceptible to scientific explanation has a ‘primary middle term’ satisfying UR.197 Let 
us now examine Aristotle’s strategy.  
                                                 
193 See Cat. 12, 14ª 29-35; 14b 11-22; Metaph. V 11, 1019a 1-4; VII 10, 1034b 30-32; 1035b 6-7. 
194 See Barnes (1993, p. 252). 
195 APr I 23, 41b 18-20; APr II 18, 66a 17-18; APo I 19-22. 
196 What Aristotle calls the ‘primary middle term’ is probably the one which produces  – as defined in 
APo I 2, 71b 9-12 – by apprehending the primary  of a given .   
197 It is worth saying that UR is compatible with APo I 29, where Aristotle claims that ‘it is possible for there to be 
several demonstrations of the same thing’ (87b 5). As Barnes (1993, p. 191) argues, Aristotle shows, at best, that there 
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In the last part of APo II 16, Aristotle discusses UR in two hypothetical scenarios (98b 
25-28). In the first of them, the same explanandum attribute belongs to distinct subjects, each of 
which relates to distinct explanantia (APo II 16, 98b 25-29). Let us call it the ‘multiple causes’ scenario 
or ‘MC-scenario.’ For instance, if a single attribute A is predicated of distinct subjects D and E, 
nothing prevents us from elaborating two demonstrative syllogisms with also distinct middle terms, 
B and C respectively: 
AaB, BaD                           AaC, CaE 
                                               AaD                                           AaE 
 
If C and B are incompatible but equally adequate explanations for the major term A, UR is not 
satisfied. Later on, in APo II 17 99b 5-7, Aristotle seems to exemplify the MC-scenario: ‘the 
explanation of longevity for quadrupeds is their not having bile, while for birds it is their being dry 
(or something else):’ 
Syllogism XII: 
Longevity holds of absence of bile, absence of bile holds of quadrupeds 
Longevity holds of quadrupeds 
Syllogism XIII: 
Longevity holds of having dry bodies, having dry bodies holds of birds 
Longevity holds of birds 
The longevity of quadrupeds cannot be explained by the same item used to explain the longevity 
of birds.198 Therefore, at least at first sight, none of the explanations of longevity satisfies UR. 
Next Aristotle discusses a second scenario in which the explanandum entails the 
occurrence of the same explanans – I shall call it the ‘one-cause scenario’ or ‘OC-scenario’: ‘or if 
problems are universal, then must the explanation be some whole and what it is explanatory of be 
universal?’ (APo II 16, 98b 32-33).199 Aristotle brings up here the notion of ‘universal problem.’ 
‘Problem’ translates the Greek ‘  probably in its technical sense of APo II 14, i.e. the 
conclusion of a demonstrative syllogism whose premises provide its adequate explanation. The 
meaning of ‘universal’ ( ), on the other hand, is not as clear. However, a case can be made 
                                                 
can be several valid arguments for the same conclusion, which suggests that the term ‘ ’ is being used in a 
weaker sense. 
198 I shall take for granted, as the intelligibility of the example requires, that the minor ‘quadrupeds’ denotes all the 
objects for which longevity is a consequence of the absence of bile. The example is problematic. First, this explanation 
would work only for some quadrupeds – perhaps blooded quadrupeds (see PA IV, 677a 30-b10) or quadrupeds without 
gall bladders (see Ferejohn 2013, pp. 104-105). Second, in PA IV 2, 677a 30-35, Aristotle recognizes that also among 
dolphins longevity is caused by absence of bile. We should not assume that the examples express Aristotle’s own 
scientific views. In one of his best-known examples of scientific explanation, thunder is said to be caused by fire being 
extinguished in the clouds, which is not the view he advances in Mete. II 9, 369ª 14-369b 4. At any rate, the inadequacy 
of the example does not affect Aristotle’s philosophical point. 
199  Barnes’ (1993) translation with changes. 
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for the following interpretation: the example – deciduousness predicated of broad-leaved plants 
(APo II 16, 98b 32-33) – suggests that ‘universal’ refers to the concept introduced in APo I 4, 73b 
25-27. As we have argued, the notion in question is more properly called ‘ ’ or 
‘primary universal’ (see APo I 5, 74a 4-6; II 17, 99a 33-35) – although Aristotle himself is flexible 
with his vocabulary.200 What is particularly relevant in the context of APo II 16-17 is that, among 
other intensional features, the  attribute is coextensive with the subject it belongs 
to (see APo I 4, 73b 32-39; II 17, 99a 33-35). In fact, the role played by the concept of primary 
universality is, among other things, to require scientific explanations to cover all instances of the 
attribute taken as explanandum. Suppose that distinct subjects D and E are both members of a kind 
F and that A belongs not only to D and E, but to all Fs and nothing more. Thus, it is reasonable 
to seek for a single middle term explaining why all Fs are A. If there is such a term (let it be G), D 
and E would be A insofar as they are F or, put in Aristotelian terms, A would not belong ‘primarily’ 
to D and E (see ‘ ’ in 98b 27) but ‘primarily’ to their common kind F.201 In this case, 
the demonstranda ‘AaD’ and ‘AaE’ would not fall into our MC-scenario, since a syllogistic proof of 
greater explanatory power would be available: 
AaG, GaF 
AaF 
Primary-universal demonstrations explain all occurrences of the explanandum attribute 
in a single syllogistic argument. If all its occurrences can be explained at once, there must be a single 
cause for all them. In this scenario, a simple syllogistic deduction can establish a mutual entailment 
between explanans and explanandum. In Barbara, the sole syllogistic mood that proves universal 
affirmative sentences, co-extensiveness between major and minor terms entails co-extensiveness 
between the major and the middle (see APr II 5). Thus, in a demonstration with a primary-universal 
conclusion, in which major and minor terms counterpredicate, the major (explanandum) and the 
middle (explanans) counterpredicate as well. In APo II 16, Aristotle’s example of such syllogism 
runs as follows: 
Syllogism XIV: 
Deciduousness holds of coagulation of sap, coagulation of sap holds of all broad-leaved trees 
Deciduousness holds of all broad-leaved trees 
                                                 
200 See APo I 4, 73b 25-74ª 3; I 24. 
201 I am following Barnes (1993) in translating these occurrences of ‘ ’ with adverbial locutions – ‘primarily’, 
where Barnes has ‘primitively’ – for the sake of the clarity and fluency. However, it might be useful to have in mind 
that ‘ ’ qualifies the subject-term of categorical sentences occurring in demonstrations, and is being used here to 
specify the relation that the major term has with the middle and the minor terms.   
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The conclusion of the syllogism states a primary-universal predication, i.e. the phenomenon of 
deciduousness is considered in all its instances (i.e. all broad-leaved trees), not only in vines or fig-
trees (APo II 16, 98b 5-10; II 17 99a 23-26). In this case, the explanation is ‘some whole’ ( , 
98b 32) or, as Ross (1949, p. 667) puts it, ‘the whole and sole cause of the effect.’ That is to say, the 
middle term (coagulation of sap at the connection of the seed) holds of and (more importantly) explains all 
instances of the major. Predicates such as ‘2R’ and ‘deciduousness’ are, in Aristotle’s words, 
‘determined to some whole’ ( , 98b 33), i.e. they are restricted to a domain of 
objects that can be grasped by a single kind-term (the  item), which clears the way for a 
single, unifying explanation (the ). 
As we have seen, Aristotle addresses Q1 and UR introducing a third item ( ) in 
his analysis of causal connections: the subject (or subjects) to which the -attribute belongs 
primarily ( ). At first sight, it seems that UR is satisfied or not depending on how the 
-term (minor) relates to the other two, the  (middle) and the  (major). When 
the demonstration is of the  – and minor ( ) and major terms ( ) are 
coextensive –, there is a single middle term ( ) which not only is coextensive with the major, 
but also (and more importantly) explains all its instances. On the other hand, when the relation 
between the major ( ) and the minor term ( ) is not one of primary-universality, 
nothing seems to prevent us from demonstrating the same explanandum/major term with two 
syllogisms with distinct middle terms as explanantia. 
5.3 - Aristotle’s Answer and the Two Models of Scientific Explanation 
In APo II 17, Aristotle goes on to state the conditions under which UR is satisfied. 
[T40] 
 
Can it or can it not be the case that what is explanatory of some feature is 
not the same for every item but different? If the conclusions have been 
demonstrated in themselves, and not in virtue of a sign or incidentally, 
then perhaps the explanations cannot be different (for the middle term is 
the account of the extreme); but if they have not been demonstrated in 
this way, perhaps they can be different [APo II 17, 99a 1-4; Barnes 1993, 
with changes]. 
An answer to the question raised in 99a 1-2 depends on the way the explanandum attribute is 
demonstrated to belong to its subject. Can there be different explanations of the same item? If the 
conclusion is proved in itself ( ), the answer is negative. If it is demonstrated in virtue of a sign 
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( ) or incidentally ( ), nothing prevents the existence of several explanantia 
for the same attribute.  
As we know, Aristotle uses the expression ‘ ’ to refer to authentic 
demonstrative knowledge, in opposition to the mere pretence of knowledge labelled as ‘
’.202 Is Aristotle claiming that only phenomena falling into the OC-scenario are 
scientifically explainable? Would not it be possible to admit explananda such as longevity as properly 
scientific by arguing that, in those cases, there is a single explanans for them in restricted domains 
(quadrupeds in one case, birds in the other)? Could not we understand the minor terms as imposing 
a domain restriction in Syllogisms XII and XIII? After all, what is being sought is an explanation 
for longevity in quadrupeds in one case and in birds in the other. If there is a single item explaining 
longevity in each of those domains (not having bile and being dry respectively), would it not be too 
demanding to say that here ‘something else will be explanatory’ (APo II 16, 98b 1-2)? 
Answering these questions requires identifying what Aristotle takes to be the most 
determinant feature of authentic demonstrative knowledge. When the conclusion of a syllogism is 
demonstrated ‘ ’, says he, the middle term is the definition ( ) of the extreme (99a 3-
4). Again, is the middle the  of the major or of the minor term? Is the cause ( ) the essence 
of the attribute of which it is cause (  ) or of the subject for which it is cause ( )? Michael 
Ferejohn (2013) has argued that Aristotle does not answer this question consistently in the APo. 
According to the author, lines 98a35-b4 favour the S-Model: broad-leaved plants such as vines and 
fig-trees shed their leaves precisely because they are broad-leaved ( ). Thus, 
the would be the essence of the subject and the middle term, the definition of the 
minor term:  
Syllogism XV: 
Deciduousness holds of Def(broad-leaved tree), Def(broad-leaved tree) holds of all broad-leaved trees 
Deciduousness holds of all broad-leaved trees 
However, as we have seen, what predominates in book II of the APo is what Ferejohn 
claims to be a ‘non-canonical’ model of scientific explanation:203 the is the essence (or the 
                                                 
202 APo I 2, 71b 9-12; I 4, 74a 1-3; I 5, 74a 25-32. Proofs ‘in virtue of a sign’ are not properly explanatory, since they 
establish the truth of its probandum through one of its consequences (one that is more easily perceived than the 
probandum itself). See APr II 27. Ross (1949, p. 669) also quotes APo II 8, 93a37-b3 as providing an example of such a 
proof. I will not discuss in detail the use of the expression ‘ ’, since it is usually absent from Aristotle’s most 
relevant accounts of scientific knowledge, while the concept of ‘ ’ is often characterized in opposition to that 
of ‘ .’ For more accurate accounts of this opposition, see Hasper (2006) and Angioni (2016). 
203 Ferejohn (2013, pp. 131-155). 
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causal part of the essence) of the -attribute.204 Chapter II 17 is no exception to this pattern. 
The following passage is particularly eloquent:  
[T41]
 
The middle term is an account of the first extreme (which is why all 
sciences come about through definitions). Shedding leaves both follows 
vine and exceeds it, and it follows fig and exceeds it – but it does not 
exceed all of them: rather, it is equal to them. If you take the primary 
middle term, it is an account of deciduousness. For there will be first a 
middle term in the one direction (that all are such-and-such); and then a 
middle term for this (that the sap coagulates, or something of the sort). 
What is deciduousness? – The coagulation of the sap at the connection of 
the seed [APo II 17, 99a 21-29; Barnes 1993, with changes]. 
 
Aristotle not only affirms that the middle term is the of the major term ( ), 
but claims that this is the reason why ‘all sciences come about through definitions’ (
, 99a 22-23). Quite emphatically, Aristotle seems to endorse the view 
that our Syllogism XIV (rather than Syllogism XV) is the one providing the primary explanation – 
the ‘primary middle term’ ( ) – of the fact that all broad-leaved trees shed their 
leaves: 
Syllogism XIV: 
Deciduousness holds of coagulation of sap, coagulation of sap holds of all broad-leaved trees 
Deciduousness holds of all broad-leaved trees 
An important thesis of APo II corroborates the A-model. As we have seen in Chapter 
2, there is an isomorphism between the definition of an attribute and the explanation of its 
occurrence in the relevant subject. For instance, thunder is defined as a noise in the clouds caused 
by fire being extinguished. On the other hand, we explain why the noise we call ‘thunder’ is 
predicated of clouds through the middle term ‘extinction of fire’ (APo II 8, 93a 7-b14). This is our 
Syllogism VIII: 
Syllogism VIII: 
Thunder (or such-and-such noise) holds of extinction of fire, Extinction of fire holds of clouds 
Thunder (or such-and-such noise) holds of clouds 
                                                 
204 APo II 2, 89b 36 - 90a 14; 90a 31-35; II 8, 93a31-33; APo II 16, 98b 21-24; II 17 99a 21-22, 25-26. 
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The definition of thunder, in turn, is isomorphic to Syllogism VIII: 
Def. (Thunder): 
Thunder is(df.) noise of fire being extinguished in the clouds (APo II 10, 94
a 5-6). 
If this pattern is followed also in the case of deciduousness, its whole definition would be 
isomorphic to Syllogism XIV: 
Def. (Deciduousness): 
Deciduousness is(df.) the loss of leaves in broad-leaved trees caused by coagulation of sap. 
As we can see, the that plays the role of middle term in Syllogisms VIII and XIV is not the 
entire definition of the major term, but the causal or explanatory element in it. Still, the middle 
term is a specification of the attribute’s essence – in fact, of the most determinant element of its 
essence.205 Therefore, the A-Model is definition- or essence-based no less than the S-Model.206 
Still in favour of the A-model, one could argue that there is no textual evidence for us 
to assume that Aristotle is committed to the S-model in APo II 16. When in 98a 35-b4 Aristotle 
presents ‘having broad leaves’ ( ) as the  of deciduousness, he probably 
has in mind our Syllogism X, formulated in 98b 5-10 – and not Syllogism XV as Ferejohn (2013, p. 
104) supposes. 
Syllogism X: 
Deciduousness holds of all broad-leaved trees, Being a broad-leaved tree holds of all vines 
Deciduousness holds of all vines 
Syllogisms of this sort have been called ‘application arguments.’207 One way of approaching these 
arguments is to take them not as properly explanatory, but as mere classificatory inferences meant 
to ‘upgrade’ non primary-universal problems into primary-universal ones. The deciduousness 
example is an instance of the OC-scenario. Since a problem with coextensive terms such as 
‘deciduousness holds of all broad-leaved plants’ is available, sentences like ‘deciduousness holds of all vines’ 
or ‘deciduousness holds of all fig-trees’ are not ‘primary demonstranda’ – i.e. sentences in which the 
predicate belongs primarily ( ) to the subject. In APo II 18, Aristotle generalises a rule 
that was already implied in T41: it would be wrong to demonstrate a non-primary-universal 
conclusion such as ‘deciduousness holds of all vines’ with the  of deciduousness as the middle 
term. Aristotle begins the chapter affirming that not all scientific problems are explainable directly 
                                                 
205 Williams & Charles (2013, pp. 122-124). 
206 Cf. Ferejohn (2013, p. 155), who seems to assume that only the ‘canonical’ model is essence-based or definition-
based, whereas the ‘non-canonical’ or ‘causal’ model would at best ‘generate definitions.’ 
207 See McKirahan (1992, pp. 177-187); Ferejohn (2013, pp. 122-131). Application arguments are called ‘type A’ 
syllogisms by Lennox (1987). 
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by ‘atomic’ (i.e. immediate) premises ( , 99b 7). As we know, 
demonstrations may be composed of several syllogistic inferences and contain premises that are 
themselves demonstrable. Therefore, in the deciduousness example, the first deductive step of the 
demonstration (  99a 26) – ‘first’ in the ‘analytic’ or ‘proof-search’ order, i.e. from the 
conclusion to the premises –, subsumes ‘vine’ under the wider kind ‘broad-leaved tree’ (
, 99a 26-27). Hence, the major premise of this first inference would state a primary-universal 
demonstrandum (‘deciduousness holds of all broad-leaved plants’) and only then ( , 99a 27) the ‘primary 
middle term’ ( , 99a 25) – the  of deciduousness – becomes part of the 
demonstration: 
(Extended) Syllogism (X + XIV)  
Deciduousness holds of coagulation of sap, coagulation of sap holds of all broad-leaved trees 
                            Deciduousness holds of all broad-leaved trees 
                             
      
    Deciduousness holds of all broad-leaved trees, Being broad-leaved holds of vines 
                                                      Deciduousness holds of all vines 
Not only is the presence of the S-Model in APo II 16-17 questionable, but also the A-
model appears to serve the purpose of these chapters more successfully. From APo II 8, it is clear 
that Aristotle takes the definiendum and the causal part of its definiens as coextensive.208 Thus, if the 
explanans is the causal element in the definiens of the explanandum attribute, affirmative answers to 
Q1 and Q2 are mere corollaries of this definitional tie. Moreover, the A-model is part of Aristotle’s 
reply to those willing to take coextensive middle and major terms as reciprocally explanatory (see 
APo II 16, 98b 4-16): if x is part of the definition of y (and if the definition of y avoids circularity), 
x and y cannot be mutually explanatory, x being used to clarify what y is, but not vice-versa (see 
APo II 16, 98b 21-24). 
Therefore, at first sight, our problem (2) does not seem to be that challenging (see 
Section 5.1). At least in APo II 16-17 – letting aside the question of whether this is the case in 
respect of the APo as a whole –, Aristotle seems to be committed not to two alternative models of 
explanation, but only to the A-model. However, this is just an apparent solution. Even if an 
‘application argument’ such as Syllogism X is implied in 98a 35-b4, Ferejohn is right in recognising 
                                                 
208 Or at least within a restricted domain, determined by the minor term. See Barnes (1993, p. 253). The major premises 
in syllogisms such as XIV and VIII and the corresponding definitions yield this result: every deciduous plant undergoes 
coagulation of sap (from the definition of deciduousness) and every plant that suffers coagulation of sap is deciduous 
(major premise of Syllogism XIV). 
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the presence of the S-Model in the passage (or, at least, some modified version of it). Let us spell 
this out. 
The question of whether or not a predicate holds primarily of a given subject (
) cannot be decided in purely extensional terms. If the scientist arbitrarily selects a -
term that counterpredicates with the -term, the demonstrandum does not immediately qualify 
as a problem. In APo I 5, 74a 25-32, Aristotle argues that the mere extensions of 
the terms involved in a demonstrative syllogism are not enough to warrant its scientific status. Let 
us say, for instance, that 2R is predicated of two different subjects: a simple one (‘triangle’) and a 
disjunctive complex one (‘everything that is either equilateral or isosceles or scalene’). The 
extension of the subject ‘everything that is either equilateral or isosceles or scalene’ would cover all 
instances of 2R only ‘in number’ ( , APo I 5, 74a 31): although the disjunction exhausts 
the desired extension (extensional grasp), the objects it denotes are not described as members of a 
cohesive kind (intensional grasp), e.g. being a triangle.209 
This intensional requirement becomes perfectly understandable if we assume that 
something along the lines of the S-Model underlies the notion of primary-universality. The reason 
why ‘triangle’ – and not some other coextensive term – is the proper subject-term for the predicate 
‘2R’ may lie with the fact that the definition of triangle plays an important role in explaining the 
2R-theorem. Whatever has the attribute 2R has it independently of having two, three or none of 
its sides equal to one another (i.e. independently of being an equilateral, an isosceles or a scalene 
figure): a given figure may have the property 2R without being an isosceles (negative answer to 
Q1), which means that something else in this case must be explanatory.210 Rather, the 
demonstration of the 2R-theorem is meant to show how 2R is explanatorily related to a specific 
property (or cluster of properties) common to all objects that have 2R: being a three-sided 
rectilinear closed figure, i.e. being a triangle. If being a triangle is actually explanatory of certain 
figures having 2R, application arguments are not meant to promote minor classificatory 
adjustments. In fact, Aristotle’s vocabulary makes it clear that the kind of upgrade accomplished 
by arguments such as Syllogism X are truly explanatory rather than merely taxonomic. If, as 
Aristotle affirms, the triangle has 2R ‘not in virtue of something different’ ( )211, one 
may argue that the reason why ( ) triangles have 2R is not something different from what it is 
to be a triangle, i.e. the essence of triangle. 
If this account is correct, we can say that the S-Model is viable after all. Additionally, 
a serious objection can be formulated against the A-Model. If the middle term of demonstrative 
                                                 
209 Lennox (1987, p. 91). 
210 See Kosman (1973, p. 375); Hasper (2006); Angioni (2014b, pp. 97-98; 2014c; 2016). 
211 APr I 35, 48a 33-36. 
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syllogisms is always the of the major term, a phenomenon such as longevity does not seem 
to be scientifically explainable, or even properly definable. When it occurs in quadrupeds, longevity 
is explained by absence of bile, whereas its presence in birds is explained by their bodies being dry 
or something similar. Since one and the same item cannot have two alternative and incompatible 
definitions, attributes such as longevity would not be scientifically definable or explainable. 
However, why would Aristotle – who devoted a whole treatise to the topic: De Longevitate et Brevitate 
Vitae – exclude an attribute such as longevity from the scope of science? This question brings us 
back to our problem (1), raised in Section 5.1. As Aristotle’s solution to it sheds some light on (2) 
as well, I shall first concentrate on (1), which is the topic of our next section. 
5.4 - The appearance of ‘multiple causes’: ‘in-a-kind’ and homonymous explananda. 
In order to understand Aristotle’s solution to our problem (1), it is worth mentioning 
some of the views set out in APo II. As we have seen in Chapter 2, Aristotle claims that a question 
of the form ‘does P holds of S?’ (Q1) is equivalent to ‘does P exist?’ (Q3.1), whereas a question like 
‘why does P holds of S?’ (Q2) is equivalent to ‘what is P?’ (Q4.1). We have also seen that Aristotle 
believes that questions Q1 and Q3.1 are reducible to a question about the existence of a middle 
term: 
(Q1*/Q3*) Is there an M such that PaM, MaS ⊦ PaS & M is the reason why PaS? 
On the other hand, we answer questions Q2 and Q4.1 by finding out what that middle term is: 
 (Q2*/Q4*) What is M such that PaM, MaS ⊦ PaS & M is the reason why PaS? 
We have argued that, for Aristotle, asking question Q3.1 – ‘Does P exist?’ – is equivalent to asking 
whether there is a middle term M which could be used not only to explain why P belongs to its 
subject S, but also to formulate a unifying, causal definition of P. Hence, it would be wrong to take 
question Q3.1 as concerning the mere existence of an attribute. Actually, what is a stake is its 
existence as a definable unity or a genuine kind. 
That being said, let us analyse the solution Aristotle offers to our problem (1): 
[T42] 
. 
You can inquire incidentally both about what is explanatory of and about 
what is explanatory for – but such things are not thought to count as 
problems. Otherwise, the middle term will have a similar character – if the 
items are homonymous, the middle terms will be homonymous; and if 
124 
 
they are in a kind, the middle terms will have a similar character [APo II 
17, 99a 4-8; Barnes 1993, with changes]. 
At least in this context, to investigate something ‘incidentally’ ( , 99ª 5) is 
to approach a scientific problem inappropriately, as if it were a case of the MC-scenario. If, on the 
other hand, the scientist investigates something ‘non-incidentally’, ( , 99ª 6), ‘the middle term 
will have a similar character’ ( ).212 In order to clarify the point, let us consider 
two syllogisms with non-coextensive extreme terms: 
AaB, BaD                           AaC, CaE 
AaD                                          AaE 
Aristotle’s examples suggest that the obscure phrase ‘ ’ refers to two types of 
apparent (but not real) cases of the MC-scenario – and therefore two apparent (but not real) 
counterexamples to the validity of UR (99a 7-15).213 
- If A holds of D and E in a kind ( ), so A holds of B and C in a kind. 
- If A holds of D and E as homonymous ( ), so A holds of B and C as homonymous. 
The first of these two situations is exemplified by the following problem: ‘why do proportionals 
alternate?’ (99a 8).214 Someone may commit the mistake of thinking that the explanation depends 
on the subjects considered: proportional numbers and proportional lines ‘alternate’ for different 
reasons (see APo I 5, 74a 17-24; I 14, 85a 36-b1). Aristotle believes, however, that a single 
explanation could be reached if numbers and lines were treated as members of a common kind (
), i.e. not qua numbers or qua lines, but qua items having such-and-such ratio (
, 99a 10). The mistake consists in ‘investigating the incidentally’: minor terms 
D and E were mistaken for subjects to which A belongs ‘primarily’ ( ), when in fact D and E 
are A not in themselves, but as members of a wider-kind F, which is A ‘not in virtue of something 
different’ ( ).215 If so, the conclusions ‘AaD’ and ‘AaE’ can be upgraded, by application 
arguments, into a single demonstrandum with coextensive terms: ‘AaF.’ Moreover, if two subjects D 
and E are A ‘in a kind’, the respective middle terms B and C can also be replaced by a unifying 
                                                 
212 I here follow Ross (1949, p. 669), who argues, against most commentators, that ‘ ’ in 99a 6 means ‘if we study 
not  the  or the .’ I take the future ‘ ’ as consequential: a scientist who is dealing with 
an apparent case of the MC-scenario infers that the middle term has ‘a similar character’ as soon as she starts 
investigating the problem ‘non-incidentally.’ For a defence of the common reading, see Hasper (2006, p. 268). 
213 In APo II 17, 99a 4-8, Aristotle also mentions a third case: explanations ‘by analogy’ ( ). Analogical 
explanations are neither about one attribute predicated of two subjects of the same kind, nor about two different 
attributes called by the same name (see Ross 1949, p. 670). The terms ‘bone’ and ‘fish-spine’ refer to quite different 
things, which nonetheless play the same function in the animals in which they are found (APo II 14, 98a 20-23). These 
explananda do not threat the validity of UR as homonymous explananda do, which explains why Aristotle mentions them 
very briefly without a proper discussion. See APo II 14, 98a 20-23. 
214 That is to say: ‘why is the case that if W is to X as Y is to Z, then W is to Y as X is to Z?’ See Ross (1949, p. 525). 
215 APo I 5, 74a 25-32; cf. I 2, 71b 9-12 
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middle term G: . For instance, deciduousness belongs to vines and fig-trees ‘in 
kind’ ( ). Hence, we should obtain a primary-universal demonstrandum in the major premise 
of an application argument such as Syllogism X before trying to propose a unifying explanation for 
the major term ‘deciduousness.’ Thus, any causal story about vines being deciduous that does not 
work for fig-trees as well can and should be improved by a wider explanation covering all instances 
of deciduousness (i.e. all broad-leaved trees), like in Syllogism XIV. Therefore, the violation of UR 
is merely apparent. 
However, not only the  but also the term can be investigated
incidentally’ ( , 99ª 5). In this case, a scientist may falsely believe that the 
conclusions ‘AaD’ and ‘AaE’ fall into the MC-scenario not because she did not realize that D and 
E are subspecies of a common kind F, but because D and E appear to be subjects of the same 
attribute, whereas in fact ‘A’ is an ambiguous term and holds of D and E homonymously. In the 
Categories, Aristotle defines homonymy as follows: ‘when things have only a name in common and 
the definition of being which corresponds to the name is different, they are called homonymous’ (Cat. 
I 1, 1a 1-2).216 Aristotle’s notion of homonymy is not that of equivocality or ambiguity, though the 
former may be derived from the latter. Homonymy is a property of things in relation to a certain 
expression, while equivocality (or ambiguity) is a feature of the expressions themselves.217 Two 
subjects D and E are homonymous in relation to a certain expression ‘A’ when ‘A’ applies to both 
of them but each application is associated with different definitions of ‘A’. Consequently, ‘A’ must 
be an ambiguous word if it applies homonymously to D and E. 
However, homonymy can obtain at different levels.218 In cases of what has been called 
‘strong homonymy’, the expression ‘A’ has associated with it totally unrelated definitions, as when 
we apply the word ‘bank’ to disparate types of thing such as a riverbank and a financial institution.219 
On the other hand, ‘weak homonymy’ occurs when the distinction between the different 
definitions of ‘A’ is more subtle. In this case, the two homonymous items D and E may share a 
property in virtue of which they are both called ‘A’ and consequently the corresponding definitions 
may also have something in common – though the complete definitions must obviously remain 
distinct if weak homonymy is to be case of homonymy at all.220 Aristotle’s example in APo II 17 
suggests that he has in mind this second and weaker kind of homonymy: ‘similar’ signifies different 
things when applied to figures and colours (APo II 17, 99a 11-15). Between figures, similarity means 
‘having proportional sides and equal angles’ (99a 13-14), while between colours it means ‘the fact 
                                                 
216 Ackrill’s translation (1963). 
217 See Ackrill (1963, pp. 71-72).  
218 For a systematic discussion of those different levels, see Shields (1999). 
219 See Wedin (2000, p. 13). 
220 See Wedin (2000, pp. 13-14). See Zingano (2013), for a detailed discussion of what he calls ‘attenuated homonymy’. 
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that perception of them is one and the same’ (99a 14-15). Hence, figures and colours are 
homonymous in relation to the expression ‘similar’ and hence ‘similar’ is an equivocal term. 
However, there is no equivocality at the level of ordinary parlance, since the word currently means, 
regardless the items it applies to, a likeness or resemblance of a certain sort. Therefore, similarity 
is a case of weak homonymy. 
Scientific definitions are explanatory and involve more than a brief account of the 
current meaning of the definiendum term. At a scientific level of analysis, similarity in figures and in 
colours relates to very different sets of truth-conditions and explanatory factors. Thus, part of the 
process of defining something in contexts of weak homonymy is to realize that there is no single 
attribute to be defined (similarity without qualification), with two (or more) competing explanatory 
accounts, but actually two (or more) different attributes (similarity in figures and similarity in 
colours) with their own definitions and explanations. Apparently, the same diagnosis applies to the 
case of longevity.221 Aristotle believed that the phenomenon of longevity is realized in very different 
manners depending on the group of living-beings considered, in such a way that it becomes 
impossible for us to come up with a single explanation for all its instances.222 Being long-lived for 
a quadruped is so different from what being long-lived is for birds that we have different middle 
terms for the major ‘longevity’ in each case: ‘absence of bile’ and ‘being dry’ respectively. If the 
middle term is the causal part of the definition of the major, the term ‘longevity’ gets one definition 
when predicated of quadrupeds and another when predicated of birds. Therefore, longevity holds 
of quadrupeds and birds homonymously. Consequently, the respective middle terms ‘absence of 
bile’ and ‘being dry’, as long as they refer to very distinct ways of being long-lived, also have 
‘longevity’ predicated of them in the respective major premises homonymously: 
. 
Again, this reasoning does not entail that ‘longevity’ is equivocal at the level of ordinary 
language. Rather, homonymy comes up only when we find out that there is no such thing as longevity 
without qualification that could be object of scientific definition. Rather, what can be defined in a 
scientific way are quite distinct attributes: longevity-for-quadrupeds (or Q-longevity) and longevity-for-birds 
(or B-longevity): 
Q-longevity is(df.) quadrupeds living long because of absence of bile. 
B-longevity is(df.) birds living long because of their bodies being dry.
223   
                                                 
221 I am indebted to Lucas Angioni and David Bronstein on this point. 
222 See Long. 1, 464b 22-464b 25; 4, 466a1- 466ª 8. 
223 These definitions avoid circularity precisely because the definienda are specific kinds of longevity, ‘living long’ being 
an expression that accounts for what Q-longevity and B-longevity have in common (since this is not a case of strong 
homonymy). 
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If this interpretation is correct, longevity is not an explanandum that fails to satisfy UR. What appears 
to be a single explanandum attribute at the level of ordinary language gives way to two different 
attributes (Q-longevity and B-longevity), each of which holds of its subject (quadrupeds and birds) 
primarily ( ) and relates to one single item as its proper explanation (absence of bile and 
dryness respectively). If so, what appears to fall into the MC-scenario is actually an instance of the 
OC-scenario. Once we restrict the domains of the demonstrations in order to disambiguate the 
major term, what appeared to exemplify the MC-scenario turns out to be a case of the OC-scenario 
and no longer threatens the validity of UR. 
In other words, longevity (without any disambiguation) does not exist as a definable unity 
or a genuine kind, but Q-longevity and B-longevity do. As Aristotle makes it clear since the beginning of 
APo II, when a scientist attempts to define an attribute such as longevity, she does not seek for a 
vague and abstract account of the term ‘longevity’ covering its (standard) uses in ordinary speech. 
Rather, she is interested in knowing whether these uses refer to a single homogenous phenomenon, 
i.e. whether they are all associated with one and the same underlying cause. If not, it is possible to 
look for unifying causes in more restricted domains than the one assumed in ordinary language. In 
this case, either there will not be restricted domains in which UR is satisfied (and the phenomenon 
is not scientifically explainable) or the scientist will find herself dealing with several scientific 
explananda – instead of just one as everyday discourse makes it appear. 
Now, I shall explain how this picture invites us to pursue a conciliatory solution to our 
problem (2). 
5.5 - A Conciliatory Solution 
As we have seen in APo II 16, 98b 21-24, the priority of the explanans over the 
explanadum is illustrated in terms of an asymmetric relation of definitional dependence: thunder (the 
explanandum attribute) cannot be defined without mentioning extinction of fire (explanans), whereas 
extinction of fire can be defined without mentioning thunder.224 However, definitions of attributes 
contain reference not only to its explanans (e.g. extinction of fire), but also to its proper subject (e.g. 
clouds). Thunder cannot be defined without mentioning clouds, but clouds can be defined without 
reference to thunder. Can this definitional priority of subjects tell us something about the role their 
essences play (if any) in Aristotelian demonstrations? 
In Chapter 4, we have seen that, for Aristotle, definitions of attributes (i.e. non-
substantial beings) must somehow account for their status as dependent entities.225 That is to say, 
                                                 
224 The example in the passage is the lunar eclipse, but the two cases are strictly parallel.  
225 Metaph. VII 1, 1028a 35-36; VII 5, 1030b 23-24; APo I 4 73a 37-b5; II 2, 90a 14-18; II 10, 93b 38-94a 7. 
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ontological priority of subjects over their attributes would have definitional priority as its linguistic 
counterpart. We have also argued, following Peramatzis (2011), that the ‘real’ or ‘metaphysical’ 
correlate of definitional priority (PID) should be understood as PIB. An attribute P (a non-
substance entity) is ontologically dependent on the relevant subject S (per se3 being, i.e. a substance 
or substance-like entity) in the sense that P does not have the essence it has (i.e. cannot perform 
the way of being that distinguishes it as such) independently of S having the essence it has. 
The way Aristotle deals with problem (1) corroborates this approach. After all, his 
solution involves arguing that a single term ‘A’ may stand for two (or more) different attributes, 
with different causal definitions, depending on the subjects of which it is predicated. In other 
words, attributes are not what they are and do not get the definitions they get independently of the 
subjects to which they belong primarily. Their identity is partially fixed by these subjects, on which 
their status as definable unities ultimately depends. For that reason, the definitions of Q-longevity, B-
longevity and deciduousness should mention quadrupeds, birds and trees respectively. If quadrupeds 
were not the sort of animals they are, their longevity would not have absence of bile as its primary 
explanation (and, consequently, as the causal part of its definition). Similarly, if broad-leaved plants 
had not the essences they have, they would not undergo coagulation of sap, which is the process 
that makes deciduousness the unified phenomenon it is. Therefore, given that the essence of 
subjects is prior to the essence of attributes, guaranteeing a place for the definitions of attributes 
in demonstrative sciences and denying one for the definitions of their proper subjects seems, at 
best, uncongenial to Aristotle’s philosophy. 
In fact, the structure of demonstrations allows definitions of subjects (as much as 
definitions of attributes) to play the role of explanatory middle term. As we have seen in our analysis 
of APo II 17, 99a 16-9, a complete demonstration may have the form of an extended argument 
with several syllogistic inferences. Moreover, the passage is also clear that it is not in every deductive 
step that the middle term is the  of the major term. The demonstration may involve (as it 
does when it contains application arguments) further syllogistic steps in which the middle term is 
not definitionally connected to the major. In Syllogism XIV, for instance, the definitional 
connection between coagulation of sap and deciduousness makes the major premise ‘immediate’.226 
Nevertheless, the relation between coagulation of sap and broad-leaved tree in the minor premise remains 
demonstrable. Therefore, in a complete demonstration, this branch of the demonstration would 
go on until it reaches a middle term ‘immediately’ connected to broad-leaved tree, i.e. the of 
broad-leaved tree. Otherwise, the demonstration would proceed ad infinitum, since it would always 
                                                 
226 This result follow if we apply to the deciduous example what Aristotle says about the syllogism of the lunar eclipse 
in APo II 8, 93a 35-36. 
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contain at least one demonstrable premise (as we have seen in Chapter 3). If this is how a complete 
demonstration of the phenomenon of deciduousness should be, the pieces of textual evidence in 
favour of the A- and the S-Model are not incompatible, but complementary.227 
The same pattern holds true mutatis mutandis for other examples. In the major premise 
of Syllogism VIII, thunder is said to follow the causal part of its definition, namely, extinction of fire. 
The minor premise, in turn, introduces a new demonstrandum: why do clouds undergo extinction of 
fire? Extinction of fire is what explains why thunder holds of clouds ‘non-incidentally’, i.e. why there is 
a regular connection between thunder and clouds. However, this could hardly be the case if extinction 
of fire were ‘incidentally’ connected to clouds. Thus, it would not be surprising if the nature of clouds 
were what directly or indirectly explains why, under certain conditions, fire is regularly extinguished 
in them. In other of Aristotle’s favourite examples, the occurrence of the lunar eclipse in the moon is 
explained by the middle term earth screening (see APo II 8, 93b 3-7). Whereas the connection between 
eclipse and earth screening (the causal part of its definition) is ‘immediate’ (93a 35-36), the link between 
earth screening and moon, on the other hand, requires further explanation. According to Aristotle’s 
cosmology, having the earth interposed between it and the sun is due to the location of the moon 
in the system of celestial spheres combined with its natural movement, which the philosopher 
would probably take either as essential to the moon or as features following from its essence. 
Finally, a combination of the A- and the S-Model is especially attractive in contexts of 
weak homonymy. In the major premise of Syllogism XII, for instance, the middle term absence of 
bile and the major longevity (which here stands for Q-longevity) are definitionally connected, whereas 
the connection between absence of bile and quadrupeds requires further premises in order to be fully 
understood. According to Aristotle, bile is a residue of impure blood that affects the conditions of 
the liver, which is a vital organ to quadrupeds in virtue of their being essentially blooded animals.228 
Therefore, in an extended version of Syllogism XII, absence of bile in quadrupeds may be 
explained, directly or indirectly, by one or more of their essential features. 
This new perspective also corroborates our analysis of the intensional aspect of 
primary-universality. As we have seen, a disjunction of all deciduous trees (‘everything that is vine 
or fig trees or oak ....’), despite covering (extensionally) the desired domain, would not work 
(intensionally) as a minor term in a primary-universal demonstration. The reason is the following: 
the essence or way of being on which the essence of deciduousness depends is the one picked up by the 
definition of broad-leaved tree. In other words, what ultimately explains why coagulation of the sap 
                                                 
227 This solution has been recently defended, with different arguments, by David Bronstein (2016a, pp. 48-51). 
228 PA IV 2, 677a 30-677b 10. In this passage, Aristotle mentions very specific kinds of quadrupeds (and also dolphins). 
On the inadequacy of Aristotle’s example, see n. 198 above. Nevertheless, we believe the philosophical point we 
attribute to him remains solid.  
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occurs to all deciduous trees is the essence displayed by a definition whose definiendum is neither 
‘vine’ nor an exhausting disjunctive term, but ‘broad-leaved tree’. For the same reason, we cannot 
explain why ‘all isosceles triangles have 2R’ with the definition of 2R as the middle term without 
first subsuming ‘isosceles triangle’ to the wider term ‘triangle.’ ‘Triangle’ is the sole term apt to 
occur as subject in the primary-universal demonstrandum because what is part of the demonstration 
of the 2R-theorem is the definition of triangle, not the definition of any of its subspecies. 
Ferejohn (2013, p. 151) rejects this kind of conciliatory solution on the grounds that it 
does not get support from Aristotle’s texts. He argues that the philosopher never combines 
Syllogisms XIV and XV to formulate a complete demonstration, and this is what we would expect 
him to do if the S-Model and the A-Model were complementary to each other. However, Aristotle’s 
aim in APo II 16-17 is to deal with problem (1), whose formulation and solution is under the 
influence of what can be taken as the main topic of APo II: the isomorphism between definitions 
and syllogistic demonstrations. Aristotle’s favourite examples of this phenomenon are attributes or 
processes such as thunder, eclipse, and deciduousness. For that reason, the essence of attributes is 
under the spotlight, which explains why the A-Model stands out in comparison to the S-Model. 
Problem (2), on the other hand, does not seem to bother Aristotle, which suggests he endorsed 
both models as parts of the same coherent doctrine. We have tried to show how his own solution 
to problem (1) leads to the same result. 
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CHAPTER 6 
COMING TO KNOW THE ESSENCE OF SUBJECTS  
 
 
 
 
 
6.1 – The Essence of Subject-Kinds: An Exception? 
The different aspects of Aristotle’s theory we have discussed in Chapters 3, 4, and 5 
point to the same result: the S-Model and the A-Model are not antagonistic patterns of explanation; 
actually, the philosopher seems to endorse both of them as parts of the same coherent doctrine. 
The ‘primary middle term’ of P belonging to S – let it be ‘M’ – is the causal part of the definition 
of P (following the A-Model). However, the causal-definitional relation between M and P does not 
take place independently of S being what it is, since the identity of demonstrable attributes is 
partially fixed by their proper subjects – as becomes clear once we examine, for instance, cases of 
homonymy. The consistency and regularity that make P a demonstrable attribute of S (and, 
therefore, a genuine kind) depends on there being a more or less close connection between M (the 
causal part of the definition of P) and the essence of S, which will appear as a middle term at some 
point of the demonstration (in accordance with the S-Model). Consequently, a scientist does not 
have scientific knowledge of S being P – at least, not in the full sense of the term – if she does not 
know the essence of S. But how do scientists come to know the essence of subjects? 
It is time for us to address a problem we raised in Chapter 2. As we have seen, 
according to APo II 1-2, scientists investigate four kinds of question: 
132 
 
(Q1) Does P belong to S? 
(Q2) Why does P belong to S? 
(Q3) Does S exist? 
(Q4) What is S? 
Questions Q1 and Q2 concern the occurrence of an attribute in a given subject, whereas questions 
Q3 and Q4 concern the existence and essence of subject-kinds. In the order of inquiry, Q1 and Q3 
are prior to Q2 and Q4, respectively. We cannot investigate why S is P (Q2) unless we already know 
that S is P (Q1). Similarly, it is not possible to determine what S is (Q4) without knowing in advance 
that S exists (Q3). 
We have argued that the distinction between subjects and attributes in APo II 1-2 
should not make us think that questions about existence (like Q3) and essence (like Q4) are 
exclusive to subjects. Actually, the existence of an attribute P can be analysed as a predicative 
relation between P and its subject S. The essence of P, in turn, can be identified with the reason 
why S is P – as we can see in our T7, APo II 2, 90a 14-18. In addition, answering the question about 
the existence of P, understood as a question about its presence in a subject S, is the same as 
determining whether there is a middle term M explaining why P belongs to S. Finding out what P 
is, on the other hand, is the same as identifying M: 
(Q1) Does P holds of S? 
≡ 
(Q3.1) Does P exist? 
≡ 
(Q1*) Is there an M such that PaM, MaS ⊦ PaS & M is the reason why PaS? 
(Q2) Why does P holds of S?  
≡ 
(Q4.1) What is P? 
≡ 
(Q2*) What is M such that PaM, MaS ⊦ PaS & M is the reason why PaS? 
These equivalencies reflect two correlate theses we have attributed to Aristotle. The 
first of them is the interdependence between noetic and demonstrative knowledge, as argued in 
Chapter 1. Full-fledged demonstrative knowledge of a conclusion c requires noetic knowledge of 
the immediate premises p1 … pn from which c is demonstrated. On the other hand, acquiring 
noetic knowledge itself requires some demonstrative practice: to know a first principle pi as such 
involves realizing (i) that there are propositions (such as c) that can be demonstrated from pi and 
(ii) that there are no propositions from which pi can be demonstrated. The second thesis is closely 
related to the first: the interdependence between defining and explaining, as discussed in Chapter 
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2. Definitions (objects of noetic knowledge) become known as such insofar as they are seen as 
explanatory of demonstrable propositions (objects of demonstrative knowledge). After all, 
definitions are ‘revealed’ by demonstrations (APo II 8, 93b 17-18) and in fact are described by 
Aristotle as demonstrative syllogisms ‘differing in arrangement’ (APo II 10, 94a 2). The 
interdependence between noetic and demonstrative knowledge, defining and explaining, helps us 
understand the equivalencies between Q1, Q3.1, and Q1*, on one hand, and Q2, Q4.1, and Q2*, 
on the other. Acquiring noetic knowledge of the essence of P requires the ability to explain, in a 
demonstrative syllogism, why P belongs to its subject S. For instance, we grasp the complete 
definition of thunder – thunder is(df.) noise of fire being extinguished in the clouds (APo II 10, 94
a 
5-6) – when we discover a middle term that can be used to explain why the noise we call ‘thunder’ 
is predicated of clouds. To know that there is such a middle term (Q1*) is to know that ‘thunder 
holds of clouds’ is a demonstrable proposition (Q1) and that thunder exists as a genuine kind (Q3.1) 
– i.e. that it happens with the kind of regularity that implies an underlying causal factor. When we 
find out what that causal factor is (Q2*), we grasp at once the reason why thunder occurs to the 
clouds (Q2) and the essence of thunder (Q4.1). 
What about subjects? How should scientists investigate Q3 and Q4? One reaction to 
this question is to affirm that subjects and their essences constitute an exception to the 
interdependence between defining and explaining. The following passage may suggest that 
Aristotle himself admits such an exception: 
[T43] 
Of some things there is something else which is their explanation, of 
others there is not. Hence it is plain that in some cases what something is 
is immediate and a principle in relation to which we must assume or make 
clear in some other way both that the thing exists and what it is. 
(Arithmeticians do this: they suppose both what a unit is and that there 
are units.) But in cases where there is a middle term and something else is 
explanatory of its being, you can – as we have said – show what something 
is through a demonstration without demonstrating what it is [APo II 9, 93b 
21-28; Barnes 1993, with changes].229 
Here Aristotle affirms that only the essence of things ‘whose cause is something else’ is made clear 
through demonstrations. Some interpreters claim that T43 is meant to show that the 
                                                 
229 Deleting Ross’ comma in 93b 22, which implies that only definitions of things ‘whose cause is not something else’ 
are immediate and principles. 
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interdependence between defining and explaining holds good for the essence of processes and 
attributes such as thunder and eclipse, but not the essence of substances such as human beings or 
broad-leaved plants.230 David Bronstein, for instance, argues that the essence of attributes is 
‘causally complex’, having a structure of the form ‘A holds of C because of B’ – e.g. the being of 
thunder can be reduced to a predicative relation between two items (noise and clouds) caused by a 
middle term (extinction of fire).231 Because of their causally complex structure, the essences of 
attributes are isomorphic to syllogistic demonstrations. On the other hand, claims the author, the 
essences of subjects are ‘causally simple’. Their structure is a combination of genus plus 
differentiae, which can be known by division and induction independently of explanatory 
connections between the elements in the definiens.232 
I believe this interpretation, although attractive, is mistaken for the following reasons. 
First, T43 is not conclusive on the issue. It is far from clear that Aristotle is interested in the 
distinction between subjects and attributes in this passage. Strictly speaking, the distinction is 
between items whose definition is isomorphic to a demonstration, because their cause is ‘something 
else’, and items whose definitions are ‘assumed’ (the verb in 93b 23 is ‘ ’) or ‘made clear in 
some other way’. It is not clear what it means to say that an item has ‘something else’ as its cause. 
But it is even less clear that Aristotle’s intention is to affirm that attributes have ‘something else’ as 
their causes, while substances do not. As Ross (1949, p. 633) notes, the example of something 
whose cause is not ‘something else’ – the unit ( ) – is not strictly speaking a substance. 
Moreover, we do not have an example of something whose cause is ‘something else’ in APo II 9. 
Even if we take the main examples from the previous chapter (thunder and eclipse) as beings whose 
cause is ‘something else’ (which I think is correct), nothing in the text suggests that this class of 
things does not include substances. Quite on the contrary, if we are allowed to take the examples 
from APo II 8 into account, we must notice that ‘human’ and ‘soul’ are also examples found in the 
chapter (93a 22-24), which suggests that the isomorphism between definition and demonstration 
applies to substances as well.233 
However, the main reason to reject the view that the essence of subjects constitute an 
exception to the interdependence between defining and explaining comes from APo II 2. As we 
have seen in Chapter 2, Aristotle affirms that Q3 – Does S exist? – and Q4 – What is S? – are also 
answered by investigating a middle term (APo II 2, 89b 37-90a5). What does it mean if not that the 
                                                 
230 Ross (1949, p. 633); Bronstein (2016a, pp. 131-143). 
231 See Bronstein (2016a), Chapter 7, 9, and 10. 
232 See Bronstein (2016a), Chapter 9 and 12. Nevertheless, Bronstein claims that the knowledge of a definition, if 
acquired only by induction and division, is ‘non-noetic’. According to the author, we only have noetic knowledge of 
the definition of a subject-kind when we are able to use its definition to explain its demonstrable attributes.   
233 See Peramatzis (2011, p. 11). In addition, I shall argue that even in the case of items whose cause is not something 
else (e.g. unit) there is a sense in which defining and explaining remain interdependent practices. 
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essence of subjects are somehow revealed by demonstrations? Nevertheless, as we have discussed, 
one could argue that Aristotle’s own theory gives him reasons to exclude subjects from the picture 
advanced in APo II 2: the existence of subjects cannot be reduced to their presence in a more basic 
entity; if the existence of S cannot be spelled out in terms of a predication in which S occurs as an 
attribute, it would not make sense to seek for a middle term when the essence of S is being 
investigated. However, this is not Aristotle’s view. In Metaph. VII 17 and VIII 2-4, the philosopher 
explicitly claims that the model presented in the APo also works for subject-kinds. Before we see 
how Aristotle applies his model to substances as well, let us address the theoretical resource that 
allowed him to do so: the hylomorphic analysis. 
6.2 – The Hylomorphic Analysis 
In the Categories, Aristotle affirms that one of the most distinctive features of particular 
substances is their capacity to receive contraries while remaining numerically one: one and the same 
man can be pale at one time and dark at another, and hot and cold, and good and bad etc. (Cat. 5, 
4a 10-22). Already here we can have a rough idea of how Aristotle thinks change should be 
described: a subject x which is not-F (at instant t1) becomes F (at instant t2). However, the issue 
receives the careful discussion it deserves only in Ph. I 6-8. Aristotle affirms that the process of an 
unmusical man becoming musical can be described in the following ways (Ph. I 7, 189b 35-190a 1): 
1. The man comes to be musical.  
2. The unmusical comes to be musical.  
3. The unmusical man comes to be a musical man. 
The three sentences contain one subject- and one predicate-term. In sentence 1, the subject-term 
refers to the subject of change, whereas in 2 and 3 it denotes the terminus a quo, the state of the 
subject before the process begins. In all of them, the predicate-term captures the terminus ad quem, 
the final result of the process.234 The distinction between these three sentence-patterns relies on 
the use of ‘simple’ terms ( ), such as ‘man’ and ‘musical’, or ‘compound’ ( ) 
expressions, such as ‘musical man’.235 The fact that each of them contains one subject- (simple or 
complex) and one predicate-term (simple or complex) should not let us think that there are only 
two items involved in the process. In this context, the expressions ‘the man’ and ‘the unmusical’ 
should not be interpreted as definite descriptions refereeing to one single being. Actually, these 
expressions designate two different entities: a substance (the man) and what has been described as 
                                                 
234 For this vocabulary and its use in this context, see Charlton (1992); Angioni (2007c, pp. 58-64; 2009).  
235 Ph. I 7, 189b 33; 190a 1-5. See Angioni (2009, pp. 145-16).  
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an ‘accidental compound’ (man plus unmusicality).236 Although ‘numerically one’, these entities are 
different ‘in form’ (190a 16). In other words, ‘the being of man is not the same as the being of the 
unmusical’ (190a 17), which means they have different essences and are therefore defined in 
different ways (Ph. I 7, 190a 15-16).237 Thus, the man and the unmusical (the latter being understood 
as accidental compound) are the same only ‘by accident’: even if, in a particular context such as the 
initial state of the change, we cannot count them as two discrete wholes (which makes them, in a 
sense, ‘numerically one’), they do not share all properties in all contexts.238 In fact, Aristotle wants 
to stress one specific difference between them: the man persists through the change, while the 
unmusical do not – i.e. by the time the man becomes musical, the accidental compound man-plus-
unmusicality ceases to exist.239 As a result, three elements are involved in the process: the man, the 
musical and the unmusical. In fact, this is the main outcome of Aristotle’s discussion in Ph. I: any 
change involves a subject that persists through the process and a pair of contrary attributes, these 
three items being the ‘principles’ ( ) of nature and natural change. 
Although the example discussed in the first half of in Ph. I 7 is a case of what Aristotle 
calls ‘alteration’ ( ), the philosopher makes it clear that this formula captures what is 
common to all kinds of change (Ph. I 7, 189b 30-32). However, substances cannot play the role of 
subject in all of them. Suppose we are interested in describing a particular substance coming into 
being or going out of existence. In that case, the underlying subject x cannot be the substance itself, 
nor can the contraries F and not-F be the substance’s existence and nonexistence, for the 
underlying subject must persist through the process (see Lewis 2009, p. 163). In the second half of 
Ph. I 7 (190b 1 ff.), Aristotle addresses the issue by comparing natural substances to products of 
craft. When a bronze statue is produced, the bronze – which is present at the beginning of the 
process, persists through it, and constitutes its product – is called ‘matter’ ( ); the final 
arrangement that makes the statue what it is is the ‘form’ ( ); at last, there is the ‘absence of 
form’ ( ), the ‘shapelessness’ ( ) and ‘disarray’ ( ) found in the bronze 
before the process begins (Ph. I 7, 190b 13-17). 
                                                 
236 For a detailed defence of this reading, see Lewis (1982). While Lewis argues that this is Aristotle’s canonical use of 
expressions such as ‘the unmusical [thing]’, I prefer to restrict my claim to the context of Ph. I 7 – although I recognize 
that this is not the only place where these expressions refer to an accidental compound (substance plus accident). 
237 Cf. Lewis (1982, pp. 15-18).  
238 See Top. I 7, 103ª 23-32. For a comparison between accidental sameness and sameness ‘in essence’ and ‘being’, see 
SE I 24, 179a 37-39; Ph. III 3, 202b 14-16. See Code (1976, p. 364), who argues that ‘to say that the man and the 
unmusical are one in number at any given time is that the latter is a spatio-temporal segment of the former and they 
are taking up the same space right now – or to use Aristotle’s phrase (190b 18-19, 26-27, 192a 31-32), the one coincides 
in the other.’ 
239 See Ph. I 7, 190ª 9-21. Aristotle affirms that both the accidental compound and the contrary attribute (unmusicality) 
go out of existence (190ª 11-13, 18-20). 
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One may think that this picture does not apply to natural substances as easily as we 
may think at first sight. We know the form is the factor that, once instantiated in a given portion 
of matter, makes the resulting hylomorphic compound what it is. However, Charlton (1992, p. 76) 
points out that we can describe a dog coming into being either (i) as a seed (matter) being fertilized 
in a certain way (form) or (ii) as flesh, bones, etc. (matter) being animated or having a certain kind 
of life (form). In both cases, the matter does not seem to persist through the process.240 If we 
follow the first alternative, the seed is not a constituent element of the final product.241 In the 
second alternative, flesh, bones and organs are not given at the beginning of the process. Therefore, 
the matter cannot be at the same time the item from which and of which the compound is made. 
However, in Ph. I 7, 190a 5-13, Aristotle says that a natural way to rephrase sentence 2 
– ‘the unmusical comes to be musical’ – is the following:  
2*. The musical comes to be from ( ) the unmusical. 
On the other hand, sentence 1 – ‘the man comes to be musical’ – cannot be translated as:  
1*. The musical comes to be from ( ) the man. 
In other words, the preposition ‘ ’ should be reserved for the non-persisting element, i.e. the 
unmusical (Ph. I 7, 190a 7-13). Nevertheless, in Ph. I 7, 190a 21-30, Aristotle admits that in some 
changes the product is said to come from the persisting element. That is, in natural language, we can 
say things such as: 
4. The statue comes to be from ( ) bronze. 
Commenting on the passage, Alan Code (1976, pp. 359-362) persuasively argues that Aristotle 
wants to avoid the following confusion: because the statue is said to come from the bronze in the 
same way as the musical is said to come from the unmusical, we may think that the bronze, like the 
unmusical, does not persist through the process.242 Aristotle explains that sentences like 4 are 
acceptable in natural language only because, in these cases, the non-persisting element is ‘nameless’ 
– e.g. there is no name for the configuration of the bronze before it receives the form of a statue 
(see Metaph. VII 7, 1033a 5-23). However, we should avoid using these sentences ‘without 
qualification’243 precisely because they give the wrong impression that the matter does not persist 
through the process described. Therefore, when Aristotle says that an animal comes to be from ( ) 
                                                 
240 For this and other related difficulties, see Ackrill (1997, pp. 169-178). See also Angioni (2007c, pp. 64-67). 
241 See GA II 3, 736a 24 ff. 
242 See Furth (1988, p. 217); Angioni (2009, pp. 151-155). 
243 Metaph. VII 7, 1033a 19-22. The ‘qualification’ required, explains Code (1976, p. 363), is that the sense of ‘from’ 
used in 4 does not imply that the item ‘from which’ the final product comes perishes in the process.  
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the seed (Ph. I 7, 190b 4-5), he must be using the preposition in the canonical sense. If so, we can 
rule out Charlton’s option (i): even if the seed initiates the process of a man coming into being, we 
cannot say that the seed is the man’s ‘matter’, and hence we should not expect it to be one of his 
constituent elements.244 
On the other hand, how could we say that flesh, bones, organs etc. are the man’s 
‘matter’ – Charlton’s option (ii) – if they are not given before the process begins? Interpreters solve 
this difficulty by unpacking the steps involved. Alan Code summarizes Aristotle’s account of the 
generation of human beings: 
What a man is made of is flesh and bones since the primary nutrient (the 
menstrual fluid) is converted into flesh upon fertilization, the flesh is 
converted into a heart, and then through the successive stages of 
development and growth explained in the second book of the Generation of 
Animals a human being finally comes to be [Code 1976, p. 364].245 
Since the generation of a man is complex, we should not expect all his material constituents to be 
present at the very first stage of the process. Nevertheless, the account of change proposed at Ph. 
I 7 remains solid. At each step, it is possible to identify a pair of contrary attributes and an 
underlying matter that persists through it. However, as Angioni (2007c, pp. 68-87) points out, one 
thing is to be an underlying matter at some point of the process, and another is to be the ‘proper’ 
matter of the final product.246 All the different portions of matter that suffer alterations during the 
generation of a man should be taken into account when the process itself is the explanandum. 
However, only the matter that underlies its final stage and remains as a constituent element of its 
product is useful to explain the basic properties of the generated human being. After all, as we shall 
see in the next section, to find out the cause in virtue of which this ‘proper’ matter constitute a 
human being is the same as discovering the essence of human beings. 
6.3 – The Analytics-model in the Metaphysics 
In this section, we shall analyse how Aristotle, in the Metaphysics, applies to subject-
kinds the model developed in the Analytics. However, before we start, a couple of comments on 
our strategy might be required. One could object that the idea that sensible substances can be 
analysed as compounds of form and matter is not present in the APo and was developed in later 
treatises such as the Physics and the Metaphysics. If so, we should not rely on Aristotle’s 
                                                 
244 Code (1976, pp. 364-366) quotes GA I 18, 724ª36 ff. to argue that when Aristotle says that a man comes to be from 
semen or an embryo (see Ph. I 7, 190b 4-5), he means that this is his efficient cause. See also Metaph. VIII 4, 1044a 35. 
245 See also Furth (1988, pp. 111-113). 
246 ‘Not fire or earth, but the matter proper to the thing’ (Metaph. VII 4, 1044b 1-2).  
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hylomorphism to sustain that the essence of substances are also known through demonstrations.247 
However, why should we think that the only reason Aristotle had for not presenting his 
hylomorphism in detail in the APo is that his theory was not completely developed by the time the 
treatise was written? The theses advanced in the APo are meant to apply to all sciences 
independently of their particular domains. Hence, the peculiarities of physical objects should not 
affect Aristotle’s main claims in the treatise. Of course, that does not mean Aristotle is never 
interested in topics that are characteristic of natural sciences. In APo II 11, for instance, he discusses 
one of the best-known doctrines of his philosophy of nature: there are four canonical types of 
explanation in the natural world, the material, the formal, the efficient, and the final.248 All this 
shows that even if Aristotle is not primarily concerned with physical phenomena in the APo – 
which explains why we do not find there a detailed defence of his hylomorphism –, there is no 
reason to doubt that he already had consolidated views on the metaphysical structure of the natural 
world. More importantly, there is a simpler reason to believe that at least some aspects of Aristotle’s 
hylomorphism are assumed in the APo: such a hypothesis has a greater explanatory power than its 
alternative. As explicitly stated in APo II 2, the essence of subjects is discovered when a middle 
term is identified. In addition, as we have seen, two of the examples provided in APo II 8 are 
substances (93a 22-24), which suggests that defining and explaining are interdependent practices 
even for subject-kinds. If it was not for all that, one could say that the reappearance of the 
‘interdependence’ thesis in Metaph. VII 17 and VIII 2-4 should be ignored by interpreters of the 
APo. However, given this scenario, the fact that Aristotle actually uses the Analytics-model in the 
Metaphysics provides further corroboration for our strategy instead of undermining it. 
That being said, we can turn to Metaph. VII 17. As we have seen, to ask whether the 
kind thunder exists is the same as asking whether a certain noise occurs in the clouds. However, 
this question should not be interpreted as concerning an episodic event. Rather, what is being 
sought is the existence of a middle term: does this sound occur in the clouds with the kind of 
regularity that implies the agency of the same underlying cause? Thus, when a scientist investigates 
the existence of thunder, she is not interested in whether ‘thunder’ is an empty term or not. 
Actually, what is at stake is whether the kind of noise we call ‘thunder’ can be treated as a genuine, 
definable kind. If the scientist finds what that middle term is, she will have found the factor that 
makes the thunder the kind of thing it is. Could we ask the same question about subject-kinds? 
                                                 
247 See, for instance, Bronstein (2016a, p. 101) 
248 See Ph. II 3; II 7; Metaph. I 3; V 2. The only kind of explanation listed in APo II 11 which is not clearly identified 
with one of the four causes is the first one (94a 24-35), although the natural candidate is the material cause. See Ross 
(1949, pp. 638-639). 
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Does it makes sense to ask why a man is what he is? According to Aristotle, it depends on how we 
formulate the problem: 
[T44] 
[…] 
When one asks why, one is always asking why one thing belongs to 
another. For to ask why a musical man is a musical man is either, as we 
have just said, to ask why a man is musical, or it is something else. But to 
ask why a thing is itself is to ask nothing at all. […] However, one could 
ask why a man is such a kind of animal. It is clear that this is not to ask 
why one who is a man is a man. So what one asks is why it is that one 
thing belongs to another. (It must be evident that it does belong, otherwise 
nothing is being asked at all.) Thus one may ask why it thunders, for this 
is to ask why a noise is produced in the clouds, and in this way what is 
sought is one thing predicated of another. And one may ask why these 
things here (e.g. bricks and stones) are a house [Metaph. VII 17, 1041a 10-
27 Bostock 1994, with changes]. 
Aristotle’s point is the following. At first sight, it might seem useless to ask questions such as: 
(i) Why is the musical musical? (1041a 17-18) 
(ii) Why is this man a man? (1041a 18) 
These questions may be interpreted as expressing trivialities, which would make them illegitimate 
explananda (see Lewis 1985, p. 69). One may think that the issue can be solved by appealing to the 
semantic rules Aristotle formulates in APo I 22, discussed in Chapter 3. According to these rules, 
question (i) is ill-formed. The referring expression ‘the musical’ does not describe the denoted 
object appropriately. For Aristotle, the grammatical subject must signify just what the metaphysical 
subject is ( ), and whatever is musical is not essentially musical. Thus, what we want to ask 
is why (e.g.) a certain (musical) man is musical (1041a 12). If we comply with Aristotle’s rules, a 
non-trivial version of question (i) can be provided (1041a 13-14), one which asks ‘why one thing 
belongs to another’ (1041a 11; 25-26): 
(i*) Why is this man musical? (1041a 13-14) 
Although effective for question (i), this analysis would not work for question (ii), since 
the grammatical subject ‘this man’ captures just what the metaphysical subject is. In T44, Aristotle 
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is probably suggesting the same strategy for reinterpreting both questions. If so, there must be 
another way of finding a non-trivial version of question (i), one which also works for question (ii). 
As we have argued in the previous section, in some contexts – especially when notions like form 
and matter are at stake – an expression such as ‘the musical’ refers not to a particular substance 
which happens to be musical, but to an accidental compound, i.e. the combination of a subject 
(man) and an attribute (musicality). Therefore, if we want to know why a musical man is as he is 
(namely, a musical man), we just need to articulate its constituent parts and ask why they are 
connected as they are. If ‘cloak’ is the name given to the accidental compound man-plus-
musicality249, to ask why a cloak is a cloak – i.e. why the musical (man) is (a) musical (man), like in 
question (i) – is the same as asking why the man is musical – as we have in question (i*).250 Since 
the hylomorphic analysis allows Aristotle to treat man as a compound of form and matter, he can 
reinterpret question (ii) as follows: 
(ii*) Why is this body with this feature a man? (1041b 6-7) 
Let us discuss Aristotle’s argument in detail. At the end of T44, the philosopher applies 
his strategy to processes and artefacts. To investigate why the musical (man) is musical is the same 
as asking why the components of the complex man-plus-musicality are connected. Likewise, we 
can investigate why thunder is what it is by seeking the cause in virtue of which its constituent 
elements (noise and clouds) are related as they are.251 Here, Aristotle is reaffirming the isomorphism 
between demonstrations and definitions, as argued in the APo. As we have seen, the essence of 
thunder is revealed by our Syllogism VIII, which is isomorphic to the definition of thunder: 
Syllogism VIII: 
Noise holds of fire being extinguished, fire being extinguished holds of clouds 
Noise holds of clouds 
 
Def. (Thunder): 
Thunder is(df.) noise of fire being extinguished in the clouds (APo II 10, 94
a 5-6). 
Similarly, a house can be described as a connection between a set of materials (bricks, 
stones etc.) and a certain structure. Thus, if we want to investigate why a house is a house, what we 
seek is the reason why these bricks, stones etc. are arranged in this way (Metaph. VII 17, 1041a 26-
27; b5-6). The example of an artefact is not introduced without reason. What fixes the identity of 
                                                 
249 As Aristotle does with ‘pale man’ in Metaph. VII 4, 1029b 22-1030a 17.  
250 In general lines, I am following the interpretation proposed by Angioni (2008, p. 333). 
251 See the examples of eclipse and sleep in Metaph. VIII 4, 1044b 8-20. 
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processes such as thunder and eclipse is an efficient cause, whereas what makes a house or a bed 
what they are is a final cause (Metaph. VII 7, 1041a 27-30). What makes something a house is its 
being structured so as to protect human beings, their belongings etc. (Metaph. VIII 2, 1043a 14-18). 
If so, the syllogism and the definition that display the essence of a house would run as follows:252 
Syllogism XVI: 
This structure holds of protecting etc., protecting etc. holds of these bricks and stones 
This structure holds of these bricks and stones 
Def. (House): 
House is(df.) a structure made of bricks, stones etc. for the sake of protecting human beings, their belongings 
etc. 
As the reader of Metaph. VII 17 can expect at this stage of the argument, the essence 
of human beings can be grasped through the same explanatory practice that reveals the essence of 
process-types and artefacts: 
[T45]
One is particularly liable not to recognize what is being sought in things 
not predicated one of another, as when it is asked what a man is, because 
the question is simply put and does not distinguish these things as being 
that. But we must articulate our question before we ask it, otherwise there 
would be something common between investigating something and 
nothing. And since the existence of the thing must already be given it is 
clear that the question may be ‘Why are these things here a house?’ (and 
the answer is ‘because what being is for a house belongs to them’), or it 
may be ‘Why is this thing here a man?’, or ‘Why is this body with this 
feature a man?’ So what is sought is the cause by which the matter is so-
and-so, i.e. the form [Metaph. VII 17, 1041a 32-b8; Bostock 1994, with 
changes]. 
For Aristotle, the essence of natural substances is, like the essence of artefacts, specified in 
teleological terms. The parts of the human body and its structure as a whole are for the sake of a 
certain kind of life, a soul of a certain type. To spell out what that soul is is the same as specifying 
what it is to be ( ) a human being (Metaph. VII 10, 1035b 14-22). Since the interdependence 
                                                 
252 See Charles (2000, pp. 286-290); Peramatzis (2013, p. 303). 
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between defining and explaining holds good for substance-kinds, we can determine the essence of 
human beings by specifying (syllogistically) the reason why the human body is structured as it is: 
Syllogism XVII: 
This arrangement holds of being rational soul, being a rational soul holds of this type of body 
This arrangement holds of this type of body. 
Correspondingly, the definition of human being would run as follows: 
Def. (Human Being): 
Human being is(df.) a body arranged in such-and-such way for the sake of being a rational soul.
253 
If at least part of the ideas spelled out in Metaph. VII 17 and VIII 2-4 are implied in 
APo II, it becomes easier to understand why Aristotle affirms that the essence of a subject S is 
discovered when the cause of S’s being  is identified. However, according to T43, the essence 
of S can be revealed by a demonstration only if ‘its cause is something else’ ( ). 
Therefore, if the essence of natural substances becomes known through demonstrations, their 
‘cause’ must be something distinct from them. But what does this mean? 
We can surely affirm that the cause that makes the thunder what it is is not the same 
thing as the thunder itself. A thunder is a certain kind of noise whereas its ‘cause’ is fire being 
extinguished in the clouds. The distinction between thunder and the cause of its ‘being’ is what 
enables us to decompose its essence in three basic elements and articulate them in a syllogistic 
structure: a certain noise (major term) belongs to the clouds (minor term) in virtue of fire being 
extinguished (middle term). Similarly, composite substances are not identical to the cause of their 
‘being’ (namely, their form). Human beings are compounds of body and soul, not souls. However, 
in Metaph. VIII 3, Aristotle warns us that we may not realize this fact due to a linguistic 
phenomenon: 
[T46] 
One must bear in mind that sometimes it is not clear whether a word 
signifies the compound substance or the actuality and shape; for instance 
whether ‘house’ is a sign for the compound, a shelter made from bricks 
and stones placed thus, or for the actuality and form, a shelter, and 
similarly whether ‘line’ means duality in length or just duality, whether 
‘animal’ means a soul in a body or just a soul (for the soul is the substance 
                                                 
253 See Charles (2000; 2010b, pp. 268-328); Peramatzis (2011, pp. 180-200; 2013, pp. 303-305). 
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and actuality of a certain kind of body) [Metaph. VIII 3, 1043a 29-36; 
Bostock 1994, with changes]. 
The fact that a word designating a natural substance may also be used to refer to its soul should 
not prevent us from distinguishing the two things. Actually, Aristotle explicitly distinguishes one 
thing from the other few lines after T46: ‘a man’, he says, ‘is not the same as what-being-is-for-a-
man, unless the soul too is to be called man’ (Metaph. VIII 3, 1043b 3-4). In some contexts, the 
philosopher uses the locution ‘what being is for S’ (  + noun in the dative + ) to refer the 
most basic component of S’s essence, namely, its form. In T45, for instance, Aristotle affirms that 
bricks, stones etc. become a house when ‘what being is for a house belongs to them’ (
), i.e. when the form of a house inheres in its material constituents (minor premise in 
Syllogism XVI). Similarly, in 1043b 3-4, what-being-is-for-a-man is identified with the human soul. 
Thus, to distinguish the man from what-being-is-for-a-man is the same as distinguishing the 
hylomorphic compound from its form. 
Again, nothing in T43 should make us think that the essence of substances are not 
discovered through demonstrations.254 The passage does not affirm or imply that the ‘cause’ of 
natural substances being what they are is identical to them. Actually, as we have just seen, the 
Metaphysics provides us with evidence to the contrary. In the absence of proof that Aristotle changed 
his mind, we have good reason to believe that the essence of subject-kinds become known through 
the explanatory practices described in APo II 8 and reaffirmed in Metaph. VII-VIII. 
The example of an ‘item whose cause is not something else’ offered in T43 is ‘unit’, 
which suggests that the exceptions to the method proposed in APo II 8 are conceptually simple 
notions, and not hylomorphic compounds. However, there is a sense in which the interdependence 
between defining and explaining remains solid even for definienda such as ‘unit’. Even if the 
definition of unit is not isomorphic to a demonstrative syllogism, its status as a first principle 
depends on its being used to explain arithmetic theorems. This conclusion can be drawn from a 
famous passage in De An. I 1: 
[T47]
…
…
   
                                                 
254 Of course, that does not mean that other methods like induction and division are not useful for investigating the 
essence of subjects (or even the essence of attributes). Perhaps, these practices reveal part of their essences (namely, 
the one appearing in nominal definitions, based on which the scientist starts its inquiry). For another view, see 
Bronstein (2016a, pp. 189-222). 
145 
 
It seems that not only is ascertaining what a thing is useful for considering 
the causes of the properties of substances […], but also, conversely, that 
ascertaining the properties of a substance plays a great part in knowing 
what a thing is. […] For the principle of every demonstration is what a 
thing is, so that those definitions which do not lead us to ascertain the 
properties of a substance, or at least to know them in a ready sort of way, 
will clearly and in every case be dialectical and vacuous [De An. I 1, 402b 
16-403a 2; Shields 2016, with changes]. 
In this passage, Aristotle is relying on the claim that what characterizes the essence of a substance 
– in comparison to other necessary (but non-essential) properties – is its being explanatorily basic, 
i.e. their presence in the substance explains the substance’s having other derivative properties, but 
is not explained by any other property the substance may have. Thus, to know the essence of a 
substance as the essence of that substance involves realizing that it explains the substance’s demonstrable 
attributes. Similarly, to recognize propositions as an authentic definitions – and not merely ‘dialectical 
and vacuous’ – involves realizing that certain phenomena can be demonstrated from them.  
This result is in accordance with our account of the relation between demonstrative 
knowledge and .  is the cognitive state that knows definitions. Since demonstrations are 
based on definitions, demonstrative knowledge is dependent on . However, if we cannot get to 
know a definition independently of the act of demonstrating, it is impossible to have  without 
having demonstrative knowledge. Again, the interdependence of these two kinds of knowledge just 
mirrors the interdependence between defining and explaining. 
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Knowledge ‘without qualification’, the kind of knowledge expert scientists have, 
consists in grasping stable connections between subjects and attributes in the world and explaining 
them from ‘appropriate principles’, i.e. indemonstrable premises that are true, primitive, immediate, 
more familiar than, prior to, and explanatory of the conclusion (APo I 2, 71b 19-22). The possibility 
of relying on indemonstrable principles is what allows scientists to explain phenomena without 
producing circular demonstrations or running the risk of infinite regress. Given this scenario, it is 
understandable that Aristotle has been classified as a foundationalist. However, his foundationalism 
should not be understood as a rationalist theory of epistemic justification, as if the indemonstrable 
principles of science were self-evident propositions acquired by non-inferential procedures. First, 
Aristotelian explanations are not justifications, i.e. they answer questions of the form ‘why is it the 
case that p?’ and not questions such as ‘why do I believe that p?’ Second, his acknowledgement of 
indemonstrable principles amounts to the recognition of essences, understood as ultimate 
explanations. Essences do not become known as such independently of their being used to explain 
scientific problems. Noetic knowledge of indemonstrable principles and demonstrative knowledge 
of explainable facts are therefore interdependent cognitive states in the same way as defining and 
explaining are interdependent scientific practices. 
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Aristotle’s philosophy of science cannot be fully understood unless its ontological 
underpinnings are properly specified. For him, essences are primary explanatory factors. However, 
in every scientific domain, we can distinguish two basic kinds of essence-bearers: subjects and 
demonstrable attributes. Subjects are defined without mentioning a more basic subject in the 
domain, since there is not another being of which they could be predicated that differs in essence 
from them. On the other hand, demonstrable attributes (or per se accidents) cannot be defined 
without specifying the kind of objects in which they inhere. With the distinction between subjects 
and attributes in mind, Aristotle imposes a set of semantical rules on scientific discourse as a way 
of guaranteeing that linguistic predications will capture the corresponding metaphysical 
predications appropriately. These semantical rules are also part of Aristotle’s foundationalist 
project, since they prevent a syllogistic chain of demonstrations from proceeding ad infinitum. 
Notwithstanding the differences between the essence of subjects and the essence of 
attributes, there is room for both of them in demonstrative sciences. The ‘primary’ middle term 
explaining why an attribute belongs to a subject is the causal part of the attribute’s essence. In other 
words, the final and crucial step in a demonstration follows the A-Model. However, if there is a 
stable, regular connection between attribute and subject, the attribute’s essence and the subject 
must be connected in a similar way – after all, the attribute’s ‘way of being’ involves its being 
predicated of that subject. If the demonstrandum is a primary-universal problem, the attribute 
counterpredicates with the subject and belongs to it in virtue of the subject being what it is. That 
is to say, the subject’s essence partially explains why it possess its demonstrable attributes. Thus, it 
is not without reason that Aristotle seems to endorse something along the lines of the S-Model as 
well. 
As it is clear from the examples used in APo II, the essence of attributes are discovered 
through demonstrations. It is not possible to know their essences without having the 
corresponding explanatory syllogism, which turns out to be isomorphic to the attribute’s definition. 
As we have argued, the essence of subjects does not constitute an exception to the 
‘interdependence’ principle. In the Metaphysics, Aristotle explicitly applies the model developed in 
APo II to substance-kinds – in fact, examples of substances are already mentioned, although not 
fully explored, in APo II 8. In addition, we argued that subjects that cannot be analysed as 
compounds of form and matter also have their essences revealed by explanatory practices. The 
essence of an unanalysable subject cannot be recognized as the essence of that subject without its being 
used to explain the subject’s demonstrable attributes. 
It is not exactly surprising that Aristotle uses some of his ontological theses in his 
attempt to formulate general principles about how  should be pursued and 
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expressed. Certainly, other aspects of the relation between Aristotle’s metaphysics and his 
philosophy of science remain to be clarified and further explored. However, we hope we have 
offered a relatively comprehensive reconstruction of the ontological framework associated with his 
theory of demonstration. We should be particularly satisfied if our reader is convinced, among 
other things, that, for Aristotle, the intelligibility of reality depends on there being finite chains of 
explanatory connections in the world and entities whose ‘ways of being’ are associated with one 
another in a hierarchical structure. 
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